Boris v. Korry Testamentary Marital Deduction Trust for Wife, In re
| Decision Date | 29 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 22867-6-I,22867-6-I |
| Citation | 785 P.2d 484,56 Wn.App. 749 |
| Parties | In re BORIS V. KORRY TESTAMENTARY MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST FOR R WIFE. Merwin E. CASEY and Key Trust Company of the Northwest, Co-Trustees of Boris V. Korry Testamentary Marital Trust for Wife, Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER, INC.; Children's Orthopedic Hospital and Medical Center of Seattle, Washington, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, George Dickson Clark, Jr.; and Bank of California, N.A., Defendants, Val Korry; Beall Korry; Meredith Korry; and Unborn Issue of Val Korry and Beall Korry, Respondents/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Elizabeth Thomas, Seattle, Casey, Gordon & Cohen, Kevin P. Casey, Bellevue, for respondents/cross-appellants.
shall distribute the then principal of this marital trust ... to or for such person or persons as my said wife may, by specific reference hereto, in her Last Will direct and appoint, ... and in default of any such appointment, the same shall be added and consolidated with the Family Trust established in Article VII hereof....
(Emphasis added.)
Mrs. Clark died in 1987 and her will, dated August 5, 1986, was admitted to probate in King County, Washington. Mrs. Clark's will contains a "Gift of Residue" clause which states in pertinent part:
All the rest of my property, including property over which I hold a power of appointment, I give ... and appoint in equal shares to [the Charities].
(Emphasis added.)
The issue is whether Mrs. Clark validly exercised her power of appointment over the marital deduction trust, and thus whether the trust funds should be given to the Charities, or consolidated with the family trust pursuant to the default provision of Mr. Korry's will. The trustees of the marital trust brought this action for a declaration of rights The trial court concluded that although Mrs. Clark exercised her power of appointment in accord with Mr. Korry's will, 4 her exercise did not comply with former RCW 11.95.060(2). That statute required the holder of a testamentary power to exercise the power by a will "that manifests an intent to exercise the power and that identifies the instrument granting the power and its date." (Emphasis added.) Former RCW 11.95.060(2). Accordingly, the court ordered consolidation of the marital trust into the family trust. It also refused the Charities' fee award request, and ordered that the Children's fees be paid from the marital deduction trust corpus.
naming the Charities and the beneficiaries of the Korry family trust (hereinafter "the Children") 3 as defendants.
On appeal, the Charities challenge on several grounds the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Clark's exercise of her power of appointment was statutorily invalid. We choose to address only their contention that RCW 11.95.060(2) was enacted in violation of Const. art. 2, § 19, as we find their remaining contentions to be clearly without merit.
RCW 11.95.060 was originally enacted in a bill entitled "Trust Law Revised," and described as "An act relating to trusts...." Laws of 1984, ch. 149. In 1985, the Legislature divided the trust act into smaller chapters and reenacted its provisions. RCW 11.95.060 was reenacted in a bill entitled "Trust Act--Fiduciaries--Technical Corrections." Laws of 1985, ch. 30.
The Charities contend that to include power of appointment provisions in these acts violates the title and one subject requirements of Const. art. 2, § 19. Const. art. 2, § In analyzing a bill under Const. art. 2, § 19, the court must keep the following principles in mind:
19 states: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
First, the statute is presumed to be constitutional and the challenger bears a heavy burden to overcome that presumption. Second, article 2, section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the validity of the legislation.
State Fin. Comm. v. O'Brien, 105 Wash.2d 78, 80, 711 P.2d 993 (1986). Additionally, due to the respect afforded the decisions of our independent and coequal branch, the court recognizes the Legislature's wide discretion to select bill titles and subject matter. O'Brien, 105 Wash.2d at 80-81, 711 P.2d 993.
[T]he legislature is deemed the judge of the scope which it will give to the word "subject." So long as the title embraces a general subject, it is not violative of the constitution even though the general subject contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions. All that is required is that there be some "rational unity" between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions. If this nexus can be found, the act will survive the light of constitutional inspection.
(Citations omitted.) O'Brien, 105 Wash.2d at 81, 711 P.2d 993 (quoting Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wash.2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443 (1966)). Thus, if a title is general and comprehensive, it will be liberally construed to embrace any provision "directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed in the title and having a natural connection thereto". 5 Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949).
Here, the titles of the acts at issue reference the general subject of trusts. Consequently, the ultimate issue before us is whether there is some "rational unity" or "natural connection" between a trust and a power of appointment. We hold that there is, and that the enactments at We so hold because, although trusts and powers of appointment are legally distinguishable, they are conceptually similar, and in fact are frequently confused. E.g., In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wash.2d 408, 419-21, 202 P.2d 259 (1949); 62 Am.Jur.2d Powers § 4 (1972); 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 5 (1975). Both powers and trusts involve a direction from one person to another to deal with property in a certain way, and both are frequently used as tax and estate planning devices. Indeed, major trust treatises generally include detailed discussions of powers of appointment. See generally G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees (2d ed. 1985); A. Scott & W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed. 1987-89); Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959).
issue satisfy the title and subject requirements of article 2, section 19.
Moreover, the alleged constitutional violations at issue here simply do not compare with the rare cases in which a violation of the constitutional provision has been found. Typically, those cases involve extreme and obvious violations of article 2, section 19. For example, in Barde v. State, 90 Wash.2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978), the court held that there was no rational unity between a provision concerning recovery of attorney fees in a civil replevin action, and imposition of criminal sanctions for dognapping. In State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 P. 375 (1903), and State ex rel. Henry v. Macdonald, 25 Wash. 122, 64 P. 912 (1901), the court held that it violates the constitution to include civil and criminal provisions within the same act when the act title references only the civil, or criminal, component. In Flanders v. Morris, 88 Wash.2d 183, 558 P.2d 769 (1977), the court struck down a substantive public assistance provision contained within a general appropriations bill. Finally, in State ex rel. Jones v. Charboneau's, 27 Wash.App. 5, 7, 615 P.2d 1321 (1980), the court held it unconstitutional to declare prostitution, lewdness, illegal gambling, drunkenness, fighting or opium smoking to be a moral nuisance within an initiative entitled: "Shall places
where obscene films are publicly and regularly shown or obscene publications a principal stock in trade be prohibited?"
Both parties challenge the trial court's fee award rulings. The court denied the Charities' fee request, and awarded the Children their fees from the trust corpus, rather than charging them to the Charities.
RCW 11.96.140 provides that in probate proceedings, either the appellate court or superior court "may, in its discretion, order costs, including attorneys fees, to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate, as justice may require." A decision under this statute "will not be overturned on review except on a clear showing of abuse of ... discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." In re Estate of Eubank, 50 Wash.App. 611, 621, 749 P.2d 691 (1988).
The Charities argue that their...
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