Bohannon v. Knapp
Decision Date | 15 April 1925 |
Docket Number | 15907. |
Citation | 127 S.E. 808,33 Ga.App. 702 |
Parties | BOHANNON v. KNAPP. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The verdict was authorized by the evidence. The charge of the court was full, clear, and fair.
Error from City Court of Newnan; W. A. Post, Judge.
Suit by C. B. Knapp against S. J. Bohannon. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
A. H Freeman, of Newnan, for plaintiff in error.
Post & Arnold, of Newnan, for defendant in error.
JENKINS P.J. (after stating the facts as above).
1. While it is the well-settled rule that, "where a conflict occurs between the recitals in a bill of exceptions and the record, the record controls" (Fulton Nat Bank v. Redmond, 33 Ga.App. 122, 125 S.E. 724, 725), yet where a conflict occurs in the certified record itself, as where a judge certifies to having given a specific instruction, and the general charge as also certified and sent up does not contain the language of such excerpt in the instruction embracing the law on the same subject, the record will be reconciled by assuming that both charges were given. Grooms v. Grooms, 141 Ga. 478 (3), 81 S.E. 210. In the instant case it appears manifest to us that the excerpts specifically excepted to, and certified by the judge to be true, constitute true and correct excerpts from the charge as given.
2. The charge as a whole has been carefully read and considered, as well as the particular excerpts excepted to, and we hold that the complaints that the judge failed to present fairly to the jury the defense actually relied on by the defendant is altogether without merit. The language of the plea, setting forth fully, plainly, and at length this ground of defense was given to the jury, and throughout the entire voluminous charge and in dealing with every phase of the law this one vital issue in dispute was plainly recognized and set forth. It is true that the defendant denied that the agreement under which the money was received constituted an unconditional promise to pay, and contended that it was not a mere loan. This was the one issue in dispute. And it is true that the excerpt from the charge as set forth in the fourth ground refers to the "note" as having been "admittedly" made, and the excerpt set forth in the fifth ground of the motion refers to the collateral as having been given to secure a "loan," otherwise referred to in the charge as an "advance." ...
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