Booth v. Kirk

• Decision Date: 12 December 1963
• Parties: Howard BOOTH, Harold H. Booth and James S. Smith, individually, jointly and severally, and as partners d/b/a Booth Funeral Home, v. William M. KIRK. 53 Tenn.App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 312

381 S.W.2d 312

Howard BOOTH, Harold H. Booth and James S. Smith individually, jointly and severally, and as partners d/b/a Booth Funeral Home, v. William M. KIRK.

53 Tenn.App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

Dec. 12, 1963.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court April 8, 1964.

[53 TENNAPP 140] Goins, Gammon, Baker & Robinson, Chattanooga, and Walter Fuller, Jr., Oak Ridge, for plaintiffs in error Howard Booth, and others.

Floyd E. Hutcherson, Rockwood, for defendant in error William M. Kirk.

COOPER, Judge.

This action was brought by the plaintiff William M. Kirk in an effort to recover both compensatory and punitive damages for injuries received when defendants' ambulance, in which plaintiff was riding as an emergency patient-passenger, was in collision with an automobile driven by Lloyd McCluen in the intersection of Gateway Avenue and Strang Street in the City of [53 TENNAPP 141] Rockwood, Tennessee. At the time of the accident, the ambulance was being driven by the defendant Howard Booth who, along with the other defendants, was a partner in the business operating under the name Booth Funeral Home.

In his declaration, the plaintiff averred, in substance, that he was found unconscious from carbon monoxide poisoning on the morning of January 7, 1960, and that the defendants' ambulance company was called to transport him to the hospital; that after picking him up, the defendant Howard Booth drove the ambulance at a speed of 75 to 80 miles per hour, even though he knew that the streets were covered with snow and ice, and ignored all signals controlling the movement of traffic over the streets of Rockwood, Tennessee; that when the ambulance, which was travelling South on Gateway Avenue, reached the intersection of Gateway and Strang Street, the defendant Howard Booth entered the intersection against the 'red' light, without diminishing his speed, and struck the McCluen automobile head-on. Plaintiff charged that the defendants were guilty of common law negligence, and also that they violated both the state statutes and city ordinances establishing speed limits, requiring obedience to traffic signals, and defining reckless driving.

The defendants filed special pleas denying the acts of negligence alleged, and averring that the accident was proximately caused by the negligence of Lloyd McCluen in entering the intersection in front of the defendants' ambulance, which was on an emergency run. The defendants also averred that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in inhaling carbon monoxide fumes, or in becoming intoxicated, as it necessitated the emergency [53 TENNAPP 142] trip, and, further, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm as he knew or should have known of the snow and ice on the road and that the ambulance would be traveling at a fast rate of speed in an effort to get him to the hospital.

Before the pleadings were read to the jury, the trial court ruled that:

'The facts involved in this accident, and the question of direct and proximate cause of the accident between the defendants' ambulance and Mr. McCluen's automobile have already been adjudicated in the suit brought in this Court by Mr. McCluen against these same defendants. * * * and is the law of this case in so far as the collision and the causation of it, and the liability of the defendants for the consequence of it is concerned.'

The trial court was further of the opinion that the defense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk as plead by the defendant was untenable as a matter of law, and limited the introduction of evidence to the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries and expenses incurred in the treatment of those injuries Later, in instructing the jury on the issue of damages, the trial court stated, among other things, that:

'Now, gentlemen of the jury, with reference to this matter of punitive damages, the Court instructs you that in the trial of the lawsuit brought by Lloyd McCluen against these defendants, which, as I explained to you this morning, is a complete adjudication of all the facts, the jury awarded the plaintiff punitive damages and that, of course, means that the jury in that case found the defendants guilty of such gross and [53 TENNAPP 143] wanton and reckless misconduct as to justify an award of punitive damages, and those facts have been settled and determined. And the Court instructs you, therefore, that if you find that this plaintiff suffered injuries in and as a result of the accident, he would be entitled not only to such compensatory damages as the jury deems would be right and proper compensation under the proof and under the law as given you for measuring this, but he would also be entitled to a separate sum of money as punitive damages.'

The jury returned verdicts of $1,000.00 as compensatory damages and $1500.00 as punitive damages, which were approved by the trial court. After their motion for a new trial was overruled, the defendants appealed insisting, primarily, that the trial court erred in holding that the defendants were judicially estopped from contesting the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and the award of punitive damages, by reason of the judgment returned against them in a prior suit arising out of the same accident.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment is an extension of the principle of res judicata, and is generally held to be applicable only when it affirmatively appears that the issue involved in the case under consideration has already been litigated in a prior suit between the same parties, even though based upon a different cause of action, if the determination of such issue in the former action was necessary to the judgment. Cline v. Cline, 37 Tenn.App. 696, 270 S.W.2d 499, 502; Thomas v. Fertick, 200 F.Supp. 851 (E.D.Tenn.S.D.); Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., etc., 26 N.J. 307, 139 A.2d 741; Anno. 88 A.L.R. 574; 30A Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 373, p. 418; Restatement of Judgments, [53 TENNAPP 144] Sec. 93; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harvard Law Review 1.

In situations involving multiple claims growing out of the same accident, the courts, with but few exceptions, have held that the doctrine of collateral or judicial estoppel has no application. As stated in 23 A.L.R.2d 717:

'Most courts of last resort which have considered the question have continued to hold, in conformity with the rule announced in the earlier annotation, that a judgment for the plaintiff in an action growing out of an accident was not res judicata, or conclusive, as to issues of negligence or contributory negligence, in a subsequent action growing out of the same accident, by a different plaintiff against the same defendant.' See also 133 A.L.R. 185.

In Suggs v. Alabama Power Co., 271 Ala. 168, 123 So.2d 4, the Court held that the doctrine was not applicable where multiple claims arose out of the same accident and stated the general rule, as follows:

'As we see it, the controlling principle is that a judgment in a suit by one of several persons injured by the same tort-feasor will not operate as an estoppel in favor of or against the other injured persons in their separate causes of action against the tort-feasor. 'It is a general rule that an adjudication takes effect only between those who are parties or privies to the judgment, and that it gives no rights to or against third parties.' Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. Sec. 407, p. 887.' See also Restatement on Judgments, Sec. 93 and comment on pages 464-466; 50 C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 765, p. 293 et seq; 30A Am.Jur., Judgments, Sec. 371, page 411-416.

* * *

[53 TENNAPP 145] 'In other words, even though the identical issue as to negligence vel non of the tort-feasor has already been resolved in another case, the other injured persons and the tort-feasor are not estopped to plead negligence or the absence of negligence, as the case may be, in the trial of the subsequent suits. To be effectual there must be mutuality of estoppels. To hold that the tortfeasor cannot interpose an estoppel in the later cases, after being found not guilty of negligence in the first case, but would be bound in the later cases by a finding of his negligence in the first case would, on its face, be unfair and unjust, and do violence to the principle requiring mutuality of estoppels.'

Plaintiff urges in argument and in brief that the Courts of this state are now committed to the rule that it is not necessary that the parties be the same, or be in privity, or that there be mutuality of estoppels, in order to render a verdict in one action evidence in another; that it is sufficient if the party against whom the verdict is intended to be introduced was a party to the former suit, and that...