Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Coffin
| Decision Date | 21 June 1890 |
| Citation | 152 Mass. 95,25 N.E. 30 |
| Parties | BOSTON SAFE-DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. v. COFFIN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Solomon Lincoln, for plaintiff.
John E. Farnham, for children of William F. Hastings.
J Willard, for next of kin and heirs.
H.G Nichols, for Coffin and others.
The whole of the testator's estate was devised and bequeathed to three trustees, and the sixth clause of the will of Jared Coffin, the construction of which is sought by the bill in the case at bar, is as follows: In terms, only two events are provided for by which the principal of the one-seventh of the testator's estate, which is the subject of that clause, is disposed of. One is the death of either of his three grandsons, children of his daughter Emeline, leaving issue, in which case the one-third of such portion or seventh is to be divided and distributed "to and among the children of such of them as shall so die, share and share alike, the descendants of any such child or children to take the same share or portion which his, her, or their parents would be entitled to, if living." The other event is the death of all these grandsons without issue. If this had occurred, the one-seventh of the testator's estate held for their benefit was to be held for the benefit of the testator's surviving children or their issue. In the event which actually took place, the death of two of the grandsons leaving no issue, provision was made that the income of their shares should be paid to the survivors or survivor. These payments have actually been made to the surviving grandson, William F. Hastings, as his brothers have respectively deceased. What was to be done with the principal of the two-thirds, to the income of which the other grandsons had been entitled upon the decease of the surviving grandson leaving issue, was not explicitly provided for. The surviving grandson, William F., had now deceased, leaving issue. It is not disputed that his children are entitled to the one-third of the portion of which he originally enjoyed the income, but it is contended, on behalf of the next of kin and the heirs at law of the testator, that the two-thirds, of which he has enjoyed the income since the decease of his brothers, are to be treated as intestate property undisposed of by the will, except so far as the income during the life of the surviving grandson was concerned, and that it is impossible to introduce into the clause a bequest over to the children of the surviving grandson of the principal, of the shares of the brothers of their father.
The general principles which apply to the construction of a clause similar to the one in question are well settled. While care must be taken that courts do not undertake to make wills for testators, and while their meaning is not to be ascertained by mere conjecture as to what they may have intended, the true meaning of words used is to be arrived at by considering them not only in their relation to the clause immediately in question, but to the whole will. Their mere grammatical or ordinary sense is not to be adhered to, if it would be repugnant or inconsistent with the remainder of the instrument. Where there has been a failure also in such a clause to use the technical or positive language appropriate to express a meaning which is evident from the whole will taken together, and where the language for that purpose is defective, the necessary words may be supplied, or words may be transposed to effectuate the obvious intention. Barrus v. Kirkland, 8 Gray, 512; Baxter v Baxter, 122 Mass. 87. The whole of the testator's estate was devised to trustees for the various purposes...
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