Bordelon v. Crutcher
| Citation | 430 So.2d 1107 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. CA,CA |
| Parties | Irion J. BORDELON v. Albert B. CRUTCHER. 0108. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US) |
Shushan, Meyer, Jackson, McPhearson & Herzog, Bradley M. Smolkin, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, John W. Haygood, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before GULOTTA and BYRNES, JJ., and G. WILLIAM SWIFT, Jr., J. Pro Tem.
This appeal arises from a suit for restitution of sums alleged to have been mistakenly overpaid by appellee, Irion J. Bordelon, to appellant, Albert B. Crutcher, under a contract entered into in 1964. Crutcher filed an exception of prescription which the trial court dismissed. After a trial on the merits the court ruled in favor of appellee and awarded him $6,199.64. Crutcher has appealed that judgment on both procedural and factual grounds. 1
The facts leading to this dispute are as follows: In January, 1964 Crutcher entered into a "farm-out" agreement with Humble Oil & Refinery Co. whereby he would be assigned specific rights in mineral leases on property located in St. Bernard Parish on the condition that he drill certain wells on the property. To help finance the drilling and completion of those wells, Crutcher, at Bordelon's suggestion, approached the California Co. (Chevron), which eventually agreed to participate in exchange for a percentage of Crutcher's "farm-out" interest.
Crutcher further subdivided his holdings by assigning one half of his retained interest to J.D. Tufts, his business partner. In March, 1964, he entered into a contract with Bordelon in which it was agreed that Bordelon would be assigned 3% of the interest Crutcher would eventually earn from his "farm-out" agreement with Humble Oil. In exchange Bordelon assumed a responsibility for drilling and completion costs proportionate to the interest he acquired from Crutcher.
A dispute later arose between the Bordelon and Crutcher over the percentage of interest due to Bordelon. In 1968 Bordelon filed suit to enforce his understanding of the contract, contending that he was entitled to 3% of the entire interest Humble Oil originally transferred to Crutcher not merely to 3% of the lesser interest Crutcher retained after sub-dividing his original interest.
That litigation concluded with a 1978 decision of this court affirming the judgment of the trial court and denying Bordelon's claim. See Bordelon v. Crutcher, 365 So.2d 1109 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978).
In June 1980, Bordelon filed a petition in the case now before us, demanding that, based on the outcome of the previous litigation, he be reimbursed for the drilling and completion costs which he had overpaid under his interpretation of the contract. Crutcher filed an exception of prescription which the trial court dismissed without written reasons.
Although prescription generally begins to run at the time of the occurrence of the facts which give rise to the cause of action, it does not run against one who is ignorant of the existence of facts which would entitle him to bring suit as long as such ignorance is not willful and does not result from his neglect. Dean v. Hercules Inc., 328 So.2d 69 (La.1976) Langendorf v. Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund, 361 So.2d 905 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978) writs denied 364 So.2d 120 (La.1978) and 363 So.2d 1384 (La.1978).
Although Bordelon knew that Crutcher disputed the extent of his interest before filing the first suit in 1968 he could not know if he had overpaid his share of costs or the extent of such over payment until the trial court in the first suit rendered final judgment. Plaintiff could not have filed a reconventional demand or have timely instituted a separate suit for reimbursement since plaintiff was ignorant not only of the extent of his overpayment but of the whether he had overpaid at all. Thus prescription did not run against the plaintiff on the second suit and the trial judge properly dismissed defendant's exception of prescription.
We now address appellant's arguments concerning the amount which Bordelon overpaid. Crutcher first contends that it was proper for him to have assessed Bordelon with 3% of drilling and completion costs because Crutcher's interest was responsible for all of these costs. This position does not seem to be supported by the facts.
It was conclusively established in the earlier suit that Chevron participated in the drilling of the wells. See Bordelon v. Crutcher, supra, 365 So.2d at 1110. Moreover, the record contains documents showing that appellant, Crutcher entered into an agreement with the California Co., (Chevron) whereby Chevron agreed to pay $50,000.00 of initial drilling costs and, when the well reached a specified depth, elect either to end their participation or pay 75% of completion costs in exchange for 75% of Crutcher's working interest in future production.
Other documents in the record show that when the appellant instructed Humble Oil as to the proper division of the 60% working interest he had earned under the terms of his farm out agreement, California Co. was listed as assignee of 75% of Crutcher's original 60% interest. These documents and the findings made in the earlier case lead to the inevitable conclusion that Chevron elected to participate in completion of the well and consequently participated in payment of both drilling and completion costs.
Thus it appears that Crutcher's interest did not bear the total cost of drilling or completing the well. Rather it seems that completion costs were shared in proportion to the interest each party had in the wells. The Chevron interest paid 75% and the Crutcher interest paid 25%. Crutcher's interest had been divided by him so that his partner Tufts held 12.5% and Crutcher held 12.5%. Crutcher had further divided his interest by assigning 3% of the 12.5% he retained to Bordelon. It is on the basis of this division of Crutcher's "farm-out" that the respective liability of the parties must be calculated.
By the terms of his agreement with Chevron, Crutcher was reimbursed for the first $50,000.00 of...
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