Mourison v. Hansen
| Decision Date | 08 May 1941 |
| Citation | 128 Conn. 62,20 A.2d 84 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | MOURISON v. HANSEN et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Frank P. McEvoy, Judge.
Action by Christina Mourison against John A. Hansen and others, for injuries sustained when an automobile in which she was riding was struck from the rear by a delivery truck operated by named defendant as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendants, brought to the superior court and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff and she appeals.
Error and new trial ordered.
Argued before MALTBIE, C. J, and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.
John Keough, Jr., of South Norwalk (Nehemiah Candee, of South Norwalk, on the brief), for appellant.
David M. Reilly, of New Haven, for appellees.
The plaintiff was riding in the front seat of an automobile which was being operated by her husband. As the automobile approached the intersection of West Avenue and Garner Street in Norwalk, it was stopped by a red traffic signal and while standing the automobile was run into in the rear by a delivery truck proceeding in the same direction driven by the defendant, John A. Hansen, and owned by his father, Einar V. Hansen. The case was tried to the jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff from which she has appealed, claiming error in the instructions of the court upon the question of damages and also bringing up for review the action of the trial court in refusing to allow the plaintiff more than four peremptory challenges.
The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved these facts: When the collision occurred, she was thrown violently forward, felt a snap in her back, and was in great pain. Subsequently, she was taken to a hospital and it was discovered that she had sustained a chip fracture of the spinous process of the seventh cervical vertebra. The plaintiff previously had undergone two operations. She claimed that she had entirely recovered from the effects of those operations and before the collision was in good health and was earning $18 per week at her employment. The collision occurred on July 22, 1939, and the plaintiff remained in the Norwalk Hospital until November 6, 1939, and thereafter was taken to her home. She claimed that she suffered great pain in consequence of her injuries, has been totally disabled from work up to the time of the trial and that she would suffer permanently. In the course of the trial, the plaintiff also offered evidence to prove and claimed to have shown that previous to her injury she had suffered from an arthritic condition which was dormant and did not prevent her from working at her occupation and that she was in fairly good health. Her claim was that this dormant condition had been lighted up by the injury to her back and had resulted in a painful condition, disabling her from work. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was completely cured of the injuries received in this collision after a period of six months and that her condition at the time of the trial was due not to the injuries which she had received in the collision but to natural causes in no way resulting from the physical injuries.
The plaintiff in writing made several requests to the court for instructions to the jury. These requests in substance asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found that prior to the collision the plaintiff had a dormant arthritic condition which gave her no particular trouble but as a result of the collision the dormant condition was aggravated to the extent that the plaintiff had suffered from it ever since, they might find that the collision was the proximate cause of her condition. The court did not charge as requested and the plaintiff assigns error in the refusal of the court to so charge and also to certain portions of the charge as delivered. While in its charge the trial court referred to the pre-existing condition of the plaintiff, it nowhere, even in substance, instructed the jury in accordance with the request. The trial court stated: "It is the duty of the plaintiff to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence, in the first place, that due to these injuries, and solely as the result of the injuries claimed to have been sustained by reason of this particular collision, she was rendered unable to pursue her usual occupation."
The plaintiff was entitled to recover "full compensation for all damage proximately resulting from the defendant's negligence, even though [her] injuries are more serious than they would otherwise have been because of pre-existing physical or nervous conditions." Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 647, 13 A.2d 677, 679; Sapiente v. Waltuch, 127 Conn. 224, 227, 15 A.2d 417; Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539, 544, 97 A. 1020; 15 Am.Jur, Damages, § 80. The trial court should have informed the jury that if they found that the wrongful act of the defendants was a substantial factor in producing the...
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...of judicial relief by compensation in damages. Division 163 etc. v. Connecticut Co., 148 Conn. 563, 569, 173 A.2d 130; Mourison v. Hansen, 128 Conn. 62, 66, 20 A.2d 84. There must be a causal relation established between the tort and the damage sustained. Robinson v. Southern New England Te......
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