Boomsma v. Star Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-C-895.,No. 99-C-896.,99-C-895.,99-C-896. |
| Citation | 202 F.Supp.2d 869 |
| Parties | Noreen BOOMSMA, as personal representative of the Estates of Thomas G. Boomsma, deceased, and Chelsea Boomsma, deceased; June Caplinger, as personal representative of the Estate of Sharon L. Boomsma, deceased; and Thomas J. Parins, as Special Administrator of the Estate of James A. Spencer, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. STAR TRANSPORT, INC. and Charles I. Bennett, Defendants & Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Stephanie Hansen, Fairwater Garage, Inc., and Auto Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Edmund J. Scanlan, Scanlan Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Paul J. Pytlik, Hills Legal Group, Waukesha, Elliott R. Schiff, Jill B. Lewis, Schiff Gorman & Krkljes, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
These actions come before the Court on a Rule 60(b) motion by the plaintiffs for relief from the Court's Orders of June 26, 2001 and March 7, 2002 as they relate to "choice of law." Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that Illinois law applies to their wrongful death damages claims against defendants Star Transport, Inc. ("Star") and Charles I. Bennett ("Bennett"). In the event the Court decides that Wisconsin law applies, the plaintiffs ask the Court to certify an interlocutory appeal of the choice-of-law issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Also before the Court are a number of motions in limine, including a motion by Star and Bennett that would bar evidence or argument in support of the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both the plaintiffs' motion for relief and their request for certification of an interlocutory appeal. In addition, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence of malicious or intentional conduct on the part of either Star or Bennett to submit the question of punitive damages to a jury under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3). The remaining motions in limine are addressed in Part IV of this opinion.
These actions arise from a tragic accident that occurred near Fond du Lac, Wisconsin in the Fall of 1996, claiming the lives of five Wisconsin residents: Thomas G. and Sharon Boomsma, their children, Chelsea and Owen (collectively "Boomsmas"), and a young man named James Spencer ("Spencer"). At approximately 7:15 AM on September 23, 1996, a semi-trailer truck hit the Boomsmas' car and a school bus from behind. The Boomsmas and their children were killed, along with Spencer, who was a passenger in the rear of the school bus. Defendant Bennett, the driver of the semi-trailer truck, was employed at the time of the accident by defendant Star. As discussed below, Bennett was domiciled in Illinois at the time of the accident and Star was a citizen of Illinois. Bennett was hauling a load of steel from Morton, Illinois to Hortonville, Wisconsin at the time of the collision.
Star and Bennett have asserted contributory negligence claims against the operator of the school bus, Stephanie Hansen ("Hansen"), the school bus owner, Fairwater Garage, Inc. ("Fairwater"), and Fairwater's liability carrier, Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). These parties were all domiciled in Wisconsin at the time of the accident. On November 18, 1999, the claims against Hansen, et al. ("third-party claims") were consolidated with the action brought by the representatives of the Boomsma and Spencer estates.
On June 14, 2001, Judge Reynolds addressed Star and Bennett's motion for partial summary judgment, which sought the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for wrongful death damages under Illinois law. Judge Reynolds analyzed the relevant choice-of-law factors at length and concluded that "it appears that Wisconsin has a more substantial relationship to this action than Illinois." However, Judge Reynolds believed that the record was insufficiently developed to permit a determination with respect to one of the factors: where the injury-causing conduct occurred. Accordingly, he decided to hold the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment in abeyance and make a determination concerning choice of law "after all the evidence has been presented at trial."
A pre-trial/settlement conference with the parties in June of last year persuaded Judge Reynolds that there was no reason to postpone a decision respecting choice of law. Therefore, on June 26, 2001, Judge Reynolds granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed all claims brought under Illinois law.
The consolidated actions were assigned to this branch of the Court on June 26, 2001. The Court decided various issues relating to the admissibility of expert witness testimony on March 7, 2002. In addition, the Court's March 7, 2002 opinion addressed the scope of Noreen Boomsma's claims. Analyzing Wis. Stat. § 895.04, the Court concluded that Noreen Boomsma (Chelsea and Owen's grandmother), lacked standing to pursue a claim for loss of society and companionship with respect to either grandchild and that her claim on behalf of Chelsea's estate would be limited to a claim for conscious pain and suffering. This aspect of the Court's March 7, 2002 opinion rested on the assumption that Judge Reynolds had correctly decided the choice-of-law issue.
In response to the Court's March 7 decision, the plaintiffs filed the instant motion for relief under Rule 60 [276-1]. The plaintiffs argue that Illinois law should govern their wrongful death damages claims against Star and Bennett and that accordingly both Judge Reynolds' June 26, 2001 decision and the portion of the Court's March 7 order limiting Noreen Boomsma's claims should be vacated. The Court ordered briefing on the plaintiffs' motion, over the objection of Star and Bennett that the Rule 60 motion was untimely.
Additional facts and procedural history will be discussed as necessary below.
Rule 60(b) provides a district court with the discretion to afford relief from a judgment or order under certain specified circumstances. Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2001). The plaintiffs' motion rests upon the residual provision in Rule 60(b)(6) that authorizes relief for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Relief is available pursuant to 60(b)(6) only in "exceptional circumstances." Williams v. Hatcher, 890 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir.1989) (quotation omitted); see also 11 Charles A. Wright, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2864, at 357-76 (2d ed.1995).
Illinois courts1 apply the "most significant relationship" test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS to determine the applicable law in wrongful death actions. In re Air Crash Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 611 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S.Ct. 358, 70 L.Ed.2d 187 (1981); see also Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1970). The RESTATEMENT provides two sets of criteria for determining which state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Air Crash, 644 F.2d at 611. The first set of criteria "includes general factors such as the needs of the interstate system; relevant policies of the forum and other interested states; protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 6). The second and more specific set of criteria, found in Section 145 of the RESTATEMENT, provides a list of "contacts" that should be taken into account by the court. These are:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
RESTATEMENT § 145. These factors "are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." Id.
Although Illinois no longer follows the simpler rule of lex loci delicti, the place where the injury occurred remains the single most important factor in applying the "most significant relationship" test. "[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, the highest scorer on the `most significant relationship' test is — the place where the tort occurred." Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton, 174 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.1999). Most often this is expressed in the form of a presumption that favors the law of the place where the injury occurred. See Air Crash, 644 F.2d at 616 (). In the Ingersoll case, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "the local law of the State where the injury occurred should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless Illinois has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties ...." 262 N.E.2d at 595 (emphasis added). Similarly, Sections 175 and 178 of the RESTATEMENT provide:
§ 175. RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship ... to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
§ 178. DAMAGES
The law selected by application of the rule of § 175 determines the measure of damages in an action for wrongful death.
RESTATEMENT, §§ 175 & 178. The commentary accompanying Section 175 suggests that it will be a "relatively rare situation" in which a "state...
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