Bond v. State Farm Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:18-cv-000176 (Erie)
• Parties: PAMELA BOND, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

PAMELA BOND, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants

Case No. 1:18-cv-000176 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 24, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF NO. 78

Plaintiff Pamela Bond (Bond) brings this action, pro se, against Defendant State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) claiming breach of contract.¹ ECF No. 9. Before the Court is State Farm's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 78. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for these proceedings. ECF No., 5, ECF No. 18. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be GRANTED.²

I. Background and Procedural History

Bond's Response to State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because it omits a concise statement of (a) material facts that she contends present genuine issues for trial, and (b) any additional facts that arguably preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Li Xia Lu v. United States, 2019 WL 2371759, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2019). Thus, the following factual background is derived from State Farm's Concise Statement of Material Facts and deemed to be undisputed because Bond did not respond to State Farm's ConciseStatement or otherwise submit any evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Tustin v. Strawn, 2020 WL 3084064, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2020); Boyles v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 3d 470, 476 (W.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd, 809 F. App'x 104 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing LCvR 56.E ("Alleged material facts set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts ... will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.").

Bond moved into a house on Dawson Street in Bradford, Pennsylvania in July of 2017. She insured her property through State Farm. ECF No. 81-5, p. 13, ln. 20-230. Shortly after moving in, Bond experienced difficulties with her home. She claimed, for example, that vandals damaged her property. See ECF No. 80, ¶ 2. Bond has claimed that

[f]ifteen walls of varying sizes have been destroyed by vandal(s). The vandal(s) are as of yet unidentified. The damages occurred over a period of several months. Each time the owner and Plaintiff, Pamela Bond, left her abode, it was noted upon her return that things had been stolen, destroyed, and moved about.

ECF No. 9, p. 5, ¶ 2. Vandals have made extensive physical changes to the property:

The bathtub has been changed twice. Two doors have been removed altogether, four doors have been changed. Old molding has been nailed into the knotty pine estimated to have been worth $164,000.00 in the State Farm Insurance binder. A beetle infestation has resulted. It is also believed that much of the good wood was removed because the boards left behind are not long enough to result in the finished look of uninterrupted Pennsylvania planks of highly polished undamaged wood.

***

The period appropriate molding was all removed and replaced with trash lumber. Estimated cost of replacing the molding runs into the thousands of dollars. When the cheap wood was removed it was noted that excessive damages along with newly placed wires were being hidden by the new "molding". New flowers and shrubs were doused with wine. Floors became scratched and actual holes appeared in the floorboards. Some of the holes in the upstairs bedroom walls are two and three inches wide.

Id., p. 6-7. Bond also claimed that the vandals infiltrated her home with beetles and voles. She notes that

Exterminators do not ordinarily expect beetles to accomplish so much damage to wood and so very quickly. The vandal who leaves his name as genius on the computers and phones he or she left hacked understood how to manipulate natural forces and engage in biological warfare (Exhibit G). Voles now live within the walls and floorboards. People at local hardware stores claim that it is known that they were invited by increased heat in the basement and a smashed foundation wall. Also, cut out areas upstairs and in the attic obviously been used to insert food into the walls for the rodents' consumption.

Id., p. 7.

After State Farm denied her claim, Bond filed suit in this Court, alleging a breach of her insurance contract. See ECF No. 3. She later filed an amended complaint, which is the operative pleading. ECF No. 9. After a period of discovery, State Farm filed its motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. It also filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts, to which Bond did not directly respond. Instead, she file three Responses in Opposition (ECF Nos. 88, 90, and 91) along with a personal affidavit. ECF No. 93. Thus, the matter is now ready for disposition.

II. Standards for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires a court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the lack of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).

The summary judgment standard, as recounted above, "is somewhat relaxed with respect to pro se litigants. Where a party is representing himself pro se, the complaint is to be construed liberally. A pro se plaintiff may not however, rely solely on his complaint to defeat a summary judgment motion." Miller v. McClure, et al., 2020 WL 1049750, *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2020) (citingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 256 ("Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.")). Allegations made without evidentiary support may be disregarded. Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[U]nsupported allegations ... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment."). With these standards in mind, the Court will address Bond's claims.

III. Discussion

This Court has jurisdiction over this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1445 (3d Cir. 1996). Bond is a resident of Pennsylvania and State Farm, for purposes of this case, is a resident of the state of Illinois. See ECF No. 9, pp. 1-2. Pennsylvania law governs this case. In an insurance coverage dispute under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he interpretation of an insurance contract regarding the existence or non-existence of coverage is 'generally performed by the court.'" Tartour v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 2020 WL 489467, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2020) (quoting Minnesota Fire and Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 861 (Pa. 2004) (internal citation omitted)). Bond, as the insured, has the burden of first making a prima facie showing that her claim falls within the policy's coverage. Koppers Co., 98 F.3d at 1446 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law). If coverage is shown, then State Farm has the burden to prove that a coverage exclusion applies. Tartour, 2020 WL 489467, at *3.

Bond has alleged that unidentified vandals "ruined" or "damaged" the Dawson Street residence by stealing, destroying, or moving things within the dwelling during their numerous intrusions. See ECF No. 9, pp. 5-7. She appears to argue these actions and subsequent damages should be covered under her homeowner's policy as "accidental direct physical loss to property." See ECF No. 81-4, pp. 12-13. To determine whether the damage alleged is...