Booth v. Maryland, Civ. JFM-02-160.
Decision Date | 03 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. Civ. JFM-02-160.,Civ. JFM-02-160. |
Citation | 207 F.Supp.2d 394 |
Parties | Jonathan F. BOOTH, v. State of MARYLAND, et. al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
John B. Stolarz, Law Office, Baltimore MD, for plaintiff.
Glenn T. Marrow, State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Public Safety and Correctional Services, J Joseph Curran, Jr., State of Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, for defendants.
Plaintiff Jonathan F. Booth has brought this suit against the State of Maryland and five of its employees who work for the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Division of Pretrial Detention and Services ("the division").1 Booth, a member of the Rastafarian religion, has been subjected to progressive disciplinary action for wearing his hair in modified dreadlocks while on duty as a uniformed prison guard in violation of division policy. He alleges violations of §§ 1981 and 1983 and Articles 24 and 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as defamation. He seeks injunctive, declaratory and compensatory relief. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied.2
Booth has been employed for more than six years as a Correctional Officer at the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center (BCBIC). As part of his religious practice he wears his hair in dreadlocks. From a photograph provided by Booth, it appears that the dreadlocks are braided, short and kept tucked neatly against Booth's scalp. See Booth Aff.Ex. 1. After being requested to cut his hair on several occasions by his superiors, Booth wrote to the Warden of the BCBIC, William Jednorski, on November 25, 2001 to notify Jednorski that he was a Rastafarian and that he wore his hair in dreadlocks for religious reasons. See Booth Aff.Ex. B. On November 29, 2001, Jednorski sent Booth's letter to the Commissioner of the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, Lamont Flanagan, and informed the commissioner that he intended to impose progressive discipline against Booth for violation of divisional policy 50-43.See Booth Aff.Ex. C. Section VI.C.2.c. of policy 50-43 states that "[o]nly traditional (i.e., historically acceptable for military/law enforcement uniformed personnel), haircuts shall be permitted." On that same day, Chief of Security George Childs informed Booth that his hairstyle violated division policy and that progressive disciplinary action would be taken if he did not cut it. In response, Booth completed a Matter of Record/Information Report which stated that he wore dreadlocks for religious reasons and that he believed that he was the victim of discrimination. He stated that he did not know what was a traditional military hairstyle and that many female employees regularly violated the division policies on personal appearance. See Booth Aff.Ex. D.
Between December 4, 2001 and January 3, 2002, Booth was subjected to progressive disciplinary measures for violation of policy 50-43 and the department's related Standards of Conduct and Internal Disciplinary Process. On each occasion, Booth was cited for violation of section VI.C.2.c of policy 50-43 and sections II.GG and IV.E.a.1.16 of the Standards of Conduct and Internal Disciplinary Process. Section II.GG states that "[a]n employee shall set a positive example in his/her overall appearance and grooming" and section IV. E.a.1.16 requires employees to "maintain proper appearance." See Booth Aff.Exs. E, G, H, J, K, N, O. On several occasions during this period Booth completed Matter of Record/Information Reports stating that he believed he had been singled out for discrimination. He named three fellow employees, officers Lombardi, Goodman and Lee, that he claimed were violating the division's grooming policies and also stated his belief that none of his superiors had military hairstyles. See Booth Aff.Ex. F, I, L, M, P. Booth also attended two disciplinary mitigation conferences where he informed Chief of Security Childs that he wore dreadlocks because it was required by his religion. See Booth Aff. at ¶¶ 18, 21.
During this litigation, the defendants have acknowledged that in 1995 two employees, one Jewish and one who is apparently3 were given religious exemptions from the grooming policy. See Jednorski Sur-Reply Aff. at ¶ 5; Price Sur-Reply Aff. at ¶ 2. One of the employees continues to work for the division and still had the exemption when this litigation began. See Price Sur-Reply Aff. at ¶ 3. In addition, Booth has identified thirteen other employees that he claims violated the division's policies regarding appearance. See Booth Aff. at ¶ 25. The imposition of progressive disciplinary actions against Booth for wearing dreadlocks has been halted pending the outcome of these motions.
In Count II of his complaint, Booth alleges that the individual defendants have violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by refusing to accommodate his religious beliefs and progressively disciplining him pursuant to policy 50-43. This claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that "a neutral, generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the law has an incidental effect on religious practice." American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990)); see also Hines v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir.1998). Here, there is no indication, either from their language or effect, that the rules that Booth challenges as violative of his rights were targeted at Rastafarians or members of other religious groups.4 The rules "make[] no distinction between action based on religious conviction and action based on secular views" so they are "generally applicable . . ., neutral toward religion and not violative of the First Amendment." See id. Booth argues that because there are secular exemptions to the appearance rules but not religious exemptions, the rules should be subject to heightened scrutiny despite the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.5 He cites Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir.1999), in which the Third Circuit applied a heightened level of scrutiny to a police department's grooming regulation prohibiting beards. Id. at 365-66. The regulation was challenged by two Muslim police officers who were required to wear beards by their religion. Id. at 360. The challenged regulation had a medical exemption to its requirement that all officers be clean shaven. Id. at 365. The court held that heightened scrutiny should be applied when a rule carves out a secular exemption but does not provide for a religious one. Id.; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 ().
Policy 50-43 does include a medical exemption as part of its facial hair rule, but it does not make any exceptions to its hairstyle rule. While the hairstyle and facial hair rules are part of the same policy, they are written as two separate and distinct subsections that are independent from one another. The drafters of policy 50-43 could have fashioned the policy so that the medical exemption applied to the entire policy, but they specifically limited it to the facial hair section, presumably the only place where it was appropriate. For these reasons, heightened scrutiny of the hairstyle policy is not required. See Robinson v. District of Columbia, 1999 WL 420298, at *7 (D.D.C.1999) ( ).6
The challenged rules are rationally related to the division's legitimate interests in public safety, discipline and esprit de corps.7 The defendants argue that requiring guards to have traditional military or law enforcement hairstyles allows them to be distinguished from prisoners during attempted uprisings or escapes. See Jednorski Aff. at ¶¶ 8-10; Childs Aff. at ¶¶ 8-10; Price Aff. at ¶¶ 8-10, 13-16. In addition, the defendants offer testimony that such hairstyles engender respect from prisoners and foster esprit de corps. Price Aff. at ¶¶ 17-18. While the defendants' explanation that guards with dreadlocks might be confused with prisoners during an uprising or attempted breakout might be considered questionable and its elaboration in the present record of its policy rationales is sparse, the defendants have met their low burden. See Hines, 148 F.3d at 358 ( ); but see Francis v. Keane, 888 F.Supp. 568, 578 (S.D.N.Y.1995) ( ). "In the day to day struggle to maintain order and discipline in prison, matters such as how prison employees dress, and whether they conform to policies, have a real impact." Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction, 944 F.Supp. 1359, 1368 (S.D.Ohio 1996). Public safety, discipline and esprit de corps are all legitimate interests and no rational jury could find that the department's hairstyle...
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