Bonica v. Gracias, 43086
| Decision Date | 11 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 43086,43086 |
| Parties | John J. BONICA and Emma L. Bonica, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. Gordon W. GRACIAS and Dorothy Gracias, husband and wife, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Eisenhower, Carlson, Newlands, Rhea, Elliott & Henriot, Ronald A. Roberts, Tacoma, for petitioners.
Wolf, Hackett, Beecher & Hart, James M. Beecher, Wayne C. Vavrichek, Seattle, for respondents.
Defendants' car crashed into the rear of plaintiffs' car on a freeway entrance ramp and this litigation ensued. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiffs, holding defendant driver liable as a matter of law. The court further refused to submit to the jury the issue of plaintiff driver's contributory negligence, finding that the evidence was not sufficient to rise above speculation on that issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling as to the defendant's negligence, but reversed as to the contributory negligence holding. Bonica v. Gracias, 9 Wash.App. 817, 515 P.2d 169 (1973). The Court of Appeals found that there existed a question of fact as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence. We reverse the Court of Appeals on the contributory negligence issue and affirm the trial court on both rulings.
The Court of Appeals opinion sets forth the facts and applicable rules of law with regard to defendant's negligence. We adopt and approve its analysis as to the defendant's being negligent as a matter of law.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question on the issue of contributory negligence. There must be substantial evidence that plaintiff's own negligence proximately contributed to the injury or evidence from which such negligence can be reasonably inferred. Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wash.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942).
The only contention by defendant is that the plaintiff's stop was unreasonably abrupt because plaintiff struck the car ahead of him. It does not follow that such abrupt stop was a proximate cause of the collision between plaintiff and defendant. It is apparent that if plaintiff had stopped just short of the car ahead, the defendant would have still struck plaintiff's car. As the trial court observed, a freeway entrance ramp presents a classic example of an area where abrupt stops should be anticipated. The expected is exactly what occurred here.
Defendant presented no evidence of plaintiff's...
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Steffen v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises
...is some correlation here with rear end collision cases where automobiles are stopped at traffic signs or signals. Bonica v. Gracias, 84 Wash.2d 99, 524 P.2d 232 (1974) (where stops can be anticipated, even abrupt stops, no contributory negligence instruction should be given); Taylor v. Culp......
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State v. Judge
...contributory negligence was a supervening cause without which her negligence would not have caused the accident. Bonica v. Gracias, 84 Wash.2d 99, 100-01, 524 P.2d 232 (1974); Everest v. Riecken, 26 Wash.2d 542, 546, 174 P.2d 762 (1946). Given the facts of the present case, her ability to m......
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Ryan v. Westgard, 2737--I
...with the preceding vehicle by allowing for those actions which should be anticipated under the circumstances. Bonica v. Gracias, 84 Wash.2d 99, 524 P.2d 232 (1974). A following driver is not negligent as a matter of law when he collides with the preceding vehicle if the preceding vehicle st......
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Ream v. United States
...liable for negligence after rear-ending vehicle that had stopped suddenly on highway after displaying break lights); cf. Bonica v. Gracis, 524 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1974) (noting freeway entrance ramp as classic example of where abrupt stops should be anticipated). Ultimately, Reeves did not beli......