Bond v. Beverly
Decision Date | 02 March 1910 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | BOND et al. v. BEVERLY et al. |
1. Adverse Possession (§ 77*)—Executor's Deed—Color of Title.
Where a person at his death had no title to certain land, it having been sold on execution sale, and his executors conveyed it as his property by a deed sufficient in form to pass the title, the deed was color of title in the grantee.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 455-457; Dec. Dig. § 77.*]
2. Adverse Possession (§ 70*)—"Color of Title."
"Color of title" may be defined to be a writing upon its face professing to pass title, but which does not do it, either from a want of title in the person making it, or the defective mode of conveyance which is used, and it would seem that it must not be so obviously defective that no man of ordinary capacity could be misled by it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Possession, • Cent. Dig. §§ 394-414; Dec. Dig. § 70.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1264-1273; vol. 8, p. 7600.]
3. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 190*)—Title of Vendor—Estoppel of Purchaser.
Where a person is let into possession of land under a contract of sale, he is a tenant at will of the vendor, and the principle that a lessee cannot dispute the lessor's title extends to him.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 384-392; Dec. Dig. § 190.*]
4. Adverse Possession (§ 70*)—Color of Title — Deed Establishing Priority Between Grantor and Grantee.
In an action to recover the possession of land, where defendant's ancestor was put into possession of the land under a deed from H., who had color of title, and the conveyance by H. was void as a deed, it clearly established the privity between H. and defendant's ancestor, so that defendants can rely on the color of title in H. to perfect their own title; and where their ancestor's possession was adverse to plaintiff and all others except as to H., and was continuous and notorious for seven years, it inured to the benefit of H.'s title, and matured that into a good title.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Dec. Dig. § 70.*]
5. Husband and Wife (§ 09y2*)—Disability op Coverture—Repeal.
Revisal 19115, § 303, which declares that in any action in which the defense of adverse possession is relied on the time computed shall not include possession had against a feme covert during coverture prior to February 13, 1899, repealed the disability of coverture since that date.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Husband and and Wife, Dec. Dig. § 69^.*]
Appeal from Superior Court, Hertford County; Peebles, Judge.
Action by J. S. Bond and others against Lucy Beverly and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed.
This is a civil action. The case was presented to his honor below upon the following agreed facts:
The Exhibit A referred to in the agreed facts is the deed from the executors of Lawrence Askew to S. S. Harrell and his heirs, dated June 7, 1886, conveying "one certain tract or parcel of land, lying and being in Hertford county aforesaid, and known and described as follows: The tract of land known as the Powell or Stallings tract of land, owned by Lawrence Askew, and bounded on the north by White Oak swamp, on the east by other lands of said Askew, on the west by t lie lands of W. H. Godwin, J. B. Chamblee, Jr., and Thos. Eiley, on the south by the Slaughter lands, containing 131 acres, be it the same more or less." Exhibit B is the deed from S. S. Harrell to Benj. Beverly, ancestor of defendants, dated December 22, 1890, and contains the following granting clause: etc., describing it as the Powell land and referring to the deed to him by the executors of Lawrence Askew. The deed to Whitmel Young referred to is made by S. S. Harrell on December 22, 1890, same day as the deed to Beverly, and contains a granting clause and description in the same language.
The defendant denied that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in controversy, and pleaded the seven-year statute of limitations and adverse possession thereunder. The agreement between Beverly and Young, establishing the dividing line between them, was in writing duly signed and dated March 30, 1901. The possession of Beverly and his heirs of the western half to the agreed dividing line has been adverse, open, notorious, and exclusive since then; in like manner has been the possession of Young of the eastern half. Upon the agreed facts, his honor rendered judgment that plaintiffs were the owners of, and entitled to the possession of, the land, and adjudged the costs against the defendants, and ordered the writ of possession to issue. The defendants appealed to this court.
R. C. Bridger and John E. Vann, for appellants.
Winborne & Winborne, for appellees.
The title in fee to the land in controversy was undoubtedly at one time vested in Lawrence Askew. It was divested by a deed of the sheriff of Hertford county to John A. Vann on April 5, 1870; this deed being made pursuant to a sale by the sheriff under an execution issued on a judgment against Askew. On November 1, 1871, John A. Vann conveyed the lands to the plaintiffs. Thus they became the owners of it in fee simple; and, as the legal title draws to it the possession, the plaintiffs, nothing else appearing, would be entitled to recover the land from the defendants. The defendants, how-ever, to avoid a recovery by the plaintiffs, show: (1) The death of Lawrence Askew in 1884, his will appointing Slaughter and Willoughby executors, directing them to sell certain named tracts of land and all other lands not otherwise mentioned. (2) A public sale by the executors of the...
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...1127, sec. 353; Rogers v. Hill, 64 S.W. (Mo.) 536; Bay St. Louis v. Hancock Co., 80 Miss. 364; Ezelle v. Parker, 41 Miss. 520; Bond v. Beverly, 152 N.C. 56. And they are therefore estopped to deny the title of appellants. Because statutes of limitations do not apply to church property. Sec.......
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