Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., RENT-A-CA

• Decision Date: 08 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 35432,RENT-A-CA,A-C,INC,35432
• Citation: 195 So.2d 216
• Parties: Freda P. BOSHNACK, Petitioner, v. WORLD WIDE, a New York corporation, Olin's Rent-ar System, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Charles O. Hatfield, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 216

195 So.2d 216

Freda P. BOSHNACK, Petitioner, v. WORLD WIDE RENT-A-CAR, INC., a New York corporation, Olin's Rent-A-Car System, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Charles O. Hatfield, Respondents.

No. 35432.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 8, 1967.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1967.

Orfinger & Tindell, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.

Cliff B. Gosney, Jr., Daytona Beach, and J. Lewis Hall, of Hall, Hartwell, Hall & Canada, Tallahassee, for respondents.

ERVIN, Justice.

We are petitioned for a certiorari review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc. et al. v. Boshnack, 184 So.2d 467.

An automobile collision occurred between a car owned by World Wide Rent-A-Car but leased by it to Olin's Rent-A-Car System and driven by Olin's employee, Charles O. Hatfield, and a car in which Freda P. Boshnack was a passenger. The two car rental companies and Hatfield were sued by Freda P. Boshnack to recover damages for personal injuries she sustained in the collision. She recovered judgment in the Circuit Court, which the District Court of Appeal reversed in said reported opinion.

Petitioner, Mrs. Boshnack, contends that there is conflict between certain appellate decisions and the following language in the opinion of the District Court:

'Appellee insists that Hatfield's testimony and the certified copies of the records of the County Judge's Court are distinguishable from the Stevens and Moseley cases upon the fact that Hatfield's plea of guilty constitutes an admission against interest which is admissible in evidence, whereas the foregoing cited cases dealt with judgments of convictions which are not admissible in evidence. We are unable to comprehend that distinction. An adjudication of a defendant's guilt must be made by the Court. It is immaterial whether such adjudication in made upon a plea of guilty by defendant or a verdict of guilty returned by a jury, for in either case the adjudication of guilt is termed a judgment of conviction. * * *' (at 469)

It is noted from the quotation Mrs. Boshnack, the Appellee, sought to get the District Court to recognize that defendant Hatfield's plea of guilty in a criminal prosecution constituted an admission against interest which was properly admissible in her civil suit since both cases involved the same circumstances. This the District Court refused to do. No doubt it was influenced to refuse because Appellee at the trial was not content to rest upon Hatfield's testimony that he had plead guilty in the criminal case but introduced in evidence with the trial court's permission a certified copy of the judgment of Hatfield's conviction which reflected his plea of guilty. The District Court considered the decided cases made no distinction between judgments of conviction based upon jury verdicts and those resulting from pleas of guilty. It said: 'It is immaterial whether such adjudication is made upon a plea of guilty by defendant or a verdict of guilty returned by a jury, for in either case the adjudication is termed a judgment of conviction.'

A close analysis of our decisions denotes we have made such a distinction although primarily by reference to other legal authorities rather than by direct pronouncement in our decisions.

In State v. DuBose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So.2d 477, and in Stevens v. Duke (Fla.), 42 So.2d 361, we noted the existence of the well-established rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution cannot be given in evidence in a civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it is rendered, but simultaneously we also noted certain recognized exceptions to said rule, one of which is that a judgment entered in a criminal prosecution on a plea of guilty may be introduced in a civil action to establish an admission against interest. In the latter cited case, we referred to the following authorities which denote recognized exceptions to said rule:

'* * * See 30 Am.Jur. pp. 1002-1006, Judgments Secs. 289-294; Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W.Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301, 31 A.L.R. 261; 57 A.L.R. 504; Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, 80 A.L.R. 1145; 130 A.L.R. 690.' (at 363)

The sections of American Jurisprudence cited in Stevens, supra, are now found in 30A Am.Jur., §§ 472-477. Section 477 points out one of the exceptions referred to by this Court in Stevens, viz.:

'There are cases in which a plea of guilty to a criminal offense or a conviction based upon such a plea is held to be admissible in a subsequent civil action, providing the plea is relevant to the issues involved in the civil case; but in such case, the record of the plea or conviction is admitted, not as establishing the fact, but as a deliberate declaration or admission of the party himself that the fact is true. The basis of admissibility is the declaration against interest, rather than the conviction as independent, objective evidence. A party pleading guilty in a criminal proceeding has even been held to be precluded thereby from denying his guilt in a subsequent civil action. On the other hand, there is authority that such a plea is not conclusive but may be explained. It is also held that the plea affects only the interests of the person...