Bosco v. State

• Decision Date: 23 May 1929
• Docket Number: 19.
• Parties: BOSCO v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

146 A. 238

157 Md. 407

BOSCO v. STATE.

No. 19.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 23, 1929

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; F. Neal Parke and Wm Henry Forsythe, Jr., Judges.

Peter Bosco was convicted of attempted bribery, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, and SLOAN, JJ.

John Wood, Jr., of Westminster (Edward O. Weant and Joseph D Brooks, both of Westminster, on the brief), for appellant.

Robert H. Archer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas H. Robinson, Atty. Gen and Theo. F. Brown, State's Atty., of Westminster, on the brief), for the State.

ADKINS J.

Peter Bosco, the appellant, was indicted for an attempt to bribe a justice of the peace, was tried and convicted, and sentenced. This appeal is from that judgment.

The appeal brings up the rulings of the trial court in overruling a demurrer to the indictment, in overruling motion for a new trial, and in overruling a motion to strike out judgment and sentence, and rulings on the admissibility of testimony. The indictment was found under article 27, § 31, of the Code, and was as follows:

"State of Maryland, Carroll County--to wit:

The grand jurors of the state of Maryland, for the body of Carroll county, do on their oaths and affirmations present that Peter Bosco, late of said county, on the second day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight, at Carroll county, aforesaid, did unlawfully, willfully and corruptly offer to give George E. Benson, who was then and there a justice of the peace of the state of Maryland, in and for Carroll county, having criminal jurisdiction, a certain envelope containing money in an attempt to bribe the said George E. Benson, justice of the peace as aforesaid, to influence the said George E. Benson, justice of the peace as aforesaid, to decide in his favor a certain prosecution then pending before the said George E. Benson, justice of the peace as aforesaid, against the said Peter Bosco on a charge of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors within Carroll county, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government, and dignity of the state.

Theo F. Brown.

The State's Attorney for Carroll County."

The principle contended for by appellant in support of his demurrer, as stated in his brief, is that, "where the statute which punishes an offense does not set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense, an indictment laid in the mere words of the statute is not sufficient in law; it must charge all the elements of the offense."

It is urged that knowledge on the part of the defendant of the official character of him to whom the bribe is offered is an essential element of the crime of bribery, and that the indictment in this case does not allege such knowledge, and consequently is fatally defective. The indictment is laid in the language of the statute. Whatever may have been decided elsewhere, it would seem that in this state it is not open to question that a statutory offense is sufficiently charged, if the indictment is laid in the language of the statute. State v. Dent, 3 Gill. & J. 8; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 198, 74 Am. Dec. 522; Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403; Mincher v. State, 66 Md. 227, 7 A. 451; Smith v. State, 106 Md. 39, 66 A. 678; Curry v. State, 117 Md. 587, 83 A. 1030; Keller v. State, 122 Md. 677, 90 A. 603; State v. Edwards, 124 Md. 592, 92 A. 1037; Armacost v. State, 133 Md. 289, 105 A. 147; State v. Jenkins, 124 Md. 376, 92 A. 773; Mulkern v. State, 127 Md. 41, 96 A. 3; Benesch v. State, 129 Md. 505, 99 A. 702; Smith v. State, 130 Md. 482, 100 A. 778; Foxwell v. State, 146 Md. 90, 125 A. 893.

Of course the particular act which constitutes the crime must be so described as to inform the accused of what he is called upon to defend, and must be identified with sufficient accuracy to protect him against future prosecution for the same offense. The distinction between the description of the particular act and its characterization as a crime is clearly stated in Armacost v. State, supra.

We do not understand that it is intended here that there is any lack of clarity in the description of the particular act, but it is urged that, as charged, it does not constitute a crime, because of the lack of a sufficient allegation of scienter. Even where allegation is necessary it need not be an express allegation. It is sufficient if it is necessarily implied from a statement of the acts which constitute the...