State v. Petrushansky

• Decision Date: 23 March 1944
• Docket Number: 24,25.
• Citation: 36 A.2d 533,183 Md. 67
• Parties: STATE v. PETRUSHANSKY. SAME v. RUDOLPH.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

36 A.2d 533

183 Md. 67

STATE v. PETRUSHANSKY.

SAME v. RUDOLPH.

Nos. 24, 25.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 23, 1944

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne Judge.

Morris Petrushansky and Louis Rudolph were indicted for violating Code 1939, art. 2B, § 89A, as added by Laws 1943, c. 996 prohibiting storage of alcoholic beverages by licensee except on premises covered by license or at public or government controlled warehouse. Demurrers to the indictments were sustained, the indictments were quashed, and defendants were discharged, and the State of Maryland appeals.

Orders sustaining demurrers, quashing indictments and discharging defendants reversed.

J Edgar Harvey, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Hall Hammond, Deputy Atty. Gen. (William C. Walsh, Atty. Gen., and J. Bernard Wells, State's Atty., and Anselm Sodaro and Joseph G. Finnerty, Asst. State's Attys., all of Baltimore, on the brief), for the State.

Hilary W. Gans, of Baltimore (S. Ralph Warnken and Samuel S. Levin, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee Petrushansky.

Oscar W. Zenitz, of Baltimore (M. William Adelson, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee Rudolph.

Before SLOAN, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, MARBURY, MELVIN, and BAILEY, JJ.

MARBURY Judge.

The General Assembly of 1943 passed an act, known as Chapter 996 of the Acts of that year, which is amendatory of Article 2B of the Code of Public General Laws. Among other enactments, it added a section to that Article, known as Section 89A, which reads as follows:

'89A. Storage of alcoholic beverages. No licensee shall store or keep any alcoholic beverages except on the premises covered by the license or at a public or government controlled warehouse having a permit issued under the provisions of this Article.'

Indictments were returned in Baltimore City in two cases against alleged violators of this section. The indictments in each case were laid in the language of the statute. Demurrers were interposed in each case, and in each case were sustained. In each case the State has appealed. The two cases were heard here together, as the questions raised affect both accused alike. The legal positions taken by them are different in some respects, but all the contentions made will be considered in this opinion which will control both cases.

The first contention is that made by the appellee Rudolph who says that Section 89A is plain and unambiguous, that it should be construed to affect the storage of all alcoholic beverages, whether for purposes of sale or not, and that so construed it violates the constitutional privileges and immunities of a licensee-citizen, and prevents him from exercising rights freely permitted to other citizens.

The State does not agree to this construction of the section, nor does the appellee Petrushansky, although the latter does contend that if this is found to be the true meaning of the statute, it is unconstitutional. Neither did the lower court give the statute this strict construction.

The State and the lower court and the appellee Petrushansky all construed the statute to prohibit the storage elsewhere than allowed of only those alcoholic beverages intended for re-sale. Based on this construction the lower court held the indictments defective because they did not state that the beverages alleged to be unlawfully stored were so stored or kept for purposes of sale. Both the appellees, of course, agree with this ruling, but the State contends that as the indictments are in the words of the statute, they are sufficient.

The first question arising is then the proper construction of the statute. There is, of course, a well-known rule that where there are two possible constructions, and one of them makes a statute of doubtful constitutionality, courts will adopt that view of the enactment which establishes it free of fundamental objections. In our view of these cases, however, we do not have to invoke this rule, because we think the obvious purposes of the law and the method of its adoption show clearly its meaning and intent.

The General Assembly was called unto extraordinary session in November 1933 largely for the purpose of passing laws relating to the control of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor in the state. This was thought necessary because of the repeal of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, generally known as the Prohibition Amendment. One result of this special session was the passage of Chapter 2, which added a new article to the Code of Public General Laws which was to be known as Article 2B, to be entitled 'Alcoholic Beverages', and among other things was to 'license, regulate, and control the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages within the State of Maryland.' Subsequent sessions of the General Assembly have passed amendments to this Act and Chapter 996 of the Acts of 1943 is one of these amendments. The proper rule of construction is that all parts of such an article of the Code as this is, must be read together as they form part of a general system. Spielman v. State, 27 Md. 520; Read Drug & Chemical Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 166 A. 742; Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, 29 A.2d 827, 146 A.L.R. 687. And Article 2B itself has been so read by this Court. Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n v. Board of License Com'rs, 171 Md. 426, at page 431, 189 A. 209, 109 A.L.R. 1253. The Act of 1943, Chapter 996, made a number of changes in Article 2B, one of which was the enactment of Section 89A, which was intended to permit a licensee to store alcoholic beverages at a public government controlled warehouse having a permit. This was important as a privilege to a licensee, and also important to the state for purposes of inspection, taxation, etc. The whole article is concerned with alcoholic beverages which are manufactured or sold, and it obviously is not intended to affect any supply of liquor which a licensee may keep at his home or some other place for his own personal use.

It is not judicial legislation for courts to construe acts according to their obvious intent and meaning, considering the purpose of their enactment. That is one of the cardinal rules of construction of statutes. Real intent must prevail over literal intent. State v. Boyd, 2 Gill & J. 365; Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1; Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403, at page 406; Mitchell v.

State, 115 Md. 360, 80 A. 1020; Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 173, 180 A. 272. Article 2B of the Code has already been thus construed by this court as intending 'to regulate and control the liquor traffic in the State.' Powell v. State, 179 Md. 399, 18 A.2d 587, 589. See also Zukowski v. State, 167 Md. 549, at page 554, 175 A. 595. The literal construction of 89A insisted upon by the appellee Rudolph would prevent the licensee from keeping any sort of alcoholic beverage in his home for the purpose of entertaining guests, or for medicinal purposes, and for his own personal use. To assume that the Legislature intended such a result as this without declaring it in very definite words would be to reach a conclusion which is repugnant to common sense, and which would attribute to the legislative mind something which there is no reason to suppose it contemplated.

There have been a number of cases in which this court has declined to construe the words of a statute in such a way as to give them a ridiculous meaning. In the case of Cearfoss v State, 42 Md. 403, there was an indictment for giving away liquor on election day. The statute was attacked on the ground that it was so broad that it would interfere with the giving of medicine. The court said, 'Whether the administration of intoxicating liquor, in good faith, for medicinal or other necessary purposes, although within the letter, would be within the mischief, is a question not necessary to be decided in this case; but if it should ever arise, we should have no hesitation in saying that it would not be an offence within the spirit of the Act.' In another case a statute was before the court which prohibited the possession of rabbits within certain specified periods of the year. The testimony showed that the rabbits found in the possession of the defendant were lawfully killed in West Virginia. Notwithstanding, the defendant was convicted, under a narrow interpretation of the statute. This court said that the prohibition in the statute as to catching and killing rabbits necessarily applied only to this state, and that since this was so, it was clear that the prohibition against having any rabbits in possession related only to rabbits caught and killed here. Dickhaut v. State, 85 Md. 451, 37 A. 21, 36 L.R.A. 765, 60 Am.St.Rep. 332. In another case a traverser was indicted for selling and giving away intoxicating liquors under a local law of Talbott County. He contended that the act was void because it did not contain a proviso excepting the giving of liquor by private citizens to the members of their households or to guests in their homes. The court overruled this contention because it did not think that under any circumstances it was intended, or it would be reasonable, to give the act the extended application contended for. Parker v. State, 99 Md. 189, 57 A. 677. In a very recent case decided at this term of court (No. 2 of the January Term of 1944), we had before us an act prohibiting the erection of billboards or structures intended to aid in the solicitation or performance of marriages. It was contended that by the terms of this Act a minister could not post his name or address on a board on the front of his church. We declined to adopt any such strained interpretation and held that it would be far-fetched and unreasonable. State v. Clay, Md., 35...