Bolger v. Nautica Intern., Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2-06-0578.,2-06-0578.
• Citation: 861 N.E.2d 666,308 Ill.Dec. 335
• Parties: David BOLGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAUTICA INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

861 N.E.2d 666

308 Ill.Dec. 335

David BOLGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAUTICA INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-06-0578.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

January 11, 2007.

Timothy D. Elliott, Rathje & Woodward, LLC, Wheaton, for David Bolger.

Patrick M. Graber, Stephen D. Koslow, McCullough, Campbell & Lane LLP, Chicago, for Nautica International, Inc.

Presiding Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

David Bolger, a resident of Illinois, appeals the dismissal of his complaint against Nautica International, Inc., a Florida company, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The sole issue on appeal is whether Nautica, a nonresident seller who sold a boat to Bolger, had sufficient contacts with Illinois to allow the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. We determine that Nautica did not have the requisite contacts with Illinois to allow the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a breach of contract action that Bolger filed in Illinois against Nautica. Nautica is a company headquartered in Miami, Florida, that manufactures custom inflatable boats based on specifications provided by its customers. On average, it sells one to four custom boats to Illinois residents each year. It does not maintain offices or advertise in Illinois.

In March 2004, Bolger asked a yacht manufacturer in New York to contact Nautica and inquire about its products. The manufacturer contacted Julie Marshall, a Nautica representative in Florida, and told her that several of its customers, including Bolger, would be contacting her about Nautica products for their yachts and requested that they receive a discount. On March 22, Bolger personally contacted Marshall to inquire about terms and prices. He also told Marshall that he would be coming to a boat show in Florida. Nautica sent a price quote through e-mail to Bolger's office in Illinois.

Bolger traveled to Florida to see the boat. During the trip, he met with Marshall, informed her that he was a Chicago-area resident, and told her that he wanted the boat shipped to Italy for installation on a yacht that was being built there. After his return, Bolger sent a fax from his Illinois office inquiring about shipping options. Nautica sent a return fax addressing the questions.

Bolger and Nautica entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of the boat. Bolger signed the quote that Nautica provided and faxed it to Nautica from his office in Illinois. He also remitted payment from Illinois to Nautica in Florida. Nautica sent an invoice to Bolger's home in Illinois. The purchase contract included the terms "FOB Pembroke Pine, FL USA," and "all sales made FOB point of shipment." It also included the statement that "[t]his agreement shall be deemed executed in Miami-Dade County, Florida and shall be construed and interpreted according to the laws of the State of Florida."

Bolger became concerned about Nautica's ability to meet his size and weight specifications and expressed those concerns to Marshall, who he alleged did not address them. When the boat was shipped to Italy, Bolger alleged it was too heavy to meet his needs. On May 20, 2004, he sent an email from Illinois to both Marshall and Nautica's sales manager in Florida, terminating the purchase and demanding return of his money.

On May 23, 2004, Bolger informed Nautica by e-mail that he found a colleague who was willing to purchase the boat and ship it from Italy to Chicago at his own expense. Bolger made a settlement proposal, suggesting that Nautica absorb the cost of the initial shipping to Italy and apply Bolger's money to a new boat that would meet his expectations. Nautica rejected the proposal, and the parties continued to communicate through e-mail about the matter.

Bolger next retained legal counsel in Illinois, who communicated with Nautica via telephone and fax. In July 2004, Nautica offered to refund Bolger's money, provided that Bolger agreed to pay the cost of shipping the boat back to Florida. Bolger responded that he was declining the offer because he was having the boat shipped to Chicago.

In August 2004, the parties entered a settlement agreement. Bolger agreed to pay the initial cost of shipping the boat from Miami to Italy. Nautica agreed to pay for shipping the boat back to the United States and to apply Bolger's money to the cost of a new boat built to his specifications. During negotiations, e-mails and faxes were exchanged between Illinois and Florida. The contract was printed on letterhead of the office of Bolger's attorneys in Illinois and sent to Nautica's counsel in Florida. Nautica later stated that it was unable to build the boat.

Bolger filed a complaint for breach of contract in Illinois. Nautica moved to dismiss under section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. 735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2004). Based on affidavits and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court granted the motion, holding that Bolger failed to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction. The court stated in part:

"The information before the Court does not substantiate there's proper contact with the state for the Court to have jurisdiction. The fact that boats are sold to people who happen to be Illinois residents. [sic] I'm reminded of the many people I know who are Illinois residents, but, in fact, have residences in Florida. And that doesn't mean, because an Illinois resident buys a boat, that necessarily creates a series of contacts."

The court issued an order identified as a final judgment based solely on jurisdictional grounds. Bolger appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Bolger contends that the trial court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Nautica because Nautica entered into a contract for a custom-made boat with a known Illinois resident and sent numerous pieces of correspondence to Illinois.

A. Standard of Review

The plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case for jurisdiction when seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Keller v. Henderson, 359 Ill.App.3d 605, 610, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930 (2005); Spartan Motors, Inc. v. Lube Power, Inc., 337 Ill.App.3d 556, 559, 272 Ill.Dec. 74, 786 N.E.2d 613 (2003). When, as here, the trial court decides the issue of personal jurisdiction based solely on documentary evidence, our review is de novo. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 611, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. In reviewing affidavits and pleadings, we resolve conflicts between the documents in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for jurisdiction has been shown. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 611, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. A plaintiff's prima facie case for jurisdiction can be overcome by a defendant's uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 611, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Section 2-209(c) of the long-arm statute allows an Illinois court to exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2004). Thus, the long-arm statute has been held to be coextensive with the due process requirements of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. See G.M. Signs, Inc. v. Kirn Signs, Inc., 231 Ill.App.3d 339, 342, 172 Ill.Dec. 933, 596 N.E.2d 212 (1992).

"Federal due process analysis¹ requires a three-prong analysis consisting of whether (1) the nonresident defendant had `minimum contacts' with the forum state such that there was `fair warning' that the nonresident defendant may be haled into court there; (2) the action arose out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum state." Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 613, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181-84, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 540-44 (1985). At issue in this appeal is the first prong—whether Nautica had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois so that Illinois courts can assert personal jurisdiction over it.

1. Minimum Contacts

Bolger contends that the necessary minimum contacts existed because Nautica had a systematic presence in Illinois through the sale of its boats, and because it sent correspondence to Illinois. He also points to Nautica's knowledge that he was a resident of Illinois and to Nautica's formation of a sale contract and settlement agreement with him while he was residing in Illinois.

In order for personal jurisdiction to comport with federal due process requirements, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintaining the suit there does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945); Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 612, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. The minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction must be based on some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d at 542; Keller, 359 Ill. App.3d at 612-13, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. "The purposeful availment requirement exists so that an `alien defendant will not be forced to litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or the unilateral act of a consumer or some other third person.'" Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 613, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930, quoting Spartan Motors, 337 Ill.App.3d at 561, 272 Ill.Dec. 74, 786 N.E.2d 613, citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct....