Boone v. Stirling
| Docket Number | C/A 1:22-4551-JFA-SVH |
| Decision Date | 31 July 2023 |
| Parties | Andre Tayson Boone, Petitioner, v. Bryan Stirling, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Petitioner Andre Tayson Boone (“Petitioner”) is an inmate at Broad River Correctional Institution in South Carolina who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge conducted an initial review of Respondent, Bryan Stirling's (“Respondent) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12), Petitioner's Response in Opposition (ECF No. 15), and Respondent's Reply. (ECF No 16).
After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this action prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”), which opines that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and Petitioner's denied. (ECF No. 17). The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.
Petitioner filed objections on May 3, 2023. (ECF No. 52). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). A district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Magistrate's Report, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court must only review those portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
“An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
“Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court reviews portions “not objected to-including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory' objections have been made-for clear error.” Id. (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47) (emphasis added).
The scope of a federal court's review of a habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is “highly constrained.” Lawrence v.Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 707 (4th Cir. 2008). The Court cannot grant a § 2254 petition “with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court” unless the state court decision was “either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the [United States] Supreme Court,” id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), or if the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Richey v. Cartledge, 653 Fed.Appx. 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). The Court “must presume state court findings of fact to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Additionally, the legal standard employed in a motion for summary judgment is well-settled and correctly stated within the Report. Accordingly, that standard is incorporated herein without a recitation.
As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report (ECF No. 17), however, this Court will provide a summary for context. In April of 2007, a Richland County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for the murder of Brian Wright following a shootout that occurred late at night on February 18, 2007, at a Waffle House in Richland County, South Carolina. (ECF No. 11-8 at 1877-78). The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Petitioner and a co-defendant and the trial Judge sentenced each of them to forty-five years of imprisonment. (ECF No. 11-7 at 1643, 1624).
After his conviction, Petitioner timely filed an appeal, and on April 17, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The grounds for Petitioner's appeal are fully stated in the Report and incorporated herein. Additionally, on November 1, 2013, Petitioner also filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (ECF No. 11-7 at 1692). By Order dated May 7, 2019, the application was denied and dismissed. (ECF No. 11-8 at 1806-73). The grounds for his application and the PCR Court's ruling are also fully stated in the Report and incorporated herein.
Thereafter, Petitioner's PCR counsel timely served and filed a notice of PCR appeal. Then, on December 9, 2019, Petitioner's appointed counsel, Adam Ruffin (“Ruffin”) filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of South Carolina. (ECF No. 11-13).
Ultimately, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition, and it was denied on August 16, 2022. (ECF No. 11-16).
Now, Petitioner comes before this Court pursuant to § 2254 and asserts the following grounds for relief:
The Report finds each ground for relief to be procedurally defaulted or barred, and as such, the Report recommends this Court deny the Petition and grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner has lodged an objection to each of the Report's conclusions which will be addressed in turn below.
In Ground one of the Petition, Petitioner argues his trial counsel did not object sufficiently to the showing of an inadmissible photograph to witnesses at trial. The Report states this issue was presented at the PCR hearing and the PCR judge denied relief on the merits. Following the hearing Petitioner's appellate counsel failed to raise this issue in the PCR appeal. Thus, the Report finds Petitioner's first ground of relief to be defaulted such that it should be dismissed.
An issue is considered procedurally defaulted or barred when a Petitioner such as the one in this case fails to raise the issue at the appropriate time in state court and has no further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In this situation, the Petitioner has bypassed his state remedies, and as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. Richey v. Cartledge, 653 Fed.Appx. 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2016) ( procedural default bars a district court's consideration of a habeas claim). To overcome default, a Petitioner must show “sufficient cause for his failure to raise the claim below and actual prejudice resulting from that failure.” Id. at 184.
In his objection, Petitioner argues his claim is procedurally defaulted because his PCR appellate counsel was ineffective. He asserts his PCR appellate counsel “abandoned” him by failing to raise this issue among others in the PCR appeal. Additionally, he argues the PCR court erred by finding that that no prejudice resulted from witnesses being shown the inadmissible photograph at trial.
Petitioner's arguments appear to be a rehashing of those presented in his Petition as the Report addresses this exact cause for default and finds “any errors of PCR counsel cannot serve as a basis for cause to excuse a petitioner's procedural default of his claims.” (ECF No. 12 at 21) citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). In his objections, Petitioner does not address the Report's conclusion on this basis or explain how it is in error. Further, Petitioner fails to articulate or demonstrate any additional cause that would allow this claim to overcome its status as procedurally defaulted such that this Court...
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