Boldon v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 14-2035 (DWF/HB) |
| Parties | Shelly Boldon, Plaintiff, v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., and Central Prairie Financial, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Esq., Consumer Justice Center P.A., counsel for Plaintiff.
Bradley R. Armstrong, Esq., Derrick N. Weber, Esq., Messerli & Kramer, counsel for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Messerli & Kramer, P.A. ("Messerli") and Central Prairie Financial LLC's ("Central Prairie") (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 43). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
Plaintiff Shelly Bolden ("Boldon" or "Plaintiff") resides in Minnesota. (Doc. No. 40, Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff allegedly incurred financial obligations for which she owed money to Chase Bank, USA. (Id. ¶ 20.) Central Prairie, which engages in the purchase and collection of defaulted consumer debts in Minnesota, purchased Plaintiff'sdebt from Chase Bank, USA. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 21.) Messerli is a law firm that collects delinquent accounts and was retained by Central Prairie to collect Plaintiff's delinquent accounts. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On August, 23, 2010, Messerli, on behalf of Central Prairie, served two state court complaints on Plaintiff related to the debt. (Id. ¶ 20.) On September 10, 2010, Boldon filed an answer in both state court actions. (Id. ¶ 23.)
On November 3, 2011, Boldon filed a complaint against Messerli in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota (Civ. No. 11-3246 (SRN/SER)) alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and relating to the above-mentioned debt allegedly owed to Central Prairie ("D. Minn. Suit"). (Id. ¶ 15.)
On February 14, 2012, the parties settled the D. Minn. Suit (the "Settlement Agreement"). (Id. ¶ 17.) The Settlement Agreement was signed by Messerli and Boldon and provides:
In consideration of the Agreement and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Party Two [Messerli & Kramer, P.A.] releases and forever discharges Party One [Shelly Boldon], including all her past and present agents, heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, insurers, attorneys, and all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to Party Two, but expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever . . . which it now has, ever had, or may hereinafter have against Party One arising out of or in consequence of or based upon any matter or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the time to the date of this agreement.
(Id. ¶ 19.)
On July 29, 2013, Central Prairie, as plaintiff, filed the 2010 complaint against Bolden in Dakota County state court in Minnesota and relating to debt Plaintiff allegedly owes to Central Prairie for account #6913 (Civ. No. 19HA-13-3311) ("Dakota 3311 Case"). (Id. ¶ 25.) On August 8, 2013, Central Prairie, as plaintiff, filed the second complaint against Bolden, which was also in Dakota County state court in Minnesota, and relating to debt Plaintiff allegedly owes to Central Prairie for account #2324 (Civ. No. 19HA-13-3466) ("Dakota 3466 Case"). (Id. ¶ 25.) A summary judgment hearing for the Dakota 3311 Case was held on October 8, 2013, and a summary judgment hearing for the Dakota 3466 Case was held on October 28, 2013. (Doc. No. 46 ("Armstrong Decl.") ¶¶ 5, 6, Exs. 2, 3.) Plaintiff appeared pro se at both hearings and asserted a number of defenses, but did not address the Settlement Agreement. (Id.) The court granted summary judgment in Central Prairie's favor in both matters. (Armstrong Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, Exs. 4-5.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on June 20, 2014. (See generally id.) Plaintiff asserts the following four causes of action: (1) Violations of the FDCPA - 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (against both Defendants); (2) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") - 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (against Messerli); (3) Breach of Contract (against both Defendants); and (4) Violation of the Minnesota Garnishment Statute - Minn. Stat. § 571.71 (against both Defendants). (Id. ¶¶ 84-104.)
Boldon alleges that both of these Dakota County lawsuits (the Dakota 3311 Case and the Dakota 3466 Case) relate to the same accounts that were a part of and were released by the Settlement Agreement. (Id. ¶ 31.) Boldon further asserts that there is a"significant connection" between Messerli and Central Prairie that is such that Messerli should be considered a party to the state court actions and Central Prairie should be considered a party to the Settlement Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 46.) In support of this assertion, Boldon alleges that Messerli and Central Prairie are located at the same address for their primary places of business. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.) Boldon asserts that the same person, Joseph Dressel, is both Central Prairie's registered agent and Messerli's Director of IT/Finance. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36.) Similarly, Bolden asserts that Paul W. Anderson is both Central Prairie's manager and is an attorney with Messerli. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.) Bolden further alleges that Messerli itself argues that the two Defendants are in privity. (See id. ¶¶ 39-43.)
In support of her FDCPA claim, Bolden alleges that she notified Defendants' counsel, Jennifer Zwilling, that she was represented on August 21, 2013, and that Defendant acknowledged that information by e-mail dated September 5, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 51.) According to Bolden, Defendants then contacted her directly on August 28, 2013 and in violation of the FDCPA. (Id. ¶ 52.) Bolden also alleges that because her debts were listed in the Settlement Agreement, Messerli's accesses of her credit reports on January 9 and April 19, 2013, and on September 3, 2014, were illegal and resulted in higher interest rates for her. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 60.)
With respect to her claim for breach of contract, Bolden alleges that the terms of the Settlement Agreement released and discharged Plaintiff from any and all claims brought by Messerli and Central Prairie, including those claims in the Dakota County lawsuits. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.)
Finally, with respect to her claims relating to Minnesota's garnishment statute, Bolden alleges that Defendants engaged in bank levies, garnished property, and communicated with Bolden's bank regarding garnishment. (See id. ¶¶ 70-82.)
Bolden alleges she has suffered "sleeplessness, nervousness, depression, feelings of hopelessness and pessimism, feelings of helplessness, and migraines" as a result of the above-actions. (Id. ¶¶ 56, 68, 82.)
Defendants now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Doc. Nos. 43, 45.)1
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court may consider thecomplaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. As the United States Supreme Court reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, this standard "calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.2
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under Minnesota law, it is well established that settlement agreements are governed by principles of contract law. See Ryan v. Ryan, 193 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Minn.1971).3 Further, the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law, and "[w]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, [courts] enforce the agreement of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract." Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court has "consistently stated that when a contractual provision is clear and unambiguous, courts should not rewrite, modify, or limit its effect by a strained construction." Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord's, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364-65 (Minn. 2009). However, "if the language is ambiguous, parol evidence may be considered to determine intent." Dykes, 781 N.W.2d at 582 (citations omitted). A contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, not simply because the parties disagree as to its meaning. See id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 562 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009). "The determination of whether a contract is unambiguous depends on the meaning assigned to the words and phrases in accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract...
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