Boney v. Atl. & N. C. R. Co
| Decision Date | 16 October 1907 |
| Citation | 146 N. C. 248,58 S.E. 1082 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | BONEY v. ATLANTIC & N. C. R. CO. |
Under Revisal 1905, § 2646, denying the defense of assumption of risk when an employ^ is injured by any defect in machinery, a nonsuit in an action by a servant for injuries resulting from a defective handcar on which he was riding is properly refused.
Where a servant who was injured while riding on a defective hand car had repeatedly reported it to his superior as defective, a'nd the superior had promised to furnish another, but had failed to do so, there was no assumption of risk.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, §§ 638-643.]
In an action by a servant for injuries received while riding on a defective hand car, evidence considered, and held to sustain a finding against contributory negligence.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, §§ 939-949.
Contributory negligence to bar a recovery must be shown to be the proximate cause of the injury.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, § 795.]
In a personal injury action, the amount of damages is a question for the jury.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Damages, § 533.]
If the verdict is for excessive damages, the court has power to set it aside.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 37, New Trial, §§ 153-156.]
A refusal of the trial court to set aside a verdict as excessive is not reviewable.
[Ed. Note.—For oases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 3873.]
Appeal from Superior Court, Lenoir County; Long, Judge.
Action by H. F. Boney against the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Rouse & Land and L. I. Moore, for appellant. G. V. Cowper and Loftin & Varser, for appellee.
The plaintiff was injured in consequence of using a defective hand car, whose defects he had repeatedly reported to his superior, who had promised to furnish another hand car, but had failed to do so. The nonsuit was properly refused, both because of the fellow servant law (Revisal 1905, § 2646), which denies the defense of assumption of risk when an employe is injured "by any defect in the machinery, ways and appliances of the company" (Coley v. Railroad, 128 N. C. 534, 39 S. E. 43, 57 L. R. A. 817), and, even independently of that statute, because the plaintiff had reported the defective hand car to his superior, and had been promised another one (Labatt, Master & Servant, p. 86 [b], and section 423, p. 1193).
The defendant relied on the defense of contributory negligence, but that issue was found in favor of the plaintiff. The acts complained of were that the plaintiff, in charge of the hand car, was standing up, helping his men work the lever up and down running the car, and, looking back, saw the train six miles off, and about this time the hand car flew the track, solely from the defect, previously reported, in its running gear. The rules of the company required the hand car to betaken off 20 minutes before the train passed. It is not clear whether the accident occurred 20 minutes before the train passed or not, but there was no causal connection between the passage of the train and the injury, and the jury so found. It may be that the court might well have instructed the jury that, if they believed the evidence, to find the issue of contributory negligence in the negative. Certainly the defendant has no cause of complaint, for the court gave the instructions asked by the defendant with the proper modification that, if the conduct of the plaintiff should be found as stated in the defendant's prayers and was the proximate cause of the injury to answer the issue of contributory negligence, "Yes, " otherwise, "No." Negligence to bar a recovery must be shown to be the proximate cause of the injury. Baker v. Railroad, 118 N. C. 102, 24 S. E. 415; Reems-bottom v. Railroad, 138 N. C. 38, 50 S. E. 448, cited and affirmed Allen v. Railroad (at this temi) 58 S. E. 1081. The charge as to quantum of damages follows that approved in Wallace v. Railroad, 104 N. C. 452, 10 S. E. 552, and recently in Ruffln v. Railroad, 142 N. C. 129, 55 S. E. 86.
The amount of damages was a matter of fact, of which the jury were the judges. If their finding was excessive, his honor, who heard the evidence, had the corrective power to set it aside. His refusal to do so is not reviewable by us. This is well settled by numerous decisions of this court. Norton v. Railroad, 122 N. C. 937, 29 S. E. 886, and cases there cited. There are states under the wording of whose Constitutions the appellate court can review the question of excessive damages, and it may not be improper to say that in those courts verdicts for damages for wrongful death and for personal injuries sustained by employes and others by reason of negligence in operating railroads, much greater in amount than those ordinarily returned by juries in cases coming up to this court, have been sustained as not excessive.
No error.
WALKER, J. (dissenting). I wish that I could fully concur with my associates in the decision of this case, because I regard the neglect of the defendant to repair the hand car, if the evidence is to be believed, as not only gross, but cruel. It is one of the first duties of the master to care for the safety of his employes, and in the discharge...
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