Pennington v. Stanton
| Citation | 28 S.W. 1067,125 Mo. 658 |
| Parties | Pennington et al. v. Stanton, Appellant |
| Decision Date | 22 December 1894 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Andrew Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. S. Herndon, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Booher & Williams for appellant.
(1) This was not a gift but a sale. Stanton paid full value for this land. The trial court does not find that any undue influence was exercised. Taylor v. Crockett, 27 S.W 620. (2) The deed being just in itself and its consequences it will not be avoided on the ground of undue influence. Moore v. Moore, 67 Mo. 192; Turner v Turner, 44 Mo. 535; Hamilton v. Armstrong, 27 S.W. 1054. (3) No fraud, mistake, deception or undue influence was exercised by Stanton or anyone else. Mrs. Goff had no children and no relatives who had done anything for her or contributed to the acquirement of the property or were dependent upon her or her bounty, and these facts should be considered in determining the questions involved. Hamilton v. Armstrong, 27 S.W. 1054. (4) The supreme court is not bound by either the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the trial court in equity cases. Thompson v. Cohen, 24 S.W. 1023; Likins v. Likins, 27 S.W. 531. (5) The burden in this case is on the plaintiffs. There were no confidential relations. Kimball v. Cuddy, 7 N.E. 589; Cornell v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91; Taylor v. Crockett, 27 S.W. 620. (6) There was no undue influence in this case. Kimball v. Cuddy, 7 N.E. 589; Will of Carroll, 7 N.W. 434; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 951; Likins v. Likins, 27 S.W. 531; Bowles v. Nathan, 54 Mo. 261; Hollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. 267; Cornell v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91; Allen v. Drake, 109 Mo. 627. (7) This case does not come within the rule laid down by this court in cases of Hall v. Knappenberger, 97 Mo. 510 and Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250. Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Cornell v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91. (8) The burden of proving mental incapacity and undue influence rests on the plaintiff. Taylor v. Wilburn, 20 Mo. 306; Rankin v. Rankin, 61 Mo. 295; Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 161; Jarman on Wills [1 Am. Ed.] p. 133; Webster v. Sullivan, 12 N.W. 319; Shepardson v. Potter, 18 N.W. 575; Abbott's Trial Evidence, p. 119; Schouler on Wills, sec. 239; Priest v. Way, 87 Mo. 16; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35. (9) The exercise of undue influence must be such as to destroy the will power and overreach and destroy the free agency of testator or grantor. Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 161; Rankin v. Rankin, 61 Mo. 295; Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 195; Jarman on Wills [1 Am. Ed.] p. 133; Shepardson v. Potter, 18 N.W. 575; Schouler on Wills, secs. 227, 229, 239; Mooney v. Olsen, 22 Kan. 79; Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92; Kimball v. Cuddy, 7 N.E. 589. (10) The relations existing between Mrs. Goff and Stanton were not "confidential." Cornell v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91; Earle v. Chance, 12 R. I. 374; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35. (11) Mrs. Goff was perfectly competent to make the deed in question. Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307; Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456.
David Rea, W. P. Hall and Vinton Pike for respondents.
(1) If this case is not controlled by Hall v. Knappenberger, 97 Mo. 511, the doctrine of that case can not be considered longer in force. The facts in Hall v. Knappenberger, are more fully reported in the opinion on the first hearing published in 6 Southwestern Reporter, 381, by which it will appear that the case was a stronger one for the donee than this. (2) The defendant agreed to take care of Mrs. Goff and her stock for the use of the farm. This arrangement governed the parties for two years. No reason for a change was suggested. Her statement to Fee, when the deed was signed, indicated that no claim of defendant for past services was in her mind; yet it is inserted in the deed which defendant had drawn. It is evident the defendant apprehended the future care and support would not be deemed adequate consideration for the conveyance, in view of the probable duration of Mrs. Goff's life. The insertion of a false consideration is a badge of fraud. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence [1 Ed.], sec. 928, note 2, p. 433; May on Fraudulent Conveyances, [2 Ed.] 496. (3) Mrs. Goff was completely "under the thumb" of defendant. The transaction was kept a secret. Mrs. Goff was not furnished with independent advice, an essential condition in cases of this character. (4) The evidence is not clear or satisfactory that the deed was explained to Mrs. Goff at its execution. Reading the deed was not sufficient to inform her of its nature and effect. Kelly v. Settegast, 2 S.W. 873; Corrigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 356.
The plaintiffs are a sister and brother, and two of the heirs at law of Mrs. Polly Goff, who died in Andrew county in August or September, 1892. On the first day of March, 1889, by warranty deed, duly executed, acknowledged and delivered, and on the next day filed for record in the office of the recorder of deeds for said county, Mrs. Goff, party of the first part, conveyed her farm in said county, containing about ninety-one acres, to the defendant, William Stanton, party of the second part, for the following consideration and agreement expressed in said deed, to wit:
Some time after the death of Mrs. Goff the plaintiffs instituted this suit in the circuit court of said county, by petition in the nature of a bill in equity, to set aside said deed on the ground of undue influence, exercised by the defendant over the mind of the grantor, and her mental incapacity to make said deed, and, having obtained a decree canceling the deed, the defendant appeals.
It appears from the evidence that at the time the deed was made and executed Mrs. Goff was about seventy-two years old, and illiterate. She had been a widow about seven years. She had been an invalid from her youth. She seems, from the description of the witnesses, to have been afflicted with shaking palsy. She could not walk without assistance, and, in the main, had to be carried from place to place. She talked with difficulty, slowly and in a stammering manner. Her control over her limbs, tongue and bowels was imperfect, and she required the constant attention and assistance of someone in performing nearly all the physical functions of life. She seems never to have received such attention from any relation of her own blood. She inherited some property from her father, which, notwithstanding her infirmities, she always managed and controlled, and when she executed the deed, besides the little farm in question, had a few head of stock and some $ 400 or $ 500 in money and notes. The defendant, who was a neighbor and a young married man, with his wife and one child went to live with, and take care of, her on her farm about the first of March, 1887. All the evidence is to the effect that from that time until the day of her death he devoted himself almost exclusively to her service, assiduously providing for her wants and rendering her every service necessary to her comfort with uniform kindness and consideration. That the defendant faithfully performed his agreement, which was the consideration of the deed, is uncontroverted. That the services which he obligated himself to perform, and did perform, were adequate consideration for the deed, is testified to by all the witnesses who testified on that subject, whether for the plaintiff or defendant, and they were many. That she executed the deed with full knowledge of its contents, clearly appears from the evidence, while there was no evidence tending to prove that the defendant used any improper means to procure its execution.
Upon this state of the proof, while the court could not, and did not, find that the deed was procured by undue influence, it did, however, find that at the time of the execution thereof "said Polly Goff was not mentally capable of making a disposition of her property, or of intelligently executing a deed," and decreed its cancellation.
To support the allegations of the petition, the plaintiffs introduced five witnesses, all of whom, including John Patton, one of the plaintiffs, testified as to her mental capacity. Mr. Brown, who had known her from her youth up said that he never thought her really capable of doing business, and, upon being immediately asked whet was the matter with her, proceeded to describe her physical condition. While the witness had known Mrs. Goff and her family for a long time, he seems to have known very...
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