Boles v. White

• Decision Date: 07 October 2021
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum-20-319
• Citation: 260 A.3d 697,2021 ME 49
• Parties: Cecelia BOLES v. Karen M. WHITE et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

260 A.3d 697

2021 ME 49

Cecelia BOLES

v.Karen M. WHITE et al.

Docket: Cum-20-319

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: July 13, 2021

Decided: October 7, 2021

Christian J. Lewis, Esq., and Sean V. Walton, Esq. (Orally), Hardy Wolf & Downing, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Cecelia Boles

John B. Schulte, Esq. (Orally), and L. John Topchik, Esq., Law Offices of John B. Schulte, Portland, for Karen M. White and Ronald C. White Jr.

Panel: GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.^*

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] Cecelia Boles was a guest of tenants who rented a two-story house owned by Karen and Ronald White. Boles appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Stewart, J. ) in favor of the Whites on Boles's complaint alleging premises liability. Boles argues that the court erred when it concluded that the tenants were in exclusive control of the premises, that the Whites did not expressly agree to maintain the premises in good repair, and that there was no alternative basis for finding the Whites liable for Boles's injury. We affirm the judgment in all respects.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the parties’ supported statements of material facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Boles. See MSR Recycling, LLC v. Weeks & Hutchins, LLC , 2019 ME 125, ¶ 6, 214 A.3d 1.

[¶3] Cecelia Boles was injured on September 18, 2016, at the house rented by her daughter and son-in-law (the Lytles) when she descended the staircase between the first and second floor and fell off the landing at the bottom of the staircase.¹ The height of the landing step measured eleven inches, which was greater than the heights of the rest of the stairs of the staircase² and did not comply with the applicable building codes. The Lytles had recently entered into a written agreement to rent the house from the Whites. The lease included the following paragraphs that are relevant to this appeal:

10. Access: Renters shall allow homeowner to access the property for purposes of repair and inspection. Renters shall keep the owners informed of any issues that arise with the property and/or appliances.

12. The renter is responsible for mowing the lawn and watering the plants. The renter is responsible for all snow removal, either snow blowing with the machine available; or arranging plowing. The renter is responsible for salting or sanding walkways if necessary to prevent personal injuries from slipping on ice.

[¶4] On June 24, 2019, Boles brought suit against the Whites on the theory of premises liability for injuries she sustained as a result of the fall. On June 26, 2020, the Whites moved for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, contending that Boles could not establish that the Whites owed Boles a duty of care. The court granted the Whites’ motion, concluding that there was no genuine dispute that the Lytles were in exclusive control of the premises, that the lease did not contain an express agreement requiring the Whites to maintain the premises in good repair, and that the Whites did not otherwise have a duty to maintain the premises.

[¶5] Boles timely filed this appeal. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2021) ; M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the parties’ statements of material facts and the record evidence to which the statements refer demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ¶ 15, 8 A.3d 677 (quotation marks omitted); see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a ‘genuine issue’ when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact." Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass'n , 2011 ME 26, ¶ 8, 13 A.3d 773.

[¶7] A landlord is not liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition on property that is under a tenant's exclusive control except when the landlord "(a) fails to disclose the existence of a latent defect which he knows or should have known existed but which is not known to the tenant nor discoverable by him in the exercise of reasonable care; (b) gratuitously undertakes to make repairs and does so negligently; or (c) expressly agrees to maintain the premises in good repair." Nichols v. Marsden , 483 A.2d 341, 343 (Me. 1984) (citations omitted). This rule and its exceptions apply to injuries sustained by a tenant's guest or others on the premises with the tenant's consent. See Stewart v. Aldrich , 2002 ME 16, ¶¶ 2, 6, 10-14, 788 A.2d 603 (applying Nichols and its exceptions where the injured plaintiff was a guest of the landlord's tenant). Finally, unambiguous contract language must be interpreted according to its plain meaning, and that interpretation is a question of law. T-M Oil Co. v. Pasquale , 388 A.2d 82, 85 (Me. 1978).

A. Exclusive Control

[¶8] Boles argues that the court erred in concluding that the premises was under the exclusive control of the Lytles because the Whites reserved the right to access the premises "for purposes of repair and inspection" in paragraph ten of the lease. Under Nichols , a landlord must first establish the landlord's "absence of control in order to avoid liability for a dangerous condition on the premises." Stewart , 2002 ME 16, ¶ 12, 788 A.2d 603 (quotation marks omitted). "Although we have not explicitly defined the term ‘control,’ the cases applying Nichols illustrate that [it] means a power over the premises that the landlord reserves pursuant to the terms of the lease or the tenancy, whether express or implied, and does not include the incidental control that comes from being able to threaten tenants with nonrenewal of a lease or with eviction." Id. ¶ 13. More specifically, "landlords may retain control over non-common areas when they reserve certain rights or responsibilities over the premises by the terms of the lease or tenancy." Id.

[¶9] Applying these principles, we vacated a summary judgment in favor of the defendant landlords after concluding that there was a genuine dispute of fact concerning the degree of control retained by the landlords because they reserved the right to enter the premises to plow snow from the parking lot and did in fact plow snow "whenever necessary." Hankard v. Beal , 543 A.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Me. 1988). Similarly, we vacated a summary judgment in favor of the defendant landlord after concluding that there was a genuine dispute of fact concerning the degree of control retained by the landlord over the basement stairs because, although the stairs could be accessed only through the plaintiff's apartment, there was evidence that the lease did not include the basement or its stairs, that the plaintiffs accessed the stairs only at the landlord's behest, and that the landlord occasionally used the stairs to service the furnace in the basement. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue , 1997 ME 99, ¶¶ 4, 12-13 n.2, 694 A.2d 924 ; see also Chiu v. City of Portland , 2002 ME 8, ¶¶ 12-15, 788 A.2d 183 (reasoning that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the tenants had exclusive control over an exterior window because the landlord had previously repaired an adjacent exterior window, could have repaired the window without entering the residence, had been asked by the tenant to fix the windows at issue, and "did not disavow his obligation to repair" them).

[¶10] The question before us is whether, as a matter of law, the reservation of access in paragraph ten of the lease for purposes of "inspection and repair," without more, creates a genuine dispute as to whether the Lytles had exclusive control over the premises, including the interior staircase. We conclude that it does not create such a dispute. The Whites’ general reservation of access for purposes of repair and inspection is distinct from the landlords’ degree of control disputed in Hankard , Rodrigue , and Chiu . In those cases, there was at least some evidence of shared control in each case between the landlord and tenants—those landlords had actually exercised some form of control, whether reserved or not, over the portion of the premises at issue during the tenancy. See Hankard , 543 A.2d at 1377-78 (landlords reserved the right to plow and did plow snow on parking lot over which control was disputed); Rodrigue , 1997 ME 99, ¶ 12 n.2, 694 A.2d 924 (landlord did not clearly include in the lease the stairs over which control was disputed and used those same stairs during the lessee's tenancy); Chiu , 2002 ME 8, ¶ 14, 788 A.2d 183 (landlord previously repaired windows over which control was disputed).³

[¶11] Our conclusion is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions that have deemed a landlord's mere reservation of the right to enter and repair the premises insufficient evidence of that landlord's control for purposes of liability. See e.g. , Lucier v. Impact Rec., Ltd. , 864 A.2d 635, 640 (R.I. 2005) ("The lease provisions," including the landlord's right to enter the premises to determine whether it was in good condition, "did not give [the landlord] control over the property, but rather were merely to protect [the landlord's] investment and reversionary interest in the property."); Settles v. Redstone Dev. Corp. , 797 A.2d 692, 696 (D.C. 2002) ("A landlord has retained sufficient control to create a duty to repair if he has the power or authority to manage, superintend, direct or oversee," but "the landlord's explicit reservation of the authority to enter the premises and to make repairs is insufficient to constitute retention of control.") (quotation marks omitted); Dubay v. Cambridge Hous. Auth. , 352 Mass. 770, 225 N.E.2d 374, 375 (1967) ("The reservation of the right to enter the tenant's premises to make repairs ... did not put the lessor in control of the premises.") (quotation marks...