Boren v. Texoma Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-07-00593-CV.,05-07-00593-CV.
• Citation: 258 S.W.3d 224
• Parties: Paul BOREN, Individually and as Legal Representative of the Estates of Laura Thomas and Andre Boren and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and Heirs to the Estates of Laura Thomas and Andre Boren and Bryant Hughes, as Legal Representative of the Estate of Leyha Hughes and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and Heirs to the Estate of Leyha Hughes, Appellants, v. TEXOMA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

258 S.W.3d 224

Paul BOREN, Individually and as Legal Representative of the Estates of Laura Thomas and Andre Boren and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and Heirs to the Estates of Laura Thomas and Andre Boren and Bryant Hughes, as Legal Representative of the Estate of Leyha Hughes and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and Heirs to the Estate of Leyha Hughes, Appellants, v. TEXOMA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee.

No. 05-07-00593-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

April 30, 2008.

Jeffrey H. Rasansky, Robert Edward Wolf, Rasansky Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for appellants.

Cathy F. Bailey, Steed Flagg, LLP, Michelle E. Robberson, Cooper & Scully, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Texoma Medical Center, Inc.

Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices BRIDGES and FITZGERALD.

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

Paul Boren (Paul), individually and as legal representative of the Estates of Laura Thomas (Laura) and Andre Boren (Andre B.) and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries and heirs to the Estates of Laura and Andre B., and Bryant Hughes (Bryant) as legal representative of the Estate of Leyha Hughes (Leyha) and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries and heirs to the Estate of Leyha appeal the summary judgment in favor of Texoma Medical Center, Inc. (Texoma). In two issues, Paul and Bryant complain that there are material issues of fact regarding duty and proximate cause precluding the granting of the summary judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

At approximately 7:00 a.m. on March 26, 2004, Andre Thomas (Andre T.) presented to the Texoma emergency room with a self-inflicted knife wound to his chest, determined to be superficial by chest x-ray. An emergency room nurse noted depression as Andre T.'s chief complaint. Emergency room physician Dr. William Bowen then interviewed and examined Andre T. and found Andre T. to be depressed and psychotic. Dr. Bowen noted Andre T.'s chief complaints were suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, suicide attempt, and self-injury. Dr. Bowen's assessment was Andre T. was depressed, paranoid, and suicidal with suicidal ideation, and his clinical impression was Andre T. was stable but had major depression and psychosis and attempted suicide.

Dr. Bowen referred Andre T. to Texoma's mental health department for evaluation and possible hospitalization. After interviewing Andre T., a counselor prepared an admission screening form, noting Andre T. had cut his chest, appeared psychotic, and was suicidal. The counselor assessed Andre T. as depressed, delusional, suicidal, and having a religious preoccupation. The counselor concurred with Dr. Bowen that hospitalization was appropriate for Andre T. Andre T. refused hospitalization at Texoma Behavioral Center on a voluntary basis. Dr. Bowen completed an application for an emergency detention order for a temporary hospitalization.¹ On the pre-printed application, Dr. Bowen signed the following, including Dr. Bowen's handwritten entries shown in italics:

I have reason to believe and do believe that Andre Thomas (name of person to be detained) is mentally ill and that unless the person is immediately restrained there is an imminent substantial risk of harm to the person or others, said risk of harm being: (describe and specify the harm that probably will occur) Andre has expressed suicidal ideation to several staff in the ER.

My beliefs are based on the following specific recent behavior, overt acts, attempts, or threats: He cut on his chest with a knife this morning.

Dr. Bowen also signed a Physician's Certificate of Medical Examination for Mental Illness. On the pre-printed form, the following includes Dr. Bowen's handwritten entries shown in italics:

That I am of the opinion that the Patient is mentally ill, and that as a result of that illness the Patient is (X) likely to cause serious harm to self or others, or (___) both self and others, or (X) will, if not treated, continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional or physical distress and will continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function independently and is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment. ...

That I am further of the opinion that the Patient presents a substantial risk of serious harm to self or others if not immediately restrained, the detailed basis for this opinion being: Unable to contract for safety, not on any psych. meds., not under a physician's care.

The counselor obtained a judge's signature on the emergency detention order and warrant for immediate apprehension. However, upon return to Texoma around 9:30 a.m. with the signed emergency detention order, it was determined that Andre T. had left Texoma without advising anyone. Texoma staff contacted the Denison police department and reported Andre T. missing.

Around 7:00 p.m. that evening, Andre T. went to the apartment of his ex-wife Laura. Laura shared the apartment with their son Andre B., her boyfriend Bryant, and her daughter with Bryant, Leyha. Andre T. listened to audiotapes with Bryant until almost midnight, after which Bryant drove Andre T. home.

On his way to work the next morning at approximately 6:00 to 7:00 a.m., Bryant saw Andre T. walking in the direction of Laura's apartment. Bryant phoned Laura's father, Paul, who went to the apartment. There he discovered Andre T. had killed Laura, Andre B., and Leyha with a knife.

Paul and Bryant filed this health care liability cause of action against Texoma. They also asserted gross negligence and sought exemplary damages. Texoma moved for summary judgment on the grounds it owed no duty to non-patients when treating Andre T., and its alleged negligence was too remote to be a proximate cause of the deaths of Laura, Andre B. and Leyha or of Paul and Bryant's claimed injuries. The order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which it was granted.

Standard of Review

The standard for reviewing a traditional summary judgment is well established. We review a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party has established its right to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). A party moving for a traditional summary judgment must show no material fact issue exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d at 295. When reviewing a summary judgment, we must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the movant. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex. 2005).

To prevail on a medical negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must prove a duty by the hospital to act according to the applicable standard of care, a breach of the applicable standard of care, an injury, and a causal connection between the breach of care and the injury. Clements v. Conard, 21 S.W.3d 514, 522 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied).² Absent a legal duty, there is no liability. See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.1999). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court to decide from the particular facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Morin, 156 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Tex.2005). Because the existence of a legal duty is a pure question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc. v. Ianni, 141 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 210 S.W.3d 593 (Tex.2006) (citing El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex.1999)).

Discussion

In their first amended petition, Paul and Bryant list particulars by which they allege Texoma failed to exercise the care of an ordinary prudent hospital in the treatment of Andre T., but each allegation is based on an underlying duty to non-patient third parties. It is undisputed no physician-patient relationship existed between Texoma and Paul, Bryant, Laura, Andre B., or Leyha. The question is whether Texoma had a duty to non-patient third parties based on its care and treatment of Andre T.

"Generally, there is no duty to control the conduct of others." Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex.2002). On numerous occasions, the Texas Supreme Court has declined to create or recognize a duty from a healthcare provider to a third party non-patient arising out of the healthcare provider's treatment of a patient. See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637-40 (Tex.1999) (mental health professional had no duty to mother for misdiagnosis of child, negligent treatment of child, or failure to warn of child's threats); Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544-46 (Tex.1998) (hospital owed no duty to hospital employees who were injured or died attempting to subdue patient); Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 396-98 (Tex.1998) (clinic and physicians had no duty to family of driver killed in motor vehicle accident resulting from epileptic seizure by patient treated prior to collision); Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 79-81 (Tex.1997) (hospital owed no duty to third party to provide competent medical care to wife or unborn child); Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.1995) (physician owed no duty to husband for negligent diagnosis of wife); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex.1995) (neither hospital nor physician owed duty to father of stillborn child for treatment of mother); Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 768-70 (Tex.1994) (psychologist owed no professional duty to a third party for alleged misdiagnosis of a patient). However, a special relationship between the actor and the third person could impose a duty on the actor to control the third person's conduct. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990). Such a relationship may exist between a parent...