Boreen v. Christensen

• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-011,96-011
• Citation: 930 P.2d 67,53 St.Rep. 1450,280 Mont. 378
• Parties: Katharine S. BOREEN, f/k/a Katharine Selby, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George CHRISTENSEN, a/k/a George P. Christensen, a/k/a "Chris" Christensen, and F. Guy Youngblood, acting individually and in the capacities of administrative officers of the Department of Military Affairs, State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 67

930 P.2d 67

280 Mont. 378

Katharine S. BOREEN, f/k/a Katharine Selby, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George CHRISTENSEN, a/k/a George P. Christensen, a/k/a

"Chris" Christensen, and F. Guy Youngblood, acting

individually and in the capacities of administrative

officers of the Department of Military Affairs, State of

Montana, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 96-011.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Sept. 10, 1996.

Decided Dec. 30, 1996.

Peter Michael Meloy (argued); Meloy & Morrison, Helena, for Appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, James M. Scheier (argued), Ass't Attorney General, Helena, for Respondents.

LEAPHART, Justice.

Plaintiff Katharine S. Boreen (Boreen) appeals the September 14, 1995 Order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granting qualified immunity to Defendant F. Guy Youngblood (Youngblood) and dismissing Boreen's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as to Defendant Youngblood. We affirm.

We consider the following issue on appeal:

Did the District Court err in granting Defendant Youngblood qualified immunity on the basis that Boreen's property interest in her employment was not clearly established law at the time she was constructively discharged by the Defendants?

Factual and Procedural Background

Boreen was employed by the Montana Department of Military Affairs. Following her resignation from her employment in April 1990, Boreen filed a complaint against the Department of Military Affairs, alleging constructive discharge under the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act. That action was dismissed because it was filed after the statute of limitations had passed. Boreen then filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ( § 1983) ALLEGING THAT SHE WAS TERMINATED FROM HER EMPLOYMENT with the Department of Military Affairs, and that she was deprived of a property interest in her employment without due process of law. Youngblood, one of the named Defendants, filed an answer to the complaint. Boreen then filed an amended complaint, alleging that she was constructively discharged from her employment. Youngblood filed an answer to the amended complaint, raising, inter alia, the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Youngblood also filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Youngblood made two primary arguments in his motion to dismiss: (1) government employees who are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement or a contract for a specific duration do not have a property interest in their employment; and (2) he was entitled to qualified immunity. Youngblood also argued that the amended complaint was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Following a hearing, in a November 16, 1993 Order, the District Court granted Youngblood's motion to dismiss on the ground that Boreen had no property interest in her employment. The District Court rejected the argument that Boreen's complaint was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The District Court declined to rule on the question of whether Youngblood was entitled to qualified immunity.

Boreen submitted an interlocutory appeal of the November 16, 1993 Order to this Court, which reversed the District Court's decision. Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 884 P.2d 761 (Boreen I ). This Court determined that Boreen, whose employment was subject to "just cause" requirements for termination, had a property interest in her employment and could therefore maintain an action under § 1983. The issues of qualified immunity, res judicata, and collateral estoppel were not before this Court in that initial appeal.

The case was remanded to District Court where Youngblood renewed his motion to dismiss or for summary judgment upon the grounds of qualified immunity, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. In a September 14, 1995 Order, the District Court held that it had already rejected Youngblood's motion for dismissal on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel and resolved the case on the issue of qualified immunity. The Court granted Youngblood qualified immunity on the basis that he did not violate any of Boreen's clearly established rights of which a reasonable person should have known.

Boreen obtained a Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., certification authorizing an interlocutory appeal of the Court's September 14, 1995 Order since the Order effectively dismissed the case as against both defendants.

Standard of Review

The question of whether a district court properly granted qualified immunity involves a determination of whether the rights in question were clearly established at the time of their alleged violation, and is a question of law, reviewable, de novo. Cannon v. City and County of Denver (10th Cir.1993), 998 F.2d 867; Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (6th Cir.1994), 24 F.3d 1526.

In Montana, the standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686.

ISSUE

Was the District Court correct in holding that Boreen's property interest in her employment was not clearly established law at the time she was constructively discharged from her employment, thereby rendering Youngblood immune from suit?

The District Court dismissed Boreen's § 1983 claim against Youngblood on the grounds that Youngblood is entitled to qualified immunity. Because § 1983 is a federal remedy, qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit is a matter of federal law. Finch v. Wemlinger (Minn.1981), 310 N.W.2d 66, 69-70; Cooperman v. University Surg. Assoc., Inc. (Ohio 1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288, 296 (superseded by state statute in 1990).

The purpose of granting qualified immunity to public officers is not to protect them from the consequences of their wrongful acts but to facilitate the proper operation of government by protecting public officers in the discharge of their duties where they act honestly and in good faith. Rickard v. Paradis (1975), 167 Mont. 450, 539 P.2d 718. The good faith requirement has since been modified as set forth below.

The theory of qualified immunity first arose as a defense for police officers in Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288. The United States Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, expanded the defense to apply to a broader group of executive branch officers. Rhodes arose out of the shootings at Kent State University in 1970. The plaintiffs alleged that Rhodes, then Governor of the State of Ohio, recklessly deployed the National Guard to the Kent State campus. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 232, 94 S.Ct. at 1684-85. The Supreme Court found that a qualified immunity should be available to officers of the executive branch of government because of the wide range of discretion that officers of the executive branch are called upon to exercise. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247, 94 S.Ct. at 1691-92. The Court found that:

It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1692. The Court explored the contours of the doctrine of qualified immunity through subsequent decisions that discussed an "objective" versus a "subjective" test of good faith. See Wood v. Strickland (1975), 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214. An official's subjective good faith belief as to whether he or she violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights was no longer relevant after Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396. The standard for granting qualified immunity was reformed in this matter:

We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

. . . . .

On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful ... the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

Harlow and its progeny make clear that the qualified immunity inquiry is an objective one. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer (1984), 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139. The qualified immunity inquiry focuses on whether a defendant, faced with circumstances similar to those of the defendant before the court and in light of the legal authorities extant at the time the defendant acted, reasonably should have known that his or her conduct was unlawful. Qualified immunity "gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v. Bryant (1991), 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 596 (quoting Malley v. Briggs (1986), 475 U.S. 335, 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1097, 89 L.Ed.2d 271, 280).

Harlow presents a two-pronged test to determine whether an official will be granted qualified immunity. The court must first consider whether a clearly established right has been violated and second, the court must determine whether a reasonable person or official would have known that his conduct violated that right. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 216, 896 P.2d 411, 415.

The first prong of the Harlow qualified immunity test depends on whether the constitutional right allegedly...