Borden v. Fed. Defenders Office
Decision Date | 07 December 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV-P29-GNS |
Parties | JASON DEAN BORDEN et al. PLAINTIFFS v. FEDERAL DEFENDERS OFFICE et al. DEFENDANTS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff Jason Dean Borden,1 a federal pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Grayson County Detention Center, filed a pro se complaint (DN 1) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents against two Defendants in their individual and official capacities: "Federal Defenders Office" and Thereafter, Borden filed an amendment (DN 15) to the complaint, seeking also to bring his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). He then filed a motion (DN 16) seeking to clarify that "indeed Patrick Bouldin facially is known as Federal Defenders Office [Defendant]." The Court granted (DN 36) the motion and directed the Clerk of Court to add Patrick Bouldin as a Defendant and to terminate the "Federal Defenders Office" as a Defendant.
This matter is currently before the Court on initial screening of the complaint and its amendment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the action will be dismissed.
In the complaint, Borden (who also refers to himself as "Movant") alleges as follows:
As relief, Borden seeks monetary and punitive damages and injunctions in the form of vacatur of all charges against him and appointment of counsel Jerry Gonzalez to represent him.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune fromsuch relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court "recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officersalleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights." Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). "Such claims are the counterpart to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials who infringe plaintiffs' federal constitutional or statutory rights," Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996), and decisional law developed under § 1983 has been fully applied to Bivens suits. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498-504 (1978).
Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. However, "a Bivens claim may not be asserted against a federal officer in his official capacity." Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991). The Court, therefore, will dismiss the Bivens claims brought against Defendants in their official capacity.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will also dismiss the Bivens claims brought against Defendants in their individual capacity.
Defendant Bouldin is an assistant federal public defender, who the Court originally appointed to represent Borden in his pending criminal action, 1:15CR-4-GNS-1.2 To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that a federal officer acted under federal law to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. A federal public defender, however, is not a federal officer acting under color of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1981) ( ); Pagani-Gallego v. Escobedo, No. 97-1640, 1998 WL 381562, at *1 (6th Cir. June 23, 1998) ( ); Bradford v. Shankman, No. 85-5150, 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 1985) (); Arnold v. Greeley, No. 2:14-CV-58, 2014 WL 1878914, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 12, 2014) (). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Bivens claims against Defendant Bouldin.
"[O]fficials enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability related to their performance of 'prosecutorial' functions." Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). "Functions that serve as an 'integral part of the judicial process' or that are 'intimately associated with the judicial process' are absolutely immune from civil suits." Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). "Meanwhile, functions which are more 'investigative' or 'administrative' in nature, because they are more removed from the judicial process, are subject only to qualified immunity." Id. (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486).
Turning to the issue at hand, courts also have held that "plea bargains are 'so intimately associated with the prosecutor's role as an advocate of the State in the judicial process as to warrant absolute immunity.'" Rouse v. Stacy, 478 F. App'x 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2009)); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 492 F. Supp. 386, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) () , aff'd, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1981). Despite Plaintiff's broad allegations that the prosecutor "threatened" him with "malicious intent" to...
To continue reading
Request your trial