Bonner v. Milledgeville Ry. Co

• Decision Date: 15 May 1905
• Citation: 50 S.E. 973,123 Ga. 115
• Parties: BONNER. v. MILLEDGEVILLE RY. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

123 Ga. 115

50 S.E. 973

BONNER.

v.MILLEDGEVILLE RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 15, 1905.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—TITLE OF ACT—HAIL-ROADS—SPUR TRACK.

1. An act to incorporate a named railroad company, "and to define its rights, powers and privileges, and for other purposes, " is not unconstitutional, as containing matter different from that expressed in its title, or as relating to more than one subject-matter, because in the body of the act it is provided that the corporation shall have the right to construct and equip such lines or routes "as have already or may hereafter be agreed upon and contracted for" by the corporators and the municipal authorities of the city in which the line is to be constructed, and that "the use and enjoyment of so much of the public streets of said city as has heretofore been granted to said corporators by [the municipal authorities], is hereby confirmed in and unto the said corporation."

2. Under such an act, passed in 1888 (Laws 1888, p. 140), where a company operating under the charter thus created is granted the right by the municipal authorities in 1905 to lay a spur track in the streets of the city, the right so granted may be exercised independently of the question whether the original charter right to lay spur tracks was exhausted with the first use.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Baldwin County; H. G. Lewis, Judge.

Action by C. H. Bonner against the Milledgeville Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

J. D. Howard and Hines & Vinson, for plaintiff in error.

Allen & Pottle, for defendant in error.

FISH, P. J. This was an action to enjoin the Milledgeville Railway Company from constructing a spur track on its line of railroad on a named street in the city of Milledgeville. The petition alleged that for various reasons the proposed track would be injurious to the plaintiff, and would constitute a public nuisance, and that the defendant was without charter authority to do the work contemplated. A temporary restraining order was granted, but on the hearing this was dissolved, and an interlocutory injunction was denied, whereupon the plaintiff excepted. The evidence as to the alleged injurious effect upon the plaintiff of the laying of the track proposed was directly in conflict, and would have supported a decision for either the plaintiff or the defendant. The case as argued in this court turns entirely upon the authority of the defendant company to lay the track.

1. The defendant is operating under a charter granted in 1888 to the Milledgeville & Asylum Dummy Railroad Company, whose successor it is. The title of the act incorporating that company is as follows: "An act to incorporate the Milledgeville and Asylum Dummy Railroad Company, and to define its rights, powers and privileges, and for other purposes." Laws 1888, p. 146. By section 4 (page 148) it was provided "that said cor poration shall have full power and authority to survey, lay out, construct, equip, use and enjoy lines or routes of said road in the city of Milledgeville, as have been already or may hereafter be agreed upon and contracted for by the aforesaid corporators and the mayor and aldermen of said city of Milledgeville; and the use and enjoyment of so much of the public streets of said city as has heretofore been granted to said corporators by the said mayor and aldermen is hereby confirmed in and unto the said corporation." It is urged by counsel for the plaintiff that the act of incorporation is unconstitutional, in that it contains matter...