Boland v. Shell Oil Co., 4756.
| Decision Date | 16 May 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 4756.,4756. |
| Citation | 71 F. Supp. 649 |
| Parties | BOLAND v. SHELL OIL CO., Inc. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Walker Woolridge, of Wentzville, Mo., and Clem F. Storckman, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.
Thompson, Mitchell, Thompson, & Young and Edmonstone F. Thompson, all of St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.
John J. Boland, now deceased, in May 1945 executed an agreement with defendant leasing to defendant a tract of ground improved for gasoline filling station business, located at the intersection of U. S. Highways 61 and 40, in Wentzville, Missouri. The lease was for a period of 10 years from the first of July, 1945. Plaintiff is the widow of John J. Boland and sues individually as sole heir under the will and as executrix to cancel the lease.
The complaint alleges John J. Boland first leased the premises to defendant in April, 1940 for a period ending the 30th day of June, 1945. Subsequently the parties executed an agreement giving defendant an option to extend the lease for a period of five years. The parties signed an agreement reducing the rent in 1943. The theory of plaintiff's case is that prior to May 18, 1945 Boland suffered several paralytic strokes and became mentally infirm and that at the time of the execution of the lease he was "incompetent, blind and physically and mentally infirm", and the agents of the defendant by "protestation of friendship and by false and fraudulent display of interest in the financial and personal well-being of said John J. Boland and his family, gained the confidence of said John J. Boland and caused him to be unduly influenced", and fraudulently represented that because of "rent regulations" the existing lease would have to be abandoned and a new lease executed and the rental reduced from $1,620 per year to $100 per month; that because of his physical condition, and believing the "false and fraudulent statements" Boland did, at the direction of defendant's agents, execute the lease in question. It is further charged that the lease is without consideration and lacks mutuality. The answer denies the charges.
Cancellation of the lease is urged upon two grounds: (1) mental incapacity of John J. Boland to execute the agreement and because of such condition, coupled with fraudulent representation, the signature of Boland to the lease was secured by fraud; and (2) the lease lacks mutuality.
The record fails to support plaintiff's charges on point one. Boland first suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in 1940. The disease grew progressively worse. It involved paralysis on the left side. His power of speech and eyesight were affected. By May of 1945 he was totally disabled, confined to his home, and blind. There was testimony that at times he did not seem to be oriented. There was some deterioration of his mental faculties. No witness testified that at the time of the execution of the lease Boland was irrational and unable to understand or carry on business transactions. There are no facts in evidence from which such a finding can be inferred. His doctor testified that he was usually lucid but that he had periods of mental incapacity. Plaintiff testified that her husband at times had difficulty remembering but that she always felt that he was capable of taking care of his own business. Her husband had other property than the filling station property and rooms were rented in the home. He took care of all of the income from this property and managed the payment of expenses for household necessities. A few days prior to the execution of the lease he refinanced a loan on the home by execution of a deed of trust and note. A number of witnesses testified that Boland did not want his wife or anyone else to interfere with his handling of his business affairs.
Representatives of the defendant called on Boland a number of times prior to the execution of the lease in May, 1945. Some of the visits were purely social and at others the execution of a new lease was discussed. There was some testimony—not of a definite character—as to comments by defendant's agents concerning gasoline rationing. Defendant's agents informed Boland that their present lease was about to expire. This was true. There was no necessity for giving any further reason for the execution of the new lease. On the day of the execution of the lease defendant's agents and Boland discussed the lease paragraph by paragraph. It was read over to him before it was signed. There was bargaining back and forth as to the amount of the rental. A nephew of Boland was called in to take the acknowledgment to the lease. After the lease was executed and defendant's agents had left, Boland discussed the lease in a rational manner and told his wife and nephew that he had to make a new lease, that he could not get out and take care of himself and that he did the best that he could. There is a total lack of substantial evidence that Boland's mental condition was such as to show that he did not possess sufficient mind to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act in which he was engaged in the execution of the lease.
The law is set out in the case of In re Nelson's Estate, Mo.App., St. Louis, 1945, 185 S.W.2d 890, loc.cit. 895, that
Plaintiff had that burden of proof. We give to plaintiff's testimony such reasonable inference as it is entitled to under the rules in reaching this conclusion. See Pennington v. Stanton, 125 Mo. 658, 28 S.W. 1067.
The charge that the lease lacks mutuality presents a close question. Paragraph 12 of the lease provides: "Shell, at its option, by giving at least thirty days notice to Lessor, may terminate this lease at any time during the original or any extended term thereof."
Aside from the payment of $100 per month rental in advance, we are unable to find that defendant has any obligations under the lease that would not exist in the absence of a lease. Plaintiff presents her position on this phase of the case that "a promise to do what one is required by law to do is no consideration for a contract." In re Wood's Estate, 288 Mo. 588, 232 S.W. 671.
We conclude that determination of the present question turns...
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