Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills

• Decision Date: 19 May 1893
• Parties: BOSTON FERRULE CO. v. HILLS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

159 Mass. 147

34 N.E. 85

BOSTON FERRULE CO. v. HILLS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 19, 1893

The bill was as follows: "*** And the complainant says: (1) That it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling ferrules, and carries on its business of manufacturing on the third floor of the building numbered 291, on Congress street, in said Boston, in rooms leased by it from the owner of said building by a written lease. That the term of said lease began on April 1, 1888 and the complainant then entered into occupation of the leased premises, putting therein delicate and expensive machinery necessary for its business, and said term has not yet expired. (2) That the complainant has carried on ever since said date, and still carries on, its business of manufacturing in said premises. (3) That the defendants are and have been engaged in said Boston in the business of manufacturing and polishing mirrors and other glassware, and selling the same; and in the summer of 1888, said defendants leased the fourth floor of said building numbered 291 Congress street from the owner thereof, took possession, and established their manufacturing business there. (4) That power to run the machinery of the complainant and of the defendants is obtained from engines situated in said building below the third floor, and is conveyed to the premises of the complainant and defendants by means of belting; and, in order that the belting may run from one floor of said building to another, there are suitable holes made in the floor, through which said belting passes. There are several of such holes in the flooring separating the premises occupied by the complainant from those occupied by the defendants, and there are also numerous smaller cracks and crannies in said flooring. And said belting and holes in the floor were in essentially the same position and condition on April 1, 1888 and at the time when the defendants took possession, as they have since been and now are. (5) That in carrying on its manufactures the defendants use large quantities of sand and acids, and they allow, and have for a long time allowed, said sand and acids, and the fumes of said acids, to sift and come through said holes, cracks, and crannies in the flooring, and fall upon the premises occupied by the complainant, to the very great damage of the machinery, materials, and goods manufactured and in process of manufacture; particles of sand getting in said machinery, and injuring and ruining it, and the acids and fumes of acids corroding said machinery materials, and goods. (6) That the defendants knew when they entered into the occupation of said premises the character of the complainant's business, and they have been since that time frequently notified by the complainant of the damage caused by said sand and acids, and requested to prevent a continuance thereof; but they still continue to allow their sand, acids, and fumes of acids to come upon the premises of the complainant. (7) That the complainant's business is suited to the locality and building where it is situated. (8) That the plaintiff is without adequate remedy at law. Wherefore the complainant prays that the defendants may be enjoined from allowing sand, acids, and fumes of acids to come as aforesaid upon the premises leased and occupied by the complainant as aforesaid from the premises leased and occupied by said defendant as aforesaid; and as auxiliary and subsidiary relief the complainant prays that for the damage already caused by them as aforesaid the defendants be decreed to pay ten thousand dollars damages to the complainant."

Defendants demurred on the grounds: "First, because said bill does not set forth any cause of action, as required by the rules of law or equity, or such as entitles it to the relief sought or to any relief in equity; second, because the bill does not allege due care on part of the plaintiff, and does not charge that the respondents have been guilty of any negligence or want of care in the premises; third, because the plaintiff has a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law."

COUNSEL

M.F Dickinson and S. Williston, for appellant.

H.L Harding and J.W....