Hooker v. Boston & M.R.r.

• Decision Date: 06 September 1911
• Citation: 209 Mass. 598,95 N.E. 945
• Parties: HOOKER v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

209 Mass. 598

95 N.E. 945

HOOKER v. BOSTON & M. R. R.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

September 6, 1911

COUNSEL

Samuel Williston, for plaintiff.

Trull & Wier, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG J.

The plaintiff, an interstate passenger of the defendant, claims damages in excess of $2,000 for loss of her baggage occurring through the negligence of the defendant. The defense is that the liability of the defendant is limited to $100. The grounds upon which that defense is predicated are these: The defendant had complied with all the provisions of the statutes of the United States known as the 'Interstate Commerce Act' and the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and among other matters had filed and published schedules of rates, fares and charges, including those in force respecting the stations between which the plaintiff was a traveler. A part of the schedules relating to transportation of baggage was: 'Regular baggage service.--One hundred fifty pounds of personal baggage not exceeding one hundred dollars in value, will be checked free for each passenger on presentation of a full ticket, and seventy-five pounds for a half ticket. * * * For excess value the rate will be one-half of the current excess baggage rate per one hundred pounds for each one hundred dollars, or fraction thereof, of increased value declared. The minimum charge for excess value will be 15 cents. Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage not to exceed one hundred dollars in value for a passenger presenting a full ticket and fifty dollars in value for a half ticket, unless a greater value is declared and stipulated by the owner and excess charges thereon paid at time of taking the baggage.' These provisions were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the agent of the defendant at Boston where the plaintiff's baggage was checked, and a notice to this effect was conspicuously posted near the defendant's Boston ticket office, and a further notice of limitation of value of baggage was likewise posted in its Boston baggage room. The plaintiff did not, in fact, know of this regulation, nor of any rule limiting the value of baggage to be carried without extra charge. She was not asked for the value of her baggage at the time of checking it or of purchasing her ticket.

The common-law rule fixing the rights of the parties is not open to doubt. It is that respecting the transportation of baggage or merchandise a common carrier may relieve itself from many of the heavy responsibilities amounting to insurance cast upon it by the law. It may not exonerate itself, however, by regulation or by contract from liability for its own negligence, but it may make just and reasonable stipulations in good faith as to the value of the property intrusted to its care, and the amount for which it shall respond in case of loss, even though occurring through its own negligence. Such stipulation must be brought home to the knowledge of the shipper through either a formal contract, or express or inferable notice, under circumstances warranting the assumption of actual assent. Brown v. Eastern R. R Co., 11 Cush. 97; Malone v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 12 Gray, 388, 74 Am. Dec. 598; Cox v. Central Vermont Ry., 170 Mass. 129-136, 49 N.E. 97; Graves v. Adams Express Co., 176 Mass. 280, 57 N.E. 462; John Hood Co. v. American Pneumatic Service Co., 191 Mass. 27, 77 N.E. 638; Brown v. Cunard Steamship Co., 147 Mass. 58, 16 N.E. 717; Hill v. Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & Western R. R., 144 Mass. 284, 10 N.E. 836; Graves v. Lake Shore & Michigan So. R. R., 137 Mass. 33, 50 Am. Rep. 282; Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass. 254, 91 N.E. 902, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 293; McKahan v. American Express Co., 209 Mass. 270, 95 N.E. 785; Gardiner v. N.Y. C. & H. R. R., 201 N.Y. 387, 94 N.E. 876; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U.S. 331, 5 S.Ct. 151, 28 L.Ed. 717; The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 17 S.Ct. 597, 41 L.Ed. 1039; Cau v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 194 U.S. 427, 24 S.Ct. 663, 48 L.Ed. 1053; Arthur v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 204 U.S. 505, 27 S.Ct. 338, 51 L.Ed. 590; N.Y. C. & H. R. R. R. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24-27, 25 L.Ed. 531. See in the Matter of Released Rates, 13 Interst. Com. Com. R. 550; Herbeck-Demer Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 17 Interst. Com. Com. R. 88; Elliott on Railroads (4th Ed.) § 1510, and cases cited. This rule prevails commonly in the states of the Union, except in Pennsylvania (Hughes v. Railroad Co., 202 Pa. 222, 51 A. 990, 63 L. R. A. 513, 97 Am. St. Rep. 713), Iowa, Kansas, Texas and Kentucky. See 1 Hutch. on Carriers (3d Ed.) § 405, and cases cited.

It is recognized generally that a public notice restricting in any respect the common-law liability of the carrier is not binding upon the shipper or passenger, even though known, unless assented to by him. Ordinarily, such assent is not implied merely from knowledge, though this may be a significant circumstance, in the light of the requirements of good faith, in connection with others in warranting the inference of assent. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344-382, 12 L.Ed. 465; Railroad Co. v. Mfg. Co., 16 Wall. 318-329, 21 L.Ed. 297; Judson v. Western R. R., 6 Allen, 486, 83 Am. Dec. 646; Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124, 93 Am. Dec. 68; Faulk v. Columbia, Newberry & Lawrence R. R., 82 S.C. 369, 64 S.E. 383. See cases collected in 4 Elliott on Railroads (2d Ed.) § 1501, and note.

The English rule is slightly more favorable to the carrier, and affirms the binding force of a notice of limitation, if the carrier has done all that is reasonably sufficient to give to the shipper knowledge of the limitation. Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 470; Richardson, Spence & Co. v. Rawntree, [1894] A. C. 217.

It is plain that if the plaintiff's case rested at common law, the action of the superior court would stand, for the fact is expressly found that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the regulation limiting the value of baggage gratuitously carried by the defendant as a part of the transportation for each passenger.

It is earnestly argued by the defendant that the common-law rule is abrogated as to this case, which involves a transportation between two states, by the federal interstate commerce act. Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154); Act March 2, 1889, c. 382, 25 Stat. 855 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3158); Act Feb. 10, 1891, c. 128, 26 Stat. 743 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3163); Act Feb. 8, 1895, c. 61, 28 Stat. 643 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3171); Act. Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1138); Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1149).

It may be conceded that the subject-matter of passenger's baggage in interstate travel is within the control of Congress, and any enactment by it would bind the parties. It is not contended that there is any specific regulation respecting it to be found in any act of Congress. The precise position of the defendant is that as the limitation of liability for baggage was filed and posted as a part of its schedules for passenger tariff, the limitation thereby became and was an essential part of its rate, from which under the interstate commerce law it could not deviate, and by which the plaintiff was bound, regardless of her knowledge of or assent to it. If the premise is sound, then the conclusion follows, for the public are held inexorably to the rate published, regardless of knowledge, assent or even misrepresentation. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98, 15 S.Ct. 802, 39 L.Ed. 910; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 26 S.Ct. 628, 50 L.Ed. 1011; Melody v. Great Northern Ry. (S. D.) 127 N.W. 545, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568.

The aim of the interstate commerce act has been stated to be to secure for all the public reasonable rates and equality of rates without discrimination or preference, and that subject to these two dominating purposes the carriers and the people are left to their common-law freedom of making special contracts according to their interests and necessities. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184, 196, 197, 16 S.Ct. 700, 40 L.Ed. 935; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry., 167 U.S. 479-493, 17 S.Ct. 896, 42 L.Ed. 243; N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U.S. 361-391, 26 S.Ct. 272, 50 L.Ed. 515; Interstate Commerce Com. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R., 220 U.S. 235-253, 31 S.Ct. 392, 55 L.Ed. 448.

Several expressions are to be found in decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which by themselves alone might be taken to indicate that whatever is posted and filed as required by the law thereby is called to the attention of the public, and everybody becomes bound thereby. See for example Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S 467-476, 31 S.Ct. 265, 55 L.Ed. 297; Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U.S. 56-81, 28 S.Ct. 428, 52 L.Ed. 681; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cisco Oil Co., 204 U.S. 449-451, 27 S.Ct. 358, 51 L.Ed. 562; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U. S 98-101, 15 S.Ct. 802, 39 L.Ed. 910. But without examining them in detail, it is apparent from the context that these phrases were intended only to emphasize the general proposition that under the interstate commerce act full publicity of the rates established by the carriers is required, and ample facility given to every interested member of the public to ascertain precisely what those rates are, and that these rates so established under the law are binding upon everybody, and cannot be modified or departed from. Their reasonableness cannot be tried out in an ordinary action in co...