Bone v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 1897 |
| Citation | 30 S.E. 845,102 Ga. 387 |
| Parties | BONE et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It is not good cause for granting a new trial in a criminal case that the judge, after correctly charging concerning the law in relation to "reasonable doubt" of the defendants' guilt, added in connection therewith "but if, on the other hand, you are satisfied of their guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty, then it would be your duty to find them guilty," it being apparent from the instructions as to reasonable doubt, taken all together that the judge intended to convey to the jury the idea that the reasonable and moral certainty of guilt to which he referred was mental conviction excluding any reasonable doubt of guilt.
2. It is not error in the trial of a criminal case for the presiding judge to charge the jury that when the state makes out a prima facie case against the defendants, "and the defense of alibi is relied on, then the burden of proof is on the defendants to show you, by the preponderance of the evidence offered, that, at the time and place in question, it was impossible for the defendants to have been there," when, immediately after such charge, he instructs the jury to consider all the evidence offered,--the evidence touching the alibi and all other parts of the case,--with reference to determining whether the evidence offered is so strong as to convince them of the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Where, in the trial of a criminal case, a witness who had testified that he did not know the defendants personally "such as going with them and dealing with them," was sought to be impeached by showing that he had made contradictory statements, it was not error, after having admitted for this purpose (the foundation being first laid) testimony showing that the witness had theretofore told different persons named that he and the defendants had together broken into a certain store and taken goods therefrom, to charge the jury with respect to such testimony as follows: "That evidence is admitted solely for the purpose of impeaching witnesses, and not as affecting the guilt of these defendants, other than it may affect what you believe to be the truth of what any witness may have testified."
4. The motion for a new trial, so far as certified, discloses no errors of law in the rulings made upon the trial, and, the verdict being supported by the evidence, the discretion of the presiding judge in refusing to grant a new trial will not be disturbed.
5. Where the evidence is close, the failure of the judge to give a clear, unequivocal, and correct charge upon the law of reasonable doubt ought to result in a new trial. Per Fish and Cobb, JJ., dissenting.
(a) The charge complained of in the present case did not come up to this standard, and is not susceptible of the construction placed thereon in the first headnote. Per Fish and Cobb, JJ., dissenting.
Lem Bone and another, being convicted of robbery, applied for a new trial, which was denied, and they bring error. Affirmed.
R. J. Jordan, for plaintiffs in error.
C. D. Hill, Sol. Gen., for the State.
The evidence in the case was sufficient to support the finding of the jury that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, and there was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial on the general grounds set out in the original motion. By the amended motion exceptions are taken to several parts of the charge given to the jury by the presiding judge, which we will consider seriatim.
The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grounds of the motion are not certified by the judge, and cannot, therefore, be considered by this court. The first and second grounds, being the general grounds which, as said above, were properly overruled, we are only to consider the errors alleged to have been committed by the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth grounds of the motion, and do so in the order indicated by the headnotes to this decision.
1. Error is assigned in that the court charged the jury as follows: "But if, on the other hand, you are satisfied of their guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty, then it would be your duty to find them guilty." This charge undoubtedly states a correct principle of law, unless it qualifies another rule for the ascertainment of guilt,--that relating to the doctrine of reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants. To ascertain what if any, qualification was made of the rule on reasonable doubt, reference should be had to that portion of the charge in which the language given is used, and also to the part in which the law as to reasonable doubt was given. In the opening of his charge after stating the issue made by the bill of indictment and the plea, and defining the offense with which the defendants were charged, the presiding judge directed the jury in these words: "If you believe from the evidence in this case that these defendants themselves, or acting and participating with others, did in this county, within four years," etc., -- giving the acts necessary to constitute the offense,--then adding: So that, in the outset of his instructions, the judge told the jury that the defendants could not be found guilty unless their guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this part of the charge there can be no question that this cardinal rule in criminal cases was impressed on the minds of the jurors. The paragraph of the charge in which the language excepted to in the motion is contained is as follows: A fair analysis of this charge would make it read thus: The words of the charge give the defendants all the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and fix the reasonable and moral certainty necessary to convict as a state of mind reached in the absence of a reasonable doubt. One thing is quite apparent from the words of the charge; that is, that the jury would not be authorized to convict if they had a reasonable doubt of guilt, nor unless they were morally and reasonably certain of such guilt. It is difficult to conceive how the mind of a juror may reach a conclusion as to a fact to the point of moral certainty, and yet be rendered uncertain by the existence of a doubt of that fact which is reasonable. Absolute certainty of any fact is not to be attained in the trial of a case. Moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be expected. Pen. Code, § 986. Mental conclusion that a fact exists can rest only on the evidence which produces absolute certainty, or on that which forces the mind to act in accordance with it. The latter is moral certainty. Territory of Montana v. McAndrews, 3 Mont. 165. As the former is not attainable, and therefore not necessary in determining the guilt of a person charged with a crime, the latter is sufficient. When the mind reaches a state of absolute certainty, there can, of course, exist no doubt of the fact so established. When moral certainty of the truth of a fact exists, that state of mind is not incompatible with doubt, nor is it required to authorize a conviction that the minds of the jury shall be absolutely free of doubt, but a reasonable doubt of his guilt shall acquit the defendant, and moral and reasonable certainty cannot exist when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 715, citing Burt v. Insurance Co., 115 Mass. 1. In Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, Chief Justice Shaw instructed the jury...
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