Bohanon v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 05 September 2003
• Citation: 875 So.2d 309
• Parties: Angela BOHANON et al. v. Bobby EDWARDS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

875 So.2d 309

Angela BOHANON et al. v. Bobby EDWARDS.

2010547.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

September 5, 2003.

Donald R. Harrison, Dadeville, for appellant.

Kenneth Ingram, Jr., of Kenneth Ingram, Jr. & Associates, P.C., Alexander City, for appellee.

MURDOCK, Judge.

This case involves an action to quiet title to real property filed by Angela Bohanon, James Chapman, and Debra Poole (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the children") against Bobby Edwards. The children appeal from a judgment of the Tallapoosa Circuit Court in favor of Edwards.

William Robinson ("the father") died intestate on May 2, 1979; he was survived by three minor children, Angela, James, and Debra, who were 18, 10, and 5 years of age, respectively.¹ The father was not survived by a spouse or by any siblings. Following the father's death, his parents, Archie Robinson ("the grandfather") and Annie Robinson ("the grandmother"), took possession of a parcel of property the father had acquired by deed in 1973.² When the grandfather died in 1980, his will devised all of his real property to the grandmother. In 1997, the grandmother died; her will devised all of her real property to Bobby Edwards, her nephew.

On November 24, 1999, Angela Bohanon filed an action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court to quiet title to the parcel of property that the father had owned. Thereafter, the complaint was amended to add Debra Poole and James Chapman as plaintiffs. On March 21, 2000, Edwards moved for a summary judgment, claiming that he owned legal title to the land by virtue of the grandmother's will. On October 15, 2001, Edwards filed a supplemental motion for a summary judgment, contending that the children's claims should be "dismissed" because they were barred by the 10-year and 20-year limitations periods referenced in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-33(2), and Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-8(a), respectively. Following the filing of this supplemental motion for a summary judgment, the children filed a "trial brief" in which they argued that Edwards could not prove the factual elements requisite to either a showing of statutory adverse possession for the 10-year period prescribed in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-200, or a showing of adverse possession for the 20-year period of prescription.

Although the trial court did not rule on either of Edwards's motions for a summary judgment, following an ore tenus hearing held on October 1, 2001, the trial court, on January 11, 2002, entered an order dismissing the children's complaint on the same grounds asserted by Edwards in his supplemental motion:

"The Court agrees with [Edwards] that the statute of limitations has expired on all of the [children's] claims set out in their Complaint, therefore, the Court finds no reason to discuss the issue of adverse possession raised by [Edwards]. Alabama Code 1975, § 6-2-33(2) states that `[a]ctions for the recovery of lands ... or the possession thereof...' must be commenced within 10 years....

"....

"Alabama Code 1975, § 6-2-8(a) also applies to this cause of action which further states that `[n]o disability shall extend the period of limitations so as to allow an action to be commenced ... after the lapse of 20 years from the time the claim or right accrued.' In applying this statute of limitations, the [children's] claims as set out in this Complaint must have been commenced on or before May 3, 1999. This action to quiet title was filed by the [children] on or about November 24, 1999, in the Circuit Court of Tallapoosa County, Alabama at Alexander City after the statute of limitations on May 3, 1999, and therefore [is] barred under the Alabama Code 1975, § 6-2-8(a) and § 6-2-33(2).

"It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the [children's] Complaint to quiet title fails and therefore the [children's] Complaint is hereby dismissed."

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, as Edwards himself states in his brief to this court, "[t]he trial court never addressed the issue of adverse possession and instead ruled for [Edwards] based on [the] statute [of] limitations."³

The children appeal. They argue that it was error for the trial court to enter the judgment in favor of Edwards based merely on either the 10-year or the 20-year limitations period referenced above without determining whether Edwards had satisfied all of the factual elements necessary under Alabama law to acquire title to real property by adverse possession.

Alabama recognizes two types of adverse possession: (1) adverse possession by prescription and (2) statutory adverse possession pursuant to § 6-5-200, Ala. Code 1975. Sparks v. Byrd, 562 So.2d 211 (Ala.1990). Specifically,

"`Adverse possession by prescription requires actual, exclusive, open, notorious and hostile possession under a claim of right for a period of twenty years. See Fitts v. Alexander, 277 Ala. 372, 170 So.2d 808 (1965). Statutory adverse possession requires the same elements, but the statute provides further that if the adverse possessor holds under color of title, has paid taxes for ten years, or derives his title by descent cast or devise from a possessor,[⁴] he may acquire title in ten years, as opposed to the twenty years required for adverse possession by prescription. Code 1975, § 6-5-200. See Long v. Ladd, 273 Ala. 410, 142 So.2d 660 (1962)

.'"

Sparks, 562 So.2d at 214 (quoting Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 390 So.2d 616, 618 (Ala.1980)) (emphasis omitted). Those required elements to claim title by prescriptive adverse possession, or by statutory adverse possession, are well established and consistently have been reiterated by this court and our Supreme Court in a long line of cases that continues to the present day. See, e.g., Bradley v. Demos, 599 So.2d 1148 (Ala.1992)

; Sparks v. Byrd, 562 So.2d 211; Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So.2d 821 (Ala.1980); Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964); and

Henderson v. Dunn, 871 So.2d 807 (Ala. Civ.App.2001).

The 10-year statute of limitations relied upon by Edwards and by the trial court states, in pertinent part:

"The following actions must be commenced within 10 years:

"....

"(2) Actions for the recovery of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or the possession thereof, except as otherwise provided in this article."

Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-33 (emphasis added).

As for the 20-year limitations period also relied upon by the trial court, § 6-2-8(a) provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) If anyone entitled to commence any of the actions enumerated in this chapter, to make an entry on land or enter a defense founded on the title to real property is, at the time the right accrues, below the age of 19 years, or insane, he or she shall have three years, or the period allowed by law for the commencement of an action if it be less than three years, after the termination of the disability to commence an action, make entry, or defend. No disability shall extend the period of limitations so as to allow an action to be commenced, entry made, or defense made after the lapse of 20 years from the time the claim or right accrued."

The children contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint based merely on the limitations periods prescribed in § 6-2-33 and § 6-2-8, without any finding as to the factual elements requisite to establishing a claim of adverse possession. There clearly is force of logic behind the children's position. If the 20-year prescriptive period referenced in § 6-2-8 is to be applied in the manner in which it was applied by the trial court in this case—without any finding as to whether the qualitative elements of possession necessary to constitute "adverse possession" (i.e., actual, exclusive, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous possession) have been proven—this effectively will excise those elements from our well-established caselaw regarding adverse possession by prescription. Likewise, to apply § 6-2-33(2) as did the trial court—without any finding that the qualitative elements of adverse possession had been proven—would effectively excise those elements from our well-established caselaw regarding statutory adverse possession under § 6-5-200. Further, application of the 10-year limitations period prescribed in § 6-2-33(2) in the manner in which it was applied by the trial court would obviate the need to demonstrate one of the three elements prescribed by § 6-5-200 as a prerequisite for acquiring title by adverse possession in 10 years, rather than in 20 years.

We reverse the trial court's judgment. In doing so, however, it is not necessary for us to rely solely upon the force of logic of the children's position.

In Washington v. Norwood, 128 Ala. 383, 30 So. 404 (1901), the Supreme Court considered a creditor's action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of land. The grantee asserted both the statute of limitations and adverse possession as defenses. In explaining that both defenses failed for the same reason, the Supreme Court explained as follows:

"In dealing with this question, it needs only to be ascertained what is adverse possession, its nature and incidents, and to avoid a confusion of it with the statute of limitations. Adverse possession may be said to be a collective fact made up of other facts which are essential, constituent elements to the creation of the collective fact. Among these constituent elements are an actual possession of the res, and an open and notorious assertion of claim of ownership hostile to the true owner. After its creation, it is the continuation of this collective fact without interruption for the period fixed by the statute of limitations as a bar to the commencement of a suit that renders it effective as a defense. It is the thing that puts the statute in motion as contradistinguished from the statute itself and its continuity for a definite period that completes the bar of the statute. Even after the statute has been put in motion a break or interruption in the adverse possession stops the running of the statute."

128 Ala. at...