Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 1

Decision Date12 October 1978
Docket NumberM,No. 78-1502,No. 1,1,78-1502
Citation585 F.2d 347
PartiesJeanette BOOKER, by Curtis C. Chivers, her grandfather and guardian ad litem, David G. Hage, by George S. Hage, his father and guardian ad litem, and Montez Willis, by James M. Willis, her father and guardian ad litem, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees, v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA, Superintendent of Schools, Special School Districtinneapolis, Minnesota and Chairperson, Board of Education, Special School Districtinneapolis, Minnesota, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Duane W. Krohnke of Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellants.

Charles Quaintance, Jr. of Maslon, Kaplan, Edelman, Borman, Brand & McNulty, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees; William Z. Pentelovitch, Minneapolis, Minn., on brief.

Larry B. Leventhal, Minneapolis, Minn., amicus curiae, for Indian Parent Committee of Minneapolis, et al.

Walter W. Barnett and Thomas M. Keeling, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae, for United States; Andrew W. Danielson, U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., and Drew S. Day, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., on brief.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and ROSS and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

HENLEY, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by public school authorities of Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1 from an order entered on May 22, 1978 by District (now Senior) Judge Earl R. Larson of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in a school integration suit commenced in 1971 by and on behalf of Negro students residing in the District. Plaintiffs were permitted to maintain the action as a class suit for the benefit of all public school students in the District, including white, black and Indian (Native American) students and other groups of students who were members of identifiable minority groups.

In 1972 Judge Larson found that since at least 1954 2 the public schools of the District had been racially segregated, that the segregation that had existed and continued to exist was due at least in part to Board action intentionally taken, and that the segregation had to be eliminated. While the district court was able to approve in large measure a desegregation/integration plan that the Board had submitted pendente lite, Judge Larson felt that the plan had to be strengthened in certain areas including both student and faculty integration. The decree established guidelines for allowable percentages of minority students that might be enrolled in the respective schools of the District; it dealt with faculty integration in both elementary and secondary schools; it forbade further school construction without judicial approval; and it required the Board to submit semi-annual status and progress reports to the court. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, 351 F.Supp. 799 (D.Minn.1972). There was no appeal from that decree.

Between May, 1972 and May, 1978 the Board submitted ten semi-annual reports, and in those reports it requested from time to time that modifications of the court's original directives be made, and from time to time the district court allowed modifications generally favorable to the Board. In 1977 the Board asked the district court to dissolve its injunction and release its jurisdiction in the case; Judge Larson refused to do so, and there was no appeal from his order.

In its tenth semi-annual report filed in early 1978 the Board renewed its request for a dissolution of the injunction; alternatively, it prayed for leave substantially to increase minority enrollments in individual schools and particularly in schools having a high concentration of Indian students.

The district court dealt with the alternative prayers for relief in a full opinion. Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis et al., 451 F.Supp. 659 (D.Minn. 1978). It refused to dissolve the injunction. It did grant some limited relief in the area of minority assignments. The relief was not satisfactory to the Board, and it appealed. The district court refused to stay its order pending appeal, and presumably it went into effect with the opening of school in September of the current year.

For reversal the District contends that in view of the progress that it has made toward integration and in view of recent Supreme Court decisions the district court should have dissolved its injunctive orders in toto. The principal cases cited by the Board are Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Alternatively, the Board contends that the district court erred when it refused to permit the District to enroll minority students up to 50% In any school and up to 60% In schools having an Indian student population of 30% Or more.

As to the differentiation between 50% And 60% In schools where Indian students are concentrated, the Board argues that the differentiation is necessary if the Indian students are to derive full benefit from federal programs designed to meet the special educational needs of Indian students, and which programs have been federally funded. The Board also argues that the plan mandated by the district court unreasonably disperses Indian students throughout the individual schools operated by the District.

We pause for a moment to observe that this is a three-sided lawsuit. We have, to begin with, the plaintiffs and the defendants. But the district court allowed and we have allowed limited participation in the case by Amici curiae consisting of the federal Department of Justice and certain organizations said to be devoted to the educational and other interests of Indians. 3

The position of the Negro plaintiffs and of the Department of Justice is that the 1978 decision of the district court should simply be affirmed. The position of the other Amici is that the Indian children in the District are entitled to special consideration, and should not be deprived of the benefits of programs designed for the needs of Indian students, which programs apparently are not available in all of the District's schools. 4

The disputes in the case do not involve so much what the underlying facts are but rather what further action, if any, should be taken if effective integration of the Minneapolis public schools is to be achieved and if the legitimate interests of Indian children in the area of special education are to be protected.

I.

Historically, the population of Minneapolis has been overwhelmingly Caucasian. However, at least in recent years the City has acquired a minority population that is made up principally of blacks and Indians, although some smaller identifiable minority groups are present.

During the 1971-72 school year when this litigation was commenced the District was operating 94 schools. There were 11 high schools, 15 junior high schools, and 68 elementary schools.

The total enrollment during the year just mentioned was 65,201 students of which 55,735 were white. There were 6,351 Negroes in the system, making up a little less than 10% Of the student population. There were 2,225 Indians who made up slightly more than 3% Of the population, and there were 890 other students who would be classified as minority students. Thus, the over-all minority student percentage in the schools was about 14.5%.

It should be kept in mind, however, that this small minority student population was not distributed evenly among the schools. As in other cities throughout the country, the minority populations of Minneapolis were concentrated in limited areas due to economic conditions, low rent housing policies, and the natural desire of people of the same race or ethnic group to live in the same neighborhoods. As a consequence of this segregated residential pattern, and the adherence of the Board to the conventional neighborhood school doctrine, the minority school population of Minneapolis has been concentrated in a few of the numerous schools operated by the District, and those few schools have been racially definable. The situation that existed in the District's schools in 1971-72 is fully described in Judge Larson's original opinion, Supra, 351 F.Supp. at 802-03.

Judge Larson found that in 1972 a system-wide segregated school system existed, and that the system had in large measure been created and maintained by intentional actions on the part of school authorities that were calculated to segregate the schools along racial lines. 351 F.Supp. at 803-06. 5 Although Judge Larson found that under the pressure of the litigation great strides toward desegregation had been made by the District, he also found that prior to the filing of the suit very little had been done toward voluntary integration, and the lack of action had admittedly been due to public opposition to the concept of integration. 351 F.Supp. at 806.

Finding that the segregation that existed in the schools of the District was unconstitutional, the district court directed that it be eliminated, and in that connection it established guidelines for the assignment of minority students to schools and for faculty desegregation. 6 As to guidelines for student assignments, the district court did not initially distinguish between members of various minority groups; the court simply stipulated that the minority enrollment in any school was not to exceed 35% Of the total population. 7

Since there was no appeal from the original order or decree, we start with the proposition that as late as May, 1972 the Minneapolis public schools were racially segregated, and that the segregation was system-wide.

II.

Between the spring of 1972 and the...

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