Bohanon v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 27 April 2007
• Docket Number: 2050840.
• Citation: 970 So.2d 777
• Parties: Angela BOHANON et al. v. Bobby EDWARDS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

970 So.2d 777

Angela BOHANON et al. v. Bobby EDWARDS.

2050840.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 27, 2007.

Donald R. Harrison, Dadeville; and Jackson Brett Harrison of The Harrison Firm, L.L.C., Montgomery, for appellants.

Mitchell E. Gavin, Alexander City, for appellee.

MOORE, Judge.

Angela Bohanon, James Chapman, and Debra Poole (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "the children"), the plaintiffs below, appeal from the trial court's April 25, 2006, judgment finding that Bobby Edwards had established his ownership of certain parcels of land in the J.B. Carlisle Estate Subdivision through adverse possession. We reverse.

Background

The evidence before the trial court indicated the following: In 1960, William Robinson ("William") and his parents, Archie Robinson ("Archie") and Annie Mae Robinson ("Annie Mae"), together acquired a one-acre parcel of property in the J.B. Carlisle Estate Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "parcel 11"). In that same year, Archie and Annie Mae built a house on parcel 11 and, upon its completion, began living in the house on the property. In 1970, William acquired a 4.5-acre parcel ("parcel 10") adjacent to parcel 11. Finally in 1973, William acquired another 8.81-acre parcel ("parcel 12"), which also abutted parcel 11.

William died intestate in May 1979. Although he had never married, he was survived by three children, Angela Bohanon, James Chapman, and Debra Poole, who, at the time, were ages 18, 10, and 5, respectively.¹ Shortly after William died, Edwards moved into the house on parcel 11 with his great-uncle, Archie, and his greataunt, Annie Mae. Edwards testified that when he began living with Archie and Annie Mae they were raising potatoes, chickens, and hogs on parcel 11.

In 1980, Archie died; he left a will, in which he devised all of his property to Annie Mae. Annie Mae and Edwards continued living in the house on parcel 11. Then, in 1982, Edwards's wife and two children moved into the house on parcel 11 with Annie Mae and Edwards.

In 1983, the house on parcel 11 was destroyed in a fire. At the time of the fire, Annie Mae, Edwards, and Edwards's wife and two children were living in the house. In February 1984, Annie Mae purported to deed parcel 11 to Edwards and to retain a life estate for herself. Edwards recorded the deed and mortgaged the land on parcel 11 to rebuild the house that had burned down. Thereafter, he paid the mortgage and the insurance on the house. Edwards also made other improvements to the house after it had been rebuilt.

In March 1996, Edwards executed a warranty deed, purporting to convey parcel 11 back to Annie Mae; Edwards and his family and Annie Mae continued to live on parcel 11 until Annie Mae died in April 1997. Annie Mae's will devised all of her property to Edwards. The deed purporting to convey parcel 11 from Edwards to Annie Mae was recorded in August 1997, after Annie Mae's death. Edwards continued living in the house situated on parcel 11 from the time William died in 1979 until the time of trial.

Angela Bohanon ("Angela"), one of William's children, filed suit in November 1999, seeking to quiet title to parcels 10, 11, and 12; she also requested that the court order a sale of the properties for division among the owners. Edwards answered the complaint, claiming superior title to the properties in question by virtue of Annie Mae's will. Angela later amended her complaint to include William's other children, James Chapman ("James") and Debra Poole ("Debra"), as plaintiffs.

Initially, Edwards argued that William had died intestate, leaving no spouse, siblings, or children, and that, therefore, William's interest in each of the parcels at issue in this case passed by intestate succession to Archie and Annie Mae. However, Angela submitted the affidavits of two of William's cousins, both of whom asserted that after Angela's birth William acknowledged her as his daughter; the cousins also asserted that William treated Angela as his daughter and that Archie and Annie Mae — William's parents — had helped raise Angela. Additionally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that William's obituary stated that he was survived by three children.²

After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court dismissed the children's complaint. The trial court concluded that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations established in § 6-2-33(2), Ala.Code 1975 (establishing a 10-year limitations period for an action seeking to recover lands), and in § 6-2-8(a), Ala.Code 1975 (establishing a maximum 20-year limitations period for any action seeking to make an entry on lands or to enter a defense founded on the title to real property, if that cause of action accrued while the plaintiff was a minor).

The children appealed, and we reversed. See Bohanon v. Edwards, 875 So.2d 309 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) ("Bohanon I"). In Bohanon I, we concluded that the trial court had improperly dismissed the children's claims, and we remanded the cause to the trial court to make findings of fact as to whether Edwards's possession met the requirements to establish adverse possession as to each parcel.

Edwards thereafter amended his answer, asserting that William had been survived by his parents, Archie and Annie Mae, and three children, Angela, James, and Debra; he then counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title or, in the alternative, to impose an equitable lien on all of the properties at issue in the action. Edwards claimed superior title to each of the parcels by adverse possession for a period exceeding 20 years; he also asserted that he had acquired title to parcel 11 by devise under Annie Mae's will.

On remand, the trial court conducted another ore tenus hearing. On April 26, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Edwards, finding that Edwards had established his title to each of the parcels at issue in this case, thereby obviating his claim seeking an equitable lien on the properties.³ In its judgment finding that Edwards had acquired each of the parcels by adverse possession, the trial court stated:

"The Court further finds that the defendant, Bobby Edwards, has established ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession for over twenty years. The evidence clearly indicates that Bobby Edwards moved onto the property immediately after the death of William Robinson on May 2, 1979, and has continued in actual possession of the property until the present time. During said time, he and those through whom he claims, Archie Robinson and Annie Mae Robinson, have been in notorious, open and hostile possession of the property, and have claimed the property as their own. The evidence establishes that the defendant, Bobby Edwards, has paid the taxes on the property since 1979. He has also had the timber on the property cut on one occasion, rented the houses situated on the property, mortgaged the property, and generally dealt with the property as his property. His title to the property was never disputed by anyone until this action was filed on November 24, 1999.

"In this state, adverse possession by prescription acts as an absolute rule of repose, since a lapse of twenty years during which there has been continuous adverse possession is considered a sufficient period for the recognition of rights based on adverse possession. Ala.Code § 6-2-8(a) (1975)."

The children appeal.

Standard of Review

In Lockhart v. Corcoran, 494 So.2d 93 (Ala.Civ.App.1986), this court outlined the standard of review applicable in adverse-possession cases:

"`Whether the evidence establishes adverse possession is a question of fact, the determination of which, when made upon evidence presented ore tenus, is favored with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or manifestly unjust.' Tidwell v. Strickler, 457 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala.1984). The trial court's judgment in such a case need only be supported by credible evidence. Jemison v. Belcher, 368 So.2d 849 (Ala. 1979)."

494 So.2d at 93.

Discussion

"Under Alabama's law there are two types of adverse possession. The first type is statutory adverse possession under Ala.Code (1975), § 6-5-200. Under this statute, the party claiming the land must have possessed the land for ten years and must also hold the land under color of title, have paid taxes on the property for ten years, or have derived title by descent or devise. Tidwell, 457 So.2d at 368.

"The second type of adverse possession is adverse possession by prescription, which requires that the claimant have possessed the land for twenty years. Hayden v. Robinson, 472 So.2d 606 (Ala.1985); Tidwell, 457 So.2d at 368.

"Both types of adverse possession require that the claimant's possession be `actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile.' Tidwell, 457 So.2d at 368. The burden rests upon the claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his possession of the land meets these elements. Tidwell, 457 So.2d at 368; Grooms v. Mitchell, 426 So.2d 820 (Ala. 1983)."

Lockhart v. Corcoran, 494 So.2d at 94. Additionally, § 6-5-200(a), Ala.Code 1975, addresses statutory adverse possession and provides, in part:

"(a) Adverse possession cannot confer or defeat title to land unless:

"(1) The party setting it up shall show that a deed or other color of title purporting to convey title to him has been duly recorded in the office of the judge of probate of the county in which the land lies for 10 years before the commencement of the action;

"(2) He and those through whom he claims shall have annually listed the land for taxation in the proper county for 10 years prior to the commencement of the action if the land is subject to taxation; or

"(3) He derives title by descent cast or devise from a predecessor in the title who was in possession of the land."

In this case, Edwards testified that he never claimed ownership of the three parcels against Annie Mae and that he never intended to adversely...