Bosem v. Bosem

• Decision Date: 05 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43230,43230
• Citation: 279 So.2d 863
• Parties: Ellen Rochelle BOSEM, Petitioner, v. Arie Lionel BOSEM, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 863

279 So.2d 863

Ellen Rochelle BOSEM, Petitioner, v. Arie Lionel BOSEM, Respondent.

No. 43230.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 5, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1973.

Jos. D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, and Miller & Podell, Miami Beach, for petitioner.

Marion E. Sibley and Irving B. Levenson of Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward, Miami Beach, for respondent.

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, (269 So.2d 758), which conflicts with a decision of another District Court of Appeal (Riley v. Riley, 131 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.1st, 1961)) on the same point of law. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.

The cause arose from a divorce between the parties and is concerned with the financial provisions of the final judgment of divorce and the effect of the decision of the District Court of Appeal on those provisions.

The divorce was awarded the wife, Ellen Rochelle Bosem, who is petitioner here. She was awarded custody of the two minor children of the parties. The trial judge awarded to Mrs. Bosem periodic alimony of $1,500 per month; support for the two minor children of $500 per month for each child; and, lump sum alimony in the amount of $100,000, to be paid in four equal installments. In addition, Mr. Bosem was required to pay all future medical and dental expenses of the wife and children, to pay all private and religious schooling of the children, and to maintain a life insurance policy of $100,000 for the benefit of the children until they reach their majority or are emancipated. An award of $85,000 for the services of Mrs. Bosem's attorneys was also made.

The District Court of Appeal reversed or altered several of the provisions of the divorce judgment, and all of the changes are contested before this Court.

First, the District Court found that the award of $100,000 in the form of lump sum alimony to Mrs. Bosem in addition to substantial periodic alimony represented an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. We cannot agree. Fla.Stat. § 61.08, F.S.A. (1969), provides:

'In every judgment of divorce in an action by the wife, the court shall make such orders about maintenance, alimony and suit money of the wife, or any allowance to be made to her, and if any, the security to be given therefor, as from the circumstances of the parties and nature of the case is equitable . . . In any award of permanent alimony the court has jurisdiction to order periodic payments or payment in lump sum or both.'

The trial judge had wide discretion, as trier of the facts, to determine what alimony arrangement would be most equitable. He had before him the financial statements of both parties, and the record of the parties' relationship. He found that Mr. Bosem had a net worth of over $2,210,000, and an annual income of over $100,000, and that Mrs. Bosem's sole assets were $30,000 in securities, clothing, furs and jewelry worth a few thousand dollars and a house encumbered by a $40,000 mortgage. He found further that the equities were with Mrs. Bosem and that Mr. Bosem had been guilty of extreme cruelty and adultery. There was also evidence, expressly relied upon by the District Court, that Mr. Bosem spent $50,000 per year on himself and his mistress.

We are unable to agree with the District Court of Appeal that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing both lump sum and periodic alimony, or that he erred in the amounts allowed.

The District Court of Appeal also approved the educational and medical benefits provisions of the divorce judgment, but limited the educational benefits to the children's minority, and limited the payment of medical bills to 'other than usual and minor medical bills.' 269 So.2d 758. We agree with the District Court that both awards are reasonable, and further agree that the limitations placed upon the awards represent reasonable interpretations of the trial judge's order.

The District Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was without power to require that Mr. Bosem maintain a life insurance policy insuring his life for a sum not less than $100,000 payable to the minor children until they reach majority or are emancipated. The District Court held that such a requirement.

'(A)mounts to a provision for the payment of child support after the death of the father. Such provisions are often a part of property settlement agreements but they may not be imposed by the trial judge.' Bosem v. Bosem, 269 So.2d 758, p. 763, (Fla.App.3d, 1972).

The District Court relies on Fleming v. Fleming, 177 So.2d 384 (Fla.App.3d, 1965), as authority for the proposition that the trial judge is not empowered to require that the divorced father take out life insurance on his life to guarantee that the children will receive the support to which the chancellor has found them entitled. However, Fleming v. Fleming, Supra, holds only that

'A careful examination of the record before us shows no abuse of discretion or error in denying the wife's request for . . . insurance for the protection of herself and minor children.' 177 So.2d 384, p. 386.

In Fleming v. Fleming, Supra, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, recognized and respected the wide discretion afforded the trial judge in a divorce case in awarding alimony and child support. It did not set forth a rule which would bar trial judges from ordering that the father provide security in the form of life insurance in a proper case, such as the same appellate court attempts to establish in the case Sub judice.

This Court has only reached the issue of requiring the husband to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of his minor children in one...