Boothe v. Sherman

• Decision Date: 03 September 2014
• Docket Number: 13 C 7228
• Citation: 66 F.Supp.3d 1069
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Patrice Boothe, as next friend of K.C., a minor, Plaintiff, v. Adam Sherman, Village of Wheeling, Township High School District 214, and Unknown District 214 Employees, Defendants.

66 F.Supp.3d 1069

Patrice Boothe, as next friend of K.C., a minor, Plaintiff

v.Adam Sherman, Village of Wheeling, Township High School District 214, and Unknown District 214 Employees, Defendants.

13 C 7228

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed September 3, 2014

April Dominique Preyar, Brendan Shiller, Mary Johanna Grieb, Shiller Preyar Law Offices, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

James Vincent Ferolo, Jason A. Guisinger, Lance C. Malina, Mallory Anne Milluzzi, Klein Thorpe and Jenkins Ltd, Chicago, IL, Michael E. Kujawa, Deborah Anne Ostvig, William Charles Barasha, Judge, James & Kujawa, Ltd., Park Ridge, IL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

FEINERMAN, United States District Judge

Patrice Boothe, the mother of K.C., a student at Wheeling High School, filed this suit against the Village of Wheeling, Wheeling police officer Adam Sherman, Township High School District 214 (which encompasses the high school), and unnamed District employees, alleging that they violated and conspired to violate K.C.'s federal and state civil rights, destroyed evidence favorable to her, and committed other torts. Doc. 1. On behalf of itself and its unnamed employees, the District has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss portions (Counts III, IV, V, and VIII) of the complaint, Doc. 22, and Sherman and the Village have done the same, Doc. 25. The motions are granted in part and denied in part.

Background

In considering the motions to dismiss, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir.2012). The court must also consider “documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice,” along with additional facts set forth in Boothe's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those facts “are consistent with the pleadings.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n. 1 (7th Cir.2012). The facts are set forth as favorably to Boothe as permitted by these materials. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir.2012).

On October 11, 2012, Sherman, the on-duty police officer at Wheeling High School, grabbed K.C.'s arms and pulled her out of the school cafeteria and into a hallway. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 11. (Sherman explains in his brief that he was breaking up a fight, Doc. 25 at 1, but that explanation cannot be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.) Despite K.C.'s cooperation, Sherman intentionally tripped K.C., causing her to fall on her face; he then knelt on her back and handcuffed her. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12–16. As a result, K.C. suffered injuries to her back and ribs. Id. at ¶¶ 17–19. Sherman took K.C. to the Wheeling police station and detained her there for several hours. Id. at ¶ 20. K.C. was charged with disorderly conduct, mob action, and resisting arrest. Id. at ¶ 21. Her criminal case remains pending in state court, with a trial set for November 18, 2014. Id. at ¶ 30; Doc. 38 at ¶ 3.

The day after K.C.'s arrest, Boothe, Sherman, and others gathered at the school to watch footage from two surveillance videos; later that day, Boothe submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act (it is unclear whether she means the federal act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the state act, 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. ) with the District to preserve the videos and to provide her with copies. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 22–24. Although the District initially refused to produce the videos because they contained footage of other minors, it ultimately provided them to K.C.'s criminal defense attorney on the order of the judge in the state criminal case. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26. A Wheeling police department report suggested that four surveillance videos had been made, but only two were produced to K.C.'s lawyer. Id. at ¶ 27. The other two “may have contained exculpatory evidence for K.C.” and, according to Boothe, “portions of the video footage [that was produced to K.C.] were altered and/or destroyed.” Id. at ¶¶ 28–29.

The first four counts of Boothe's twelve-count complaint allege violations of K.C.'s federal constitutional rights and are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 31–56; Doc. 28 at 4. Boothe alleges that Sherman used excessive force against (Count I) and unlawfully seized (Count II) K.C. in violation of the Fourth Amendment; that all Defendants, including the unnamed District employees, destroyed exculpatory evidence and provided false testimony (Count III) in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ; and that Defendants conspired to violate K.C.'s federal civil rights (Count IV). The remaining counts arise under Illinois law. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57–101; Doc. 28 at 4. Boothe alleges that Defendants civilly conspired to maliciously prosecute K.C. (Count V); that Sherman, the Village, and the District are liable for Sherman's assault (Count VI) and battery (Count VII) of K.C., as well as for malicious prosecution (Count VIII) and abuse of process (IX) relating to the criminal proceedings against K.C.; that the District is liable for negligent spoliation of the missing or altered surveillance videos (Count X); and that the Village and the District are liable for Sherman's and the unknown District employees' state law torts under theories of indemnity, 745 ILCS 10/9–102 (Count XI), and respondeat superior (Count XII). The court has federal question jurisdiction over the first four claims, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Discussion

The District has moved to dismiss Counts III (Brady claim), IV (federal conspiracy), V (state law civil conspiracy), and VIII (malicious prosecution). Doc. 22. Sherman and the Village have moved to dismiss Count III against the Village only, and Counts IV, V, and VIII in their entirety. Doc. 25. In response, Boothe agrees to dismiss Count VIII (malicious prosecution) without prejudice, pending the outcome of K.C.'s criminal case. Doc. 28 at 9. Boothe also agrees that the District is not a proper defendant on Counts III and IV. Id. at 6. Remaining in dispute are the following issues: (1) whether the unknown District employees and the Village should be dismissed as defendants on Count III; (2) whether Count IV states a claim for relief against Sherman, the Village, and the unknown District employees; and (3) whether Count V states a claim for relief against any defendant.

Before reaching the merits of Defendants' arguments, the court must first consider whether it should abstain under the rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from exercising jurisdiction over Counts III and IV. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (“The District Court committed error in reaching the merits of this case despite the appellants' insistence that it be dismissed under Younger [.]”). Although no party has formally moved for Younger abstention, the court may raise the issue sua sponte . See Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 733 F.3d 705, 713 n. 5 (7th Cir.2013) ; Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir.1996). Younger abstention requires federal courts to “abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir.2007) ; see also Forty One News, Inc. v. Cnty. of Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir.2007). Although “only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States,” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989), state criminal proceedings indisputably qualify as “exceptional circumstances” warranting Younger abstention, see Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). The Younger doctrine traditionally involves claims for injunctive relief, but the Seventh Circuit has long held that it applies even where, as here, the plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. See Gakuba v. O'Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir.2013) ; Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137–39 (7th Cir.1995). That said, a court should not abstain under Younger where “(1) the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) there is an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relief; or (3) the challenged provision is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” Jacobson v. Vill. of Northbrook Mun. Corp., 824 F.2d 567, 569–70 (7th Cir.1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Count I of the complaint alleges that Sherman violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force when arresting K.C. But K.C. is charged in the criminal case with resisting arrest, and whether the plaintiff resisted arrest is one of the factors to be considered in an excessive force claim. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (holding that on an excessive force claim, the Fourth Amendment's “proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including ... whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest”); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir.2013) (same). Because the question whether K.C. is guilty of resisting arrest is intertwined with the question whether Sherman used excessive force, Younger abstention is appropriate on Count I.Abstention is also warranted on Count II, which alleges that K.C. was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. K.C. was charged in the criminal case not only with resisting arrest, but also with mob action and disorderly conduct, and K.C.'s arrest...