Boston & A.R.R. v. Reardon

• Decision Date: 06 March 1917
• Citation: 226 Mass. 286,115 N.E. 408
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: BOSTON & A. R. R. v. REARDON et al.

226 Mass. 286

115 N.E. 408

BOSTON & A. R. R.

v.REARDON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

March 6, 1917.

Exceptions from Land Court, Middlesex County.

Two petitions to register title to land by the Boston & Albany Railroad, opposed by Edmund Reardon and others. From a decree that petitioner was entitled to have the titles registered subject to certain easements, the respondents bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

In respect to the matter of estoppel, the court found and ruled as follows:

‘The respondent claims that he has obtained title by estoppel, but I fail to find any basis, on the evidence in these cases, for the claim. The respondent has filled and improved the property. The city has laid out Henry street by a different location from that given on the Wadsworth plan, and the city engineer produced a plan which was ‘furnished to him’ by the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, showing the side line of the location of 1866, with a red line running from it down along the 25-foot line on which the fence was built. This red line was interpreted by the city engineer in making the layout of Henry street in 1884, as showing the side line of the railroad location. Beyond the fact that the plan was furnished by the petitioner, there is nothing to show why, under what circumstances, or by what official or employé it was done. I admit the plan in evidence as showing the situation on the ground (Bagley v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 165 Mass. 160;Clark v. Hull, 184 Mass. 164); but I rule that the petitioner is in no way estopped by it, and I exclude the interpretation as placed upon it by the city engineer (Amee v. B. & A. R. R., supra).'

To the foregoing findings and rulings the respondents duly excepted.

W. L. Parsons, of Boston, for petitioner.

McLellan, Carney & Brickley and F. J. Carney, all of Boston, for respondents.

RUGG, C. J.

These two petitions for the registration of title to land resolve themselves into a question of statutory construction. If the statute has one meaning, the petitioner is entitled to registration; if it has another meaning, other factors need to be considered. The question is whether title of land, the fee in which is in a railroad corporation, can be acquired by prescription. It was provided by St. 1874, c. 372, § 107 (now St. 1906, c. 463, pt. 2, § 80), in force at the time when the defendant took possession of the land in question:

‘4. Intrusion on lands belonging to railroads. Section 107. No length of possession or occupancy of land belonging to a railroad corporation, by an owner or occupier of adjoining land shall create any right to such land of the corporation in such adjoining owner or occupier, or any person claiming under him.’

A substantial part of the land in question lies outside of but adjacent to the location or right of way of the petitioner. It has been held that St. 1861, c. 100, applied only to the railroad location. Maney v. Providence & Worcester R. R., 161 Mass. 283, 37 N. E. 164. But it was said in the opinion in that case in substance that St. 1874, c. 372, § 107, was not merely a consolidation of existing acts but a general revision of the railroad law, and that the later statute could have no effect in interpreting the earlier one. It was pointed out in Littlefield v. Boston & Albany R. R., 146 Mass. 268, 276, 15 N. E. 648, that the language of St. 1861, c. 100, ‘is very different from that in the substituted St. 1874, c. 372, § 107.’ Nothing contrary to this proposition was decided in Hall v. Boston & Maine R. R., 211 Mass. 174, 97 N. E. 914, where, as to the facts then before the court, the successive changes and re-enactments of the statute were not material. As to the point then before the court, they had not been substantially modified. It is manifest that the scope and effect of St. 1861, c. 100, are more constricted than of the statute here involved.

The purpose of the Legislature must be ascertained. The words of the governing statute are plain. They are comprehensive. They include all ‘land belonging to a railroad corporation.’ There are no exceptions or limitations. Their sweep is not confined to land within the location nor to land which has been acquired by the exercise of eminent domain. They are broad enough to include all land which a railroad has power to acquire either by purchase or otherwise. There is no contention in the case at bar that the fee to this land was not purchased rightfully for railroad purposes and with a genuine purpose to devote it to railroad uses. There is no occasion to consider what conclusion might be reached as to the effect of the statute upon land acquired ultra vires.

There appears to be no ground in reason for restricting by construction the operation of the statute to lands within the location or taken by eminent domain. The need of railroad corporations for the acquisition of land outside their locations has been recognized by the statutes for many years. Power has been conferred upon such corporations to procure such lands by private purchase from the early days of railroad development. It may be as essential to the necessities of railroads and their capacity to render efficient service to the public that their lands acquired by deed should be protected from the encroachments of adjoining owners through prescriptive occupation as that their lands acquired for the location thus should be protected.

The fact that the defendant claims a fee in the land by adverse possession and not merely an easement distinguishes the case at bar from Fisher v. N. Y. & New England R. R., 135 Mass. 107,Deerfield v. Connecticut River R. R., 144 Mass. 325, 11 N. E. 105, and kindred cases.

The statute as thus construed does not contravene article 6 of the Declaration of Rights, which prohibits the granting of special privileges to any man, corporation or association of men. The real estate of railroads is in a sense impressed with a public use. Heavy obligations are imposed on them. Their operation to a considerable extent is regulated by public authorities. The real estate of such corporations may in the respect provided by the instant statute be protected against invasion by adverse possession without violation of the fundamental law. Indeed, it has been held by some decisions that, without special exemption, land granted by the government for the location of a railroad is by its very nature exempted from encroachments by adverse possession. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 23 Sup. Ct. 671, 47 L. Ed. 1044, and Northern Pac. Ry. v. Ely, 197 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct. 302, 49 L.Ed. 639.

The constitutionality of the statute has been impliedly recognized in Maney v. Providence & Worcester R. R., 161...