Boileau v. Seagrave, No. COA07-1431 (N.C. App. 10/21/2008)
| Decision Date | 21 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. COA07-1431,COA07-1431 |
| Parties | PAMELA A. BOILEAU v. ANN M. SEAGRAVE. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by G. Russell Kornegay, III, Preston O. Odom, III, and Sarah M. Brady, for Plaintiff.
Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, PA, by Kary C. Watson for Defendant.
Plaintiff Pamela A. Boileau and her husband, Mr. Boileau, were married on 30 July 1977. In 2003, Plaintiff and Mr. Boileau joined St. Alban's Episcopal Church in Davidson, North Carolina, where Defendant Ann M. Seagrave was also a member. Plaintiff and Mr. Boileau became friends with Defendant and spent time with her in and out of church.
On 30 December 2003, Defendant and Mr. Boileau kissed in a local restaurant parking lot. On 9 January 2004, Defendant and Mr. Boileau had sexual intercourse with each other. Over the next six months, Defendant continued to have sexual relations with Mr. Boileau while maintaining her friendship with Plaintiff. In June 2004, Plaintiff discovered Defendant's relationship with Mr. Boileau and moved out of the marital home.
On 21 April 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. On 30 June 2005, Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim against Plaintiff, asserting defamation. On 5 September 2006, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Ms. Clara Boyer and other evidence relating to Defendant's alleged misconduct with Ms. Boyer's husband during the Boyer's marriage (collectively "the Boyer evidence"). The trial court granted the motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403.
The case came on for trial during the 5 September 2006 civil session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court, and on 20 September 2006 the jury returned a verdict (1) finding Defendant liable for alienation of affections and awarding Plaintiff $1.00 in compensatory damages and $5,000.00 in punitive damages; (2) finding Defendant liable for criminal conversation and awarding Plaintiff $1.00 in compensatory damages and $105,000.00 in punitive damages; (3) finding Plaintiff not liable for libel; and (4) finding Plaintiff liable for slander and awarding Defendant $ 1.00 in compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. The verdict resulted in a net award of $10,001.00 to Plaintiff. On 4 October 2006, the trial court entered judgment upon the jury verdict.
On 16 October 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59, seeking to set aside a portion of the jury verdict and for a new trial. The trial court entered an order denying the motion on 12 December 2006. On 11 January 2007, Plaintiff filed notice of appeal from the 4 October 2006 judgment and from the trial court's order denying Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion. On 19 January 2007, Defendant filed notice of appeal from the 4 October 2006 judgment.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by excluding the Boyer evidence. We disagree.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2007). However, the trial court may exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2007). "In making its determination with respect to the Rule 403 balancing test, a trial court must analyze the similarity and temporal proximity between the acts." State v. Mabrey, 184 N.C. App. 259, 265, 646 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[R]emoteness in time tends to diminish the probative value of the evidence and enhance its tendency to prejudice." State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 300, 384 S.E.2d 470, 482 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).
Whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the ruling may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that the decision was so arbitrary it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 523 S.E.2d 663 (2000).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has been liberal in allowing evidence of similar sex offenses to show a common plan or scheme in trials on sexual crime charges, especially when the alleged victims have been children. State v. Cotton, 318 N.C. 663, 351 S.E.2d 277 (1987). See State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 362 S.E.2d 244 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1988); State v. Gordon, 316 N.C. 497, 342 S.E.2d 509 (1986); State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986) (). However, evidence that a defendant engaged in prior acts of sexual misconduct has been excluded by our Supreme Court and this Court when the prior acts have been too remote in time. See State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 585, 369 S.E.2d 822 (1988) (); State v. Delsanto, 172 N.C. App. 42, 615 S.E.2d 870 (2005) (). Here, Plaintiff argues that the Boyer evidence was relevant to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, to impeach Defendant's testimony and veracity, and to Plaintiff's defense of Defendant's defamation counterclaim due to the similarity of the prior and present conduct. Plaintiff asserts that had Ms. Boyer been allowed, she would have testified that Defendant's destruction of her marriage was similar to Defendant's destruction of Plaintiff's marriage in that: Defendant met both married couples at church, befriended both couples, began illicit relationships with the husbands, hid the illicit relationships from the wives while maintaining their friendships, continued seeing the husbands after the marriages had ended, and was not ashamed or disgraced by her conduct. The Boyer marriage dissolved allegedly as a result of Defendant's conduct in 1973, more than 30 years before the events in this case took place.
As this evidence is being offered in a civil case where the victim is an adult, and is not being introduced to show that Defendant's prior and present acts arose out of a common scheme or plan, the Court's precedent for liberally allowing such evidence is inapplicable. Furthermore, even if the evidence of Defendant's prior conduct contains sufficient similarities to the present conduct and, thus, is probative of Defendant's conduct in this case, the passage of approximately 30 years between Defendant's prior acts and the acts charged diminishes the probative value of the evidence and enhances the tendency to cause unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Accordingly, the trial court's exclusion of the Boyer evidence on grounds that "the potential confusion and prejudicial value of the evidence outweighs the probative value" is not manifestly unsupported by reason. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. Plaintiff's argument is overruled.
Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider "the existence and frequency of any similar past conduct by the defendant" when deciding punitive damages.
"When a party's requested jury instruction is correct and supported by the evidence, the trial court is required to give the instruction." Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C., 146 N.C. App. 449, 464, 553 S.E.2d 431, 441 (2001), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 315, 571 S.E.2d 220 (2002). "The instructions must be based on evidence, which when viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent, will support a reasonable inference of each essential element of the claim or defense asserted." Anderson v. Austin, 115 N.C. App. 134, 136, 443 S.E.2d 737, 739, disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 514, 452 S.E.2d 806 (1994).
In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be awarded, the trier of fact may consider, inter alia, "[t]he existence and frequency of any similar past conduct by the defendant." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-35(2)(g) (2007). Plaintiff argues that the jury should have been instructed on this element of punitive damages as it was supported by the Boyer evidence. However, as the trial judge properly excluded this evidence, and no other evidence admitted at trial supported this jury instruction, the trial court did not err in refusing to give this instruction. We thus overrule Plaintiff's argument.
Plaintiff next contends the trial court's errors in excluding the Boyer evidence and denying the requested jury instruction were errors of law, warranting a new trial under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8). We have concluded, however, that the trial court did not err in its rulings on these two issues. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on these alleged errors. Plaintiff's argument is overruled.
Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in instructing Plaintiff not to include in her closing argument...
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