Bopp v. Clark
| Decision Date | 12 May 1914 |
| Docket Number | 29,796 |
| Citation | 147 N.W. 172,165 Iowa 697 |
| Parties | M. N. BOPP, Appellant, v. ED. R. CLARK, Sheriff, Appellee |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Fayette District Court.--HON. A. N. HOBSON, Judge.
THIS is a habeas corpus proceeding. The plaintiff herein is defendant in a criminal case and is in the custody of the defendant herein, as sheriff, under arrest in such criminal case. In this proceeding, the plaintiff challenges the validity of his arrest and of all other proceedings in the criminal case against him on the ground that they are based upon an unconstitutional statute. The finding of the trial-court was against him, and he was remanded to the custody of the defendant sheriff, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
H. P Hancock, for appellant.
George Cosson, Attorney General, John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, and C. B. Hughes, for appellee.
I.
The statute which is assailed as unconstitutional by this proceeding is chapter 249 of the Laws of the 35th G. A. which is known by the published title as the "Minimum Wage for Teachers in the Public Schools." Sections 1 and 2 of such act fix certain rates of wages for school teachers, graded according to their proficiency as indicated by their official certificates. Sections 3 and 4 thereof are as follows:
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any school board or any school officer to contract for or pay a less wage to any teacher in the public schools of this state than the minimum amounts herein fixed for the grade certificate held by such public school teacher. But nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the right to make a lawful contract for a higher wage than herein specified as a minimum.
Sec. 4. Any school officer violating the provisions of this act shall be fined a sum of not less than twenty-five ($ 25.00) dollars, nor more than one hundred ($ 100.00) dollars in the discretion of the court, and shall be suspended from office.
Information was filed against the plaintiff charging that as a school officer he entered into a contract with a teacher for the public school of his district for a less rate of wages than provided in such act. A warrant being issued on such information, he was arrested thereunder. He immediately sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this proceeding. We infer from the record that the criminal prosecution is undetermined and still pending awaiting the outcome hereof.
Appellant challenges the validity of the act as being in violation of sections 1 and 6 of article 1 of the Constitution of Iowa. Such sections are as follows:
Section 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Section 6. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.
Counsel for appellant has been unable to cite any pertinent authorities in support of his contention. His argument is brief and is based wholly upon analogy. We think it clear that the sections of the Constitution above quoted have no special application to the case and that they are in no manner violated by the legislation complained of. The school district is a creation of the Legislature. Its powers and the method of their exercise are all defined by legislative act. In like manner the powers and duties of its officers are defined. Such officers have no powers except such as are conferred by legislative act. Prior to the act in question the power of the school officer to make contracts with teachers was conferred by section 2778 of the Code. If the Legislature was within its authority in conferring such power upon school officers, it necessarily had the same authority to enlarge or to abridge the same. Appellant's counsel concedes that the Legislature would have had authority to fix a maximum wage. Accepting this concession, it would seem to follow of logical necessity that it had equal authority to fix a minimum wage. The argument at this point is that the statute in question interferes with the right of the particular teacher to accept such wages as he will, whether below the statutory schedule or not. The manifest purpose of the law is to offer and maintain an inducement to higher standards in the profession of teaching and to encourage competition in qualifications among teachers rather than in the amount of wages. Even teachers whose acquired standards may be equal, as indicated by their respective certificates, may yet vary greatly in their practical success as teachers. As to such teachers, school officers would naturally select the best in preference to the worst, unless such best were underbid in the competition. The purpose of the statute is to eliminate competition at this point below the specified rate.
It is a matter of common observation that school officers are sometimes large taxpayers who have no children dependent upon the public schools for their education. Such officers are under constant temptation to overemphasize the importance of low wages for teachers and to attach too little importance to the qualifications of teachers. In such cases, the lowest bidder obtains the employment, and this often to the great detriment of the public interest. That the rights of individual teachers are not invaded by such legislation is well settled by the decisions of many eminent courts. It will be sufficient to cite Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (24 S.Ct. 124, 48 L.Ed. 148), and the cases therein cited.
Whether the practical working of this legislation will meet the intended purpose can be determined only by experience. All new legislation is necessarily experimental and in a sense tentative. The courts cannot be called upon to guarantee its wisdom nor to condemn it for want of wisdom. All that we hold here is that the legislation in question herein is within the domain of legislative authority.
II. It is further urged on behalf of the appellant that, though the act in question be constitutional, its violation does not constitute a crime within the meaning of the law. The reason urged is that such statute does not in terms declare that its violation shall constitute a crime, and that the only penalty imposed in terms for its violation is a fine, and that no penalty of imprisonment is imposed. The penal provisions of the act are contained in sections 3 and 4 which we have quoted above. Sections 1 and 2 of the act are mandatory; sections 3 and 4 thereof are prohibitory. Section 3 declares a violation of the act by any "school officer" to be "unlawful." Section 4 provides that any school officer who shall violate the provisions of the act "shall be fined . . . not less than $ 25, nor more than $ 100, in the discretion of the court, and shall be suspended from office." Appellant's argument at this point is based upon the absence from the statute of the words "crime," "misdemeanor" or "felony." The argument is that a mere "fine" is equivalent to "penalty" or "forfeiture," and that it may be recovered by civil action without criminal prosecution. In general terms, a crime is an act committed in violation of a public law. 4 Blackstone, 15. Under our statute all crimes are classified as (1) felonies, and (2) misdemeanors. Code, section 5092. Each class is defined as follows:
Sec 5093. A felony is a public offense which is, or in the discretion of the...
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