Boomer v. Gibbs
Decision Date | 06 March 1894 |
Citation | 19 S.E. 226,114 N.C. 76 |
Parties | BOOMER et al. v. GIBBS. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Hyde county; Hoke, Judge.
Civil action by W. W. Boomer and others against Alexander Gibbs for title and possession of land, tried at the fall term, 1892 of the superior court of Hyde county, before Hoke, Judge. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
The plaintiffs deraigned title through (1) grant to William Watson dated October 2, 1817; (2) will of William Watson devising one-half of the land covered by the patent, each, to his sons, Augustus and James M. Watson; (3) deeds of James M Watson to plaintiff W. W. Boomer dated February, 1873, and of Augustus Watson to plaintiff Riley Murray dated August, 1852 conveying their respective interests in the land embraced within the limits of the patent, which, it is admitted, covers the locus in quo. The defendant relied upon two defenses: (1) That the locus in quo was covered by a grant to John Gray Blount dated November 26, 1799; (2) upon possession under a deed from Eli Smallwood to Thomas Gibbs dated November 26, 1849, and the will of said Thomas Gibbs, dated in 1854, devising said land to the defendant Alexander Gibbs.
The testimony of the surveyor, Wahab, was as follows: The witness further testified that he surveyed the Smallwood deed from Benson's southwest corner at T and then to 8, and then to I, and then to S, which was pointed out to him as the southeast corner of the John Benson land, at a point on the Weston Long patent; that he did not make any actual survey east of that point; that he did not know where the Samuel Weston house was built, but that he knew where Bluff bay was, and the other points called for in the Smallwood deed south of this point S,--and from such knowledge testified that the remaining lines of the Smallwood deed would close up and embrace the locus in quo.
W. B. Rodman, for appellants.
L. C. Latham, for appellee.
The land in controversy is included within the lines indicated on the map by the letters and figures 8, I, D, C, B to 8; and the first question raised by the testimony was whether the limits of the John Gray Blount patent extended north to V and then ran south, 82 east, so as to include the locus in quo, or no further north than A, so that the next line would run south of it to B. The call of the patent which gave rise to the dispute was: "Then, with the same, [English's ditch, just previously mentioned as the terminus of the line running west 220 poles,] and the road, northwardly, seven hundred and fifty (750) poles, to a point 160 poles from the lake along the road." If the point A had been shown by undisputed testimony, or had been admitted to have been 160 poles from the margin of the lake, and along the road mentioned, when the survey was made under which the grant was issued, such positive proof would have controlled course and distance, and established the location of the corner at A, though less than 750 poles from the last station. Strickland v. Draughan, 88 N.C. 315. But, as the testimony was conflicting, it was the province of the jury to determine whether the corner was satisfactorily shown to have been originally located at A, and if, in their opinion, the actual site of that corner was left in doubt by the evidence, it was their duty to be guided by what would, in that event, be the more certain description,--the course and distance. This controverted question of fact was therefore properly submitted to the jury, with appropriate instruction for their guidance. Marsh v. Richardson, 106 N.C. 539, 11 S.E. 522; Dobson v. Whisenhant, 101 N.C. 645, 8 S.E. 126; Jones v. Bunker, 83 N.C. 324; Redmond v. Stepp, 100 N.C. 212, 6 S.E. 727; Spruill v. Davenport, 1 Jones (N. C.) 203. If the Blount...
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