Boland v. Vanderbilt

• Decision Date: 22 December 1953
• Citation: 140 Conn. 520,102 A.2d 362
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BOLAND v. VANDERBILT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 362

102 A.2d 362

140 Conn. 520

BOLAND v. VANDERBILT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 22, 1953.

David M. Reilly, Jr., New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Louis Feinmark, New Haven, with whom was Irving Smirnoff, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, QUINLAN and WYNNE, JJ.

BALDWIN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for injuries received in a collision of their automobiles. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations of negligence and charged that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant has appealed from the judgment entered thereon, assigning errors in the charge and in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence.

The plaintiff's claims of proof on the issue of negligence ane contributory negligence were that he was proceeding northerly on Forest Road in New Haven early in the morning of November 16, 1949, when he was in collision with the defendant at the intersection of Forest Road and Edgewood Way and that the defendant, who was proceeding easterly, failed to grant him the right of way. The defendant claimed to have proved that he had entered the intersection ahead of the plaintiff, that he assumed, as he had a right to do, that he could cross safely ahead of the plaintiff, and that therefore he had the right of way.

The defendant alleges error in certain instructions to the jury and in the refusal of certain requests to charge. A charge must be 'correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.' Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc., § 48; Doe v. Saracyn Corporation, 138 Conn. 69, 75, 82 A.2d 811. The charge as given met this test. The court did not adopt the language of the defendant's requests, but that is not necessary. Hoffberg v. Epstein, 130 Conn. 613, 615, 36 A.2d 388. The defendant's requests relating to the question of liability were adequately and properly covered.

The parties were mainly at issue on the question of damages. As to this, the claims of proof of the plaintiff were, generally, that he had 'blacked out' after the crash, that he had received strains, bruises and contusions, and that, in addition, he had suffered a cerebral thrombosis on December 3, 1949, which was the result of the injuries sustained in the accident. The defendant avers that the court erred in charging the jury that they might compensate the plaintiff for permanent injury or physical impairment, for future pain and suffering, and for loss of earning capacity. The court specifically cautioned the jury that compensation for these was not a matter of guesswork or speculation but must be based upon results which would reasonably and probably flow from the injuries the plaintiff received at the time of the accident. The defendant claims that there was no evidence to support any award for these elements of damage. At the time of the trial, two and a half years after the accident, the plaintiff's left arm was almost completely paralyzed, he walked with great difficulty, he suffered constant buzzing in his head, headaches and dizzy spells, he had to be driven about to do his customary work, and he was earning less than he had previously. He was before the jury and several of his injuries were of such a nature as to be readily apparent. Speaking broadly, the jury had the opportunity to appraise his condition and the probable future consequences of it. The circumstances of this case clearly distinguish it from Hulk v. Aishberg, 126 Conn. 360, 11 A.2d 380, relied upon by the defendant. In that case the plaintiff sought a recovery for a knee injury which had required surgical treatment and was of such a nature that the extent and probable duration of future disability by reason of it could not have been ascertained by the jury without the aid of testimony upon that element of damage. Under the circumstances, the instruction in question was proper.

The defendant also complains because the court charged that the plaintiff might recover full compensation for his injuries even though they were more serious by reason of his pre-existing physical condition than they would otherwise have been. This charge was proper under the circumstances. The plaintiff was claiming, on the one hand, that the injuries he sustained caused a cerebral thrombosis which completely disabled him. The defendant asserted, on the other, that the plaintiff was suffering from arteriosclerosis at the time of the accident and that it was the arteriosclerosis and not the accident which produced the thrombosis. If, as the defendant claimed, the plaintiff was suffering from arteriosclerosis, he would be entitled to recover for the effect of the injuries on him as a person suffering from arteriosclerosis, even though their effect might be more serious than in the case of a normal person. Mourison v. Hansen, 128 Conn. 62, 65, 20 A.2d 84, 136 A.L.R. 413; Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 94 Conn. 618, 629, 110 A. 63.

The defendant maintains that the plaintiff failed to establish any causal relation between the accident and the cerebral thrombosis suffered by him and that the court ...