Bond v. State, 49S02-8711-CR-1098

Decision Date25 November 1987
Docket NumberNo. 49S02-8711-CR-1098,49S02-8711-CR-1098
Citation515 N.E.2d 856
PartiesKevin J. BOND, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Richard D. Gilroy, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Kevin Bond was convicted of attempted child molesting, a class D felony. Ind.Code Secs. 35-41-5-1 and 35-42-4-3(d) (Burns Repl.1985). The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Bond v. State (1987), Ind.App., 506 N.E.2d 491. We grant transfer and affirm on different grounds.

The evidence at trial indicated that twelve-year-old D.N. was walking from her home to a grocery in Indianapolis when she saw an adult male, Bond, coming down the street. He stood in a doorway, making the noise, "Psst! Psst!" Unclothed below the waist, he was playing with his genitals. She walked on past, but was sufficiently concerned that she decided to take a different route home.

On the way home, she noticed that Bond was following her, still pantless but wearing a coat. She started to run, and he chased her. D.N. ran to the home of a friend and entered the porch. Bond stopped. D.N.'s friend came to the door, and Bond kept on running.

The question on appeal is whether this evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted child molesting. The substantive crime is defined as follows:

A person sixteen (16) year of age, or older, who, with a child of twelve (12) years of age or older, but under sixteen (16) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the other person, with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Class D felony.

Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-3(d).

Bond argues the evidence does not indicate that he intended to fondle D.N. or have her fondle him. He further asserts that nothing in his actions constituted a substantial step toward doing so. The Court of Appeals held that an adult commits child molesting when he fondles or touches himself "with a child" if the person "uses the child's presence as an aid to the arousal or satisfaction of sexual desires." Bond, 506 N.E.2d at 492. If this is true, Bond did not attempt child molesting; he committed it.

The facts of this case suggest a useful comparison with the definition of public indecency: "A person who, knowingly or intentionally, in a public place ... [f]ondles the genitals of himself or another person ... commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor." Ind.Code Sec. 35-45-4-1(...

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11 cases
  • Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 21 Junio 1991
    ...Indiana officials have brought many public indecency prosecutions for activities having no communicative element. See Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind.1987); In re Levinson, 444 N.E.2d 1175, 1176 (Ind.1983); Preston v. State, 259 Ind. 353, 354-355, 287 N.E.2d 347, 348 (1972); Thomas ......
  • Calvin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 21 Diciembre 2017
    ...powers ties into another reason we do not apply the absurdity doctrine: our narrow construction of criminal statutes. See Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 858 (Ind. 1987) ("[Criminal statutes] may not be enlarged beyond the fair meaning of the language used and may not be held to include offe......
  • Ellis v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 18 Octubre 2000
    ...that criminal statutes be strictly construed against the State." Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind.1996)(citing Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind.1987)). Adherence to this rule requires that we interpret the statute to exempt from the sentencing limitation (1) consecutive sent......
  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 25 Junio 1996
    ...to the school. Additionally, the rule of lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed against the State. Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind.1987). Here again, one is led to the conclusion that the express use of term "knowingly" in the dealing in cocaine statute require......
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