Booth v. Mason

Decision Date10 October 1966
Docket NumberNo. 5--3947,5--3947
Citation406 S.W.2d 715,241 Ark. 144
PartiesRoscoe R. BOOTH and Nellie E. Booth, Appellants, v. Curtis F. MASON and Peggy Sue Mason, Husband and Wife, Roy Taylor, Individually, and Roy Taylor d/b/a Safeway Real Estate Company, Earl Rackley, R. E. (Ed) Rogers, and P. L. Moses, Trustees, Chastain Church of Christ, Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Harold C. Rains, Jr., Van Buren, for appellant.

N. D. Edwards, Van Buren, and Gean, Gean & Gean, Fort Smith, for appellee.

HARRIS, Chief Justice.

Roscoe R. Booth and Nellie Booth, his wife, came to Arkansas in July, 1960, from the state of Oregon for the purpose of locating in this state. The Booths desired to purchase a farm, and contacted Roy Taylor, a real estate dealer, living at Alma, Arkansas. Mr. Booth requested Taylor to find a place, and Taylor contacted Curtis Mason and wife, and a Mr. Jennings (who owned a farm adjoining that of Mason), and these people agreed to sell their farms. Taylor showed Booth over the properties, and the latter made a $500.00 down payment, the total purchase price to be $30,000.00, of which the Masons would receive $25,000.00, and Jennings would receive the sum of $5,000.00. On August 16, 1960, Booth gave his check in the amount of $29,500.00 to Taylor in full payment, and received deeds to the property. On July 22, 1965, the Booths instituted suit against the Masons, 1 Taylor, and the Trustees of the Chastain Church of Christ, the complaint containing various allegations:

It was first alleged that the Booths purchased the Mason property with the understanding that it contained 136 acres, but they actually received by deed only 125 acres, and it was asserted that they had been damaged, by reason of the fraudulent and false representations, in the sum of $183.80 per acre, or a total of $2,021.80. Next, it was asserted that the Booths had paid an additional $1,425.68 because part of the property was included in the Soil Bank, and they were told that they could not obtain immediate possession unless this payment was made, since Mason had not received the Soil Bank check; appellants contended that, as owners, they were due to receive the check, and should not have been required to make the additional payment. It was further asserted that, after accepting the down payment on the land, the Masons had executed a deed to a third person for 7/10 of one acre, which land was supposed to go to the Booths under the agreement. Count Four alleged that taxes in the amount of $120.05 for the year 1960 had not been paid; that appellants were compelled to pay this amount and should recover it from the Masons. Finally, it was contended that the sale included certain land which was being claimed by the Chastain Church of Christ, and it was prayed that title be confirmed in appellants, as against the trustees of the church; further, that they were entitled to receive the fair rental value of this property from the Masons; in the alternative, if it were held that the property belonged to the church, appellants asked that they be given judgment against the Masons in the amount of $229.75, the asserted value of this particular part of the land.

The Masons answered with a denial of the allegations, and further contended that every item in the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and laches. Taylor demurred to the complaint, as not stating a cause of action against him, and the trustees of the church answered, contending that they were the owners of a particular 1 1/4 acres, wherein the church was located; that the Booths held no interest, and they asked that title be quieted in them.

The court sustained the Taylor demurrer, and, since there has been no appeal from that order, Taylor is no longer involved in this litigation. After hearing only the evidence offered by appellants, the court dismissed all counts of the complaint as to the Masons. Evidence was then offered by the Chastain Church Trustees, and the court dismissed appellants' complaint, and on the cross-complaint, quieted title in the 1 1/4 acres at issue in them. From the decree so entered, appellants bring this appeal.

We think the court was right in dismissing the first count. For one thing, though the complaint alleges that a written contract was entered into, it does not appear that there was such a writing. Mr. Booth, when asked if he had signed a contract, or 'Offer and Acceptance,' with Taylor, replied, 'He made out a slip. I never did get a copy of the slip.' This is the only testimony relating to any sort of writing. It is, of course, evident that no agreement was executed by the parties, and there is never any explanation of what the 'slip' contained; for that matter, Taylor might simply have been making a memorandum for his own benefit. At any rate, there is no written contract in evidence, and if the agreement was oral, the cause of action was barred after three years. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 37--206 (Repl.1962). However, there are additional reasons why appellants' contention on this point is without merit. Admittedly, Mason made no representations to Booth at all about the number of acres contained in the farm; rather, Booth stated that this representation was made by Taylor, 2 and he asserts that Taylor was Mason's agent. The testimony on this point is rather indecisive. Here again, the evidence shows that Booth contacted Taylor, and asked the latter to locate a suitable farm. The record reflects the following testimony relative to the matter of agency: 'Q. Now Mr. Taylor, you did find him a place and he eventually bought the Jennings and the Curtis Mason Place? A. That is right. Q. Were you paid a commission for the sale of these places? A. I was. Q. By whom? A. By Mr. Mason and Mr. Jennings. Q. Did you act for him during this sale in preparing all the papers and carrying out the transaction? A. I did.'

It is true not at all clear whom Taylor represented (perhaps both). However, the matter of...

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3 cases
  • O. K. C. Corp. v. Allen
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 1978
    ...Bridges v. Henson,216 Ga. 426, 116 S.E.2d 570 (1960), affm'd, Henson v. Bridges, 218 Ga. 6, 126 S.E.2d 226 (1962); Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966); Burton v. Griffith, 226 Ark. 641, 291 S.W.2d 516 (1956). The possession of the members for associational purposes is constr......
  • O'Bryant v. Horn, 89-20
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 13, 1989
    ...of action pled in the appellant's complaint. Further, we note the appellant's reliance on this court's holding in Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966). In Booth, this court held that part of a complaint relating to a property description contained in the warranty deed was con......
  • Scher v. Altomare
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 1976
    ...A.2d 287, 290 (1975); accord, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 663-65, 194 S.E.2d 521, 535 (1973); Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 149-50, 406 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1966). We will therefore vacate the judgment for costs entered in favor of the Altomares and remand the case to the trial ......

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