BOSTON & MAINE R. CO. V. HOOKER
| Decision Date | 06 April 1914 |
| Citation | 233 U. S. 97 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS
Congress, by the Hepburn Act and the Carmack Amendment in 1906, has regulated the subject of interstate transportation of property by federal law to the exclusion of the states to control it by their own policy or legislation. Pennsylvania v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, distinguished, having been decided prior to the passage of the Hepburn Act.
Knowledge of the shipper that the rate is based on value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the effect of so filing the schedules makes the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier alike.
The limitation of liability of carriers for passengers' baggage is covered by the Interstate Commerce Act and the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act applies thereto as well as to liability for shipments of freight.
Under § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, carriers must include in the schedules of rates filed regulations affecting passengers' baggage and the limitations of liability.
A provision in a tariff schedule that the passenger must declare the value of his baggage and pay stated excess charges for excess liability over the stated value to be carried free is a regulation within the meaning of §§ 6 and 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and as such is sufficient to give the shipper notice of the limitation.
In construing a statute, the practical interpretation given to it by the administrative body charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight:
The effect of permitting the carrier to file regulations as to passengers' baggage which limit its liability except on payment of specified rates is not to change the common law rule that the carrier is an insurer against its own negligence, but simply that the carrier shall obtain commensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed.
Where charges for full liability as specified in the published tariff are unreasonable, they can only be attacked before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Congress is familiar with the customs of travelers, including that of checking baggage, and so held that a baggage check is sufficient compliance as to passengers' baggage with the provision in the Carmack Amendment for issuing a receipt or bill of lading for the shipment.
If the subject needs regulation, it is within the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under §§ 1 and 15 of the Act of June 18, 1910, to make requirements as to checks or receipts to be given for baggage by common carriers.
209 Mass. 598 reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Carmack
Amendment to the Hepburn Act and the right of a common carrier which has filed schedules containing regulations as to passengers' baggage to limit its liability for loss of such baggage caused by its own negligence to the extent and in the manner specified in the schedules, are stated in the opinion.
Katharine Hooker brought an action in the Superior Court of Middlesex County, Massachusetts, to recover from the Boston & Maine Railroad as a common carrier on account of the loss of certain baggage belonging to her, which had been transported by the defendant in interstate commerce from Boston, Massachusetts, to Sunapee Lake Station, New Hampshire, on September 15, 1908. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for the value of the baggage lost, with interest. The case was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upon exceptions of the defendant, and upon its rescript, returned to the
superior court, overruling the exceptions (209 Mass. 598), judgment was there entered for the plaintiff for ,253.77.
The defendant insists that the recovery of the plaintiff should have been limited to the sum of 0 in view of certain requirements made by it concerning the transportation of baggage and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. From the findings of fact, it appears that the baggage was checked upon a first-class ticket purchased for the plaintiff (although not used by her, she traveling upon another similar ticket purchased by herself); that, at the time the baggage was checked, the plaintiff had no notice of the regulations hereinafter referred to, limiting the liability of the defendant (further than such notice is to be presumed from the schedules filed and posted as hereinafter stated); that no inquiry was made by the defendant on receiving the plaintiff's baggage as to its value; that there was no evidence that any more expensive or different mode of transportation was adopted for baggage the value of which was declared to exceed 0 than for other baggage; that any reasonable person would infer from the outward appearance of the plaintiff's baggage when tendered to the defendant for transportation that the value largely exceeded 0, and that the loss of plaintiff's baggage was due to the negligence of defendant.
The court further found that, previous to and during September, 1908, the defendant had published and kept open for inspection and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, in accordance with the act of Congress relating to interstate commerce and amendments thereto and the orders and regulations of the Commission, schedules giving the rates, fares, and charges for transportation between different points, including Boston and Sunapee Lake Station, all terminal, storage, and other charges required by the Commission, all privileges and facilities granted or allowed, and all rules or regulations
which in any way affected or determined such rates, fares, and charges or the value of the service rendered to passengers; that, during the same time, in accordance with an order of the Commission of June 2, 1908, making comprehensive regulations as to rate and fare schedules, the defendant had placed with its agent in Boston all rate and fare schedules and the terminal and other charges applicable to that station, and had enabled and required him to keep in accessible form a file of such schedules, and had instructed him to give information contained therein to all seeking it, and to afford to inquirers opportunity to examine the schedules, and that the defendant in the manner shown and in all other ways conformed to the acts of Congress and the orders and regulations of the commission with reference to such schedules. The court also found that the schedules contained provisions limiting the free transportation of baggage to a certain weight, and the liability of the defendant to 0, followed by a table of charges for excess weight, and also contained the following provision:
that the excess charge for transporting baggage valued at ,904.50, which was the value of the baggage lost, from Boston to Sunapee Lake Station during September, 1908, according to the schedules, was .75; that notices were posted at or near the offices where passenger's tickets were sold in the Boston
station, stating that tariffs naming the rates on interstate traffic were on file with the agent, and would be furnished for inspection upon application, and that notices were posted in the baggage room of that station, in a conspicuous place, and in sight of persons using the room for checking baggage, reading that personal baggage not exceeding 0 in value would be checked free for each passenger on presentation of a first-class ticket, and containing information with reference to excess weight. And the court further found that the plaintiff did not declare at the time her baggage was checked that it exceeded 0 in value, and did not pay any charges for valuation in excess of that amount.
It is to be borne in mind that the action as tried and decided in the state court was not for negligence of the railroad company as a warehouseman for the loss of the baggage after its delivery at Sunapee Lake Station, but was solely upon the contract of carriage in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in deciding the case, held that the Interstate Commerce Act did not in any wise change the common law rule, applicable in Massachusetts, that regulations of this character, limiting the amount of recovery for baggage lost, must be brought home to the knowledge of the shipper and assented to, or circumstances shown from which assent might be implied. In reaching this conclusion, that learned court relied upon the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, in which case it was held that a state might apply its local law and policy to recovery for the loss of a horse shipped in interstate commerce from Albany, New York, to Cynwyd, in the State of Pennsylvania, and injured by the negligence of a carrier in the latter state, notwithstanding the bill of lading contained an express condition that the carrier assumed liability to the extent only of the agreed valuation in event of loss.
It was further held in the Hughes case that the Interstate Commerce Act, in the respect then under consideration, had not enacted an exclusive rule upon which recovery might be had governing responsibility for loss, and that, as the law then stood, the state might enforce its own...
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