Boone County, MO. v. County Employees' Retirement Fund

• Decision Date: 27 June 2000
• Citation: 26 S.W.3d 257
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Boone County, Missouri, et al., Appellants, v. County Employees' Retirement Fund, et al., Respondents WD57420 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

26 S.W.3d 257 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

Boone County, Missouri, et al., Appellants, v. County Employees' Retirement Fund, et al., Respondents

WD57420

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

06/27/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Byron Kinder

Counsel for Appellant: John Patton and Mary Mueller

Counsel for Respondent: Mark Anderson and Allen Allred

Opinion Summary: Both the Missouri Employees' Retirement System and the County Employees' Retirement Fund denied LaDonya Hill, Forrest Wonneman, and Susan Tatters' and other similarly situated Boone County Circuit Court employees' participation in their statutorily created retirement programs. Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that they were entitled to participate in either CERF or MOSERS. The circuit court found for MOSERS and CERF.

On appeal, plaintiffs claimed, as a matter of law, that they are Boone County "employees" pursuant to section 50.1000(8) RSMo Supp. 1998 and are thereby entitled to participate in CERF. In the alternative, they argued that they are state "employees" pursuant to section 104.010(19) RSMo Supp. 1998 and are thereby entitled to participate in MOSERS.

Division Three holds: (1) Only those employees whose salaries are paid, at least in part, by the state are state "employees" under section 104.010(19). Because plaintiffs' salaries are paid by the county, they are not state employees for purposes of participation in MOSERS.

(2) In order to qualify as a county "employee" under section 50.1000(8) for purposes of participation in CERF, plaintiffs must: (1) be hired and fired by the county; and (2) have their work and responsibilities directed and controlled by the county; and (3) be compensated directly from county funds; and (4) have a position that requires the actual performance of duties during not less than one thousand hours per year. Although plaintiffs' positions satisfy the third and forth requirements, they do not satisfy the first and second. Thus, they are ineligible for participation in CERF.

There is no directive that all persons are entitled to participate in a pension plan. Because MOSERS and CERF are statutory creations, plaintiffs must fit within their purviews in order to be entitled to participate. Any change in position must come from the legislature and not this Court.

Smith, P.J., and Howard and Holliger, JJ. concur.

C. Howard, Judge

Both the Missouri Employees' Retirement System ("MOSERS") and the County Employees' Retirement Fund ("CERF") denied LaDonya Hill, Forrest Wonneman, and Susan Tatters'¹ participation in their statutorily authorized retirement programs. Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that they were entitled to participate in either CERF or MOSERS. The circuit court found for MOSERS and CERF.

On appeal, plaintiffs claim, as a matter of law, that they are Boone County "employees" pursuant to section 50.1000(8) RSMo Supp. 1998² and are thereby entitled to participate in CERF. In the alternative, they argue that they are state "employees" pursuant to section 104.010(19) and are thereby entitled to participate in MOSERS.

Background

A brief description of this case's background follows, with additional facts included in our discussion of plaintiffs' points on appeal:

Plaintiffs work at the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, located in Boone County, Missouri, as a court security officer/marshal (Mr. Wonneman), a secretary for the court administrator (Ms. Tatters), and a court services officer (Ms. Hill). They were hired and can be fired by the court administrator.³ Likewise, their work and job responsibilities are supervised, directed and controlled by the court administrator. Boone County provides all of plaintiffs' compensation and benefits.

Pursuant to section 50.1020 RSMo 1994, from August 28, 1994, (when CERF was created) until 1996, plaintiffs were allowed to participate in CERF by making monthly contributions of two percent of their compensation to CERF. In December of 1996, CERF's board of directors determined that the county-funded employees who were under the control of the circuit court would no longer be considered "county employees" for purposes of membership in CERF. As a result, plaintiffs' contributions to CERF were discontinued in January of 1997.

After repeated attempts to resolve this matter informally and through administrative processes, plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunction in the Circuit Court of Cole County. Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that, as a matter of law, they were eligible "employees" for purposes of participating in CERF, or, in the alternative, MOSERS. The court granted MOSERS' motion to dismiss early in the case, finding that plaintiffs were not state "employees" as defined in section 104.010(19). Thereafter, plaintiffs and the remaining defendants, CERF and its board of directors,⁴ filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court then also determined that plaintiffs were not county "employees" as defined in section 50.1000(8) and entered summary judgment on behalf of CERF. Plaintiffs now appeal the circuit court's determination that they did not, as a matter of law, qualify for participation in either CERF or MOSERS.

Standard of Review

Although MOSERS was dismissed from this action as a result of the court granting its motion to dismiss, Rule 55.27(a) allows a trial court to treat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as one for summary judgment. See Want v. Leve, 574 S.W.2d 700, 709 (Mo. App. 1978). In reviewing the record on appeal, it appears likely that the circuit judge had to go outside the pleadings in order to determine that plaintiffs were not "employees" under section 104.010(19) and were therefore not qualified to participate in MOSERS. All parties agreed at oral argument that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, that the issue is strictly a matter of law, and that they would like a final determination on the merits. Accordingly, we review this matter as it relates to both CERF and MOSERS as a summary judgment proceeding.⁵

We review de novo a trial court's granting of summary judgment. Dunagan by and through Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Center, 967 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). In doing so, we consider the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and accord plaintiffs all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record. Id. We consider summary judgment "'an extreme and drastic remedy'" and are cautious in affirming it, "because the procedure implicates the denial of due process by denying an opposing party [its] day in court." Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (quoting ITT Commercial Finance Corporation v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 377 (Mo. banc 1993)). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dunagan, 967 S.W.2d at 287.

MOSERS

In their first point on appeal, plaintiffs allege the trial court erred in granting MOSERS' motion to dismiss because, pursuant to the definitions set forth in section 104.010, plaintiffs are "employees" of a "department of the state." Thus, they allege they are eligible to participate in MOSERS, notwithstanding the fact that they are paid and otherwise benefited by Boone County, Missouri.

There is no dispute that Boone County, not the state, paid all of plaintiffs' compensation and benefits. Plaintiffs' argument that they are state employees for purposes of MOSERS, despite their source of income, can be summarized as follows: Section 104.010(19)'s definition of "employee" does not exclude employees hired by the circuit court, nor does it exclude plaintiffs simply because the source of the funds for their salary comes from the county. They argue that following section 104.010(19), a person is "employed by the state" who is "employed" by a "department" into a new or existing position and earns a salary or wage in a position normally requiring performance by the person of duties during not less than 1,000 hours per year. Specifically, plaintiffs argue:

The term "employer" is defined in section 104.010(20) as "a department of the state" and a "department" is defined in section 104.010(16) to include the courts. Since [plaintiffs] are hired by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court through its Court Administrator and the terms and conditions of their employment are governed and controlled by the Court Administrator, they should fall within the definition of employees who are otherwise eligible to participate in MOSERS.

Plaintiffs' (Appellants') brief, p. 22.

"Determining whether a particular employee is a state employee depends on the precise language of the particular statute involved and the general principles in the relevant area of law." Smith v. Thirty-Seventh Judicial Circuit of Missouri, 847 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Mo. banc 1983). Section 104.010(19)(a),⁶ defines a state "employee" as:

Any elective or appointive officer or person employed by the state who is employed, promoted or transferred by a department into a new or existing position and earns a salary or wage in a position normally requiring the performance by the person of not less than one thousand hours per year . . .

When engaging in statutory interpretation, we are required "to determine the intent of the legislature from the words used in the statute and give effect to that intent," while keeping in mind that the language used should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Missouri Com'n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Restaurant, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).

If the language of the statute is unambiguous, there is no basis for construction of the statute and the court must give effect to the statute as it is written. [Citation omitted.] Courts, however, look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute when its meaning is ambiguous or will...