Borsheim v. Owan
Decision Date | 19 March 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 900322,900322 |
Citation | 467 N.W.2d 95 |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Parties | Violet O. BORSHEIM and George R. Borsheim, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Charles OWAN, Jr., Vernon Owan, Mitchell Owan, individually, and O & J Properties, a partnership consisting of R.E. Jacobsen, Charles Owan, Jr., Vernon Owan and Mitchell Owan, Defendants and Appellees, and R.E. Jacobsen, Defendant. Civ. |
Charles L. Neff, of Bjella, Neff, Rathert, Wahl & Eiken, P.C., Williston, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Max D. Rosenberg, of Rosenberg Law Firm, Bismarck, for defendants and appellees.
Violet O. Borsheim and George R. Borsheim have appealed from a district court judgment dismissing their action against Charles Owan, Jr., Vernon Owan, Mitchell Owan and R.E. Jacobsen, individually, and O & J Properties, a partnership consisting of those individuals, to recover under a guaranty executed by the individual defendants. We affirm.
On December 12, 1986, the Borsheims secured a judgment against O & J Properties and the individual defendants, holding them jointly and severally liable for specific performance of a contract for deed and payment of the principal balance due under the contract for deed, plus interest. The parties thereafter negotiated for the release of that judgment. In 1987, the Borsheims released their judgment in exchange for a cash payment; a promissory note signed by all of the individual defendants; a mortgage on unimproved property; and a general continuing guaranty signed by all of the individual defendants, by which they jointly and severally guaranteed payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the promissory note. The guaranty also provided that each individual guarantor "specifically waives and releases his right to rely upon or seek protection against a deficiency judgment by virtue of any statutes or Supreme Court decisions."
After the defendants defaulted on the promissory note, the Borsheims brought this action for recovery under the defendants' guaranty. The district court dismissed the action and the Borsheims appealed, raising the following issues: 1) whether our anti-deficiency statutes apply to a mortgage and guaranty given to obtain a release of a judgment; 2) whether the district court erred in holding that the defendants' waiver of their right to seek protection against a deficiency judgment under our anti-deficiency statutes was void as a violation of public policy; and 3) whether, if not void, the waiver is sufficient to allow enforcement of the defendants' general continuing guaranty. 1
Relying on Sec. 32-19-07, N.D.C.C., the Borsheims contend that "no money was loaned by the Borsheims 'upon real estate or to secure the purchase price of real estate' " and that "[n]owhere in this statute does the legislature make any attempt to apply the statute to a situation where a mortgage and personal guarantees are taken to secure a negotiated release of a prior valid judgment lien." Section 32-19-07, N.D.C.C., provides in part:
The Borsheims' interpretation of the words "payment of money loaned upon real estate" is too narrow. Their construction would limit the prohibition on deficiency judgments to those transactions wherein the mortgage was given for the immediate exchange of money. For example, the Borsheims would deny the protection of the statute wherein an original loan which was unsecured is refinanced with a mortgage but without any new money loaned. We cannot conclude that was the intent of the legislation. Any obligation capable of being reduced to a money value may be secured by a mortgage. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101 (N.D.1982). Section 32-19-06, N.D.C.C., which is incorporated by reference in Section 32-19-07, N.D.C.C., provides in part "[w]here a note or other obligation and a mortgage upon real property have been given to secure a debt ... the plaintiff may, in a separate action, ask for a deficiency judgment" as provided in that section. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus we have said that "[w]here a promissory note is executed in conjunction with the taking of a mortgage, the provisions of the state's anti-deficiency statutes apply." First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Ashton, 436 N.W.2d 215, 216-217 (N.D.1989). See also Mischel v. Austin, 374 N.W.2d 599 (N.D.1985). In H & F Hogs v. Huwe, 368 N.W.2d 553, 556 (N.D.1985), we said:
In Mischel, we rejected an argument that the anti-deficiency statutes apply only to original mortgages and not to someone holding a note outside the original transaction. We held that "where a promissory note is executed in conjunction with the taking of a mortgage, the provisions of the State's anti-deficiency statutes apply." Mischel v. Austin, supra, 374 N.W.2d at 600. Furthermore, the term "money loaned" or "money lent" is not a precise term of art. Great American Insurance Co. v. Nat'l Health Services, Inc., 62 Cal.App.3d 785, 133 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1976) ; Huss v. Maras, 77 Ill.App.3d 554, 33 Ill.Dec. 16, 396 N.E.2d 92 (1979) [ ]. But see Section 47-14-01, N.D.C.C. [Loan of money is a contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another and the latter agrees to return at a...
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