Boston Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Boston

• Decision Date: 29 October 1874
• Citation: 116 Mass. 181
• Parties: Boston Seamen's Friend Society v. Mayor and Aldermen of Boston. Children's Mission to the Children of the Destitute v. Aldermen of Boston
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

116 Mass. 181

Boston Seamen's Friend Society v. Mayor and Aldermen of Boston. Children's Mission to the Children of the Destitute v. Aldermen of Boston

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

October 29, 1874

Suffolk.

Writ of certiorari denied.

C. T Russell, for the Boston Seamen's Friend Society.

O. W Holmes, Jr. & R. Gray for the Children's Mission.

J. P Healy, for the defendant.

Devens J. Colt & Endicott, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Devens, J.

The first case arises upon a petition to the Superior Court for a trial by jury upon a certain assessment made upon the estate and lands of the petitioner at the corner of Purchase and Oliver streets in Boston, for a portion of the expense of laying out, widening and grading said Oliver Street, &c., under a resolve of the mayor and aldermen of the city, approved September 6, 1865, under the St. of 1865, c. 159; and the questions reported to this court are:

"1st. Whether, under the provisions of the St. of 1865, c. 159, the petitioner or its estate is liable for or subject to said assessment, or any assessment, for the expense of laying out, widening and grading said streets, and whether said mayor and aldermen had or have any right or authority to lay or collect said assessment, or any assessment, therefor upon the petitioner's estate."

"2d. Whether, in case said petitioner's estate is liable for an assessment, the petitioner or its estate is liable to pay any interest thereon."

That the legislature had the constitutional authority to pass the act under which this petition is brought was fully determined in Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 223. See also Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 75.

Recognizing this as settled, the petitioner, a charitable institution incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth, whose real estate (which at the time of the passage of the St. of 1865, c. 159, had been and still is used by it for the charitable purpose for which it has been incorporated) has been assessed for a portion of the expense of laying out, widening and grading this street, contends that it is improperly assessed, because its property is included in the exemption from taxation contained in the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 5, cl. 3. This clause provides that "the personal property of literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions incorporated within this Commonwealth, and the real estate belonging to such institutions, occupied by them or their officers for the purposes for which they were incorporated," shall be exempted from taxation.

That an assessment of the character of the one in question is a tax, and that it can only be levied under the power of taxation, confided by the Constitution to the legislature, and exercised by the mayor and aldermen by virtue of the authority given in the statute under which they have acted, is decided by the case of Harvard College v. Aldermen of Boston, 104 Mass. 470.

In many instances, the general public may be interested in an improvement of a local character to such an extent that a proportion of the expense should properly be borne by all the citizens and their property, while it is also attended with especial benefit to particular estates or localities. In such cases, it would be competent for the legislature to authorize a certain proportion of the expenditure to be assessed in the general public taxes, and a certain other to be assessed upon the estates in proportion to the benefit they derive from it. And where, as in the present case, in the judgment of the legislature, a work of a public nature should be undertaken, which is so largely in its immediate advantages for the benefit of the estates in a particular district as to render such an adjustment of the expenditure proper, it is competent for it to define the limits of such district and cause to be therein assessed the whole expenditure which may be incurred for the purpose. In the assessment of such expenditure they may adopt as the rule that it shall be assessed upon the estates in proportion to their value, if in their judgment this mode is equitable. Springfield v. Gay, 12 Allen 612.

But, while impositions for the purpose of carrying on the government and meeting those expenditures which properly rest upon the whole people of the Commonwealth, whether levied by the government of the state directly, or through the various municipalities by which it exercises its powers, and those impositions which are made upon property benefited by improvements which, although demanded by public convenience and necessity, are yet undertaken for, or are attended with, especial benefit to particular localities, are alike taxes, the only power to levy which must be derived from the authority of the legislature, they form two quite distinguishable classes.

Is then the exemption of the General Statutes to be construed as an exemption from taxation for the public charges of government; or is it to be construed as extending so as to include assessments for expenditures of a local character, the benefits of which are immediately experienced in the particular localities where property so claimed to be exempt is situated?

In Harvard College v. Aldermen of Boston, supra, which raised the question whether an assessment for a betterment was a tax or civil imposition within the meaning of the very broad clause in the charter of Harvard College, by which its property to a certain value was exempted from all "civil impositions, taxes and rates," it was said that the words thus used in a grant of privileges by the body from whose authority alone taxes, and impositions in the nature of taxes, could be levied, must import a renunciation of the taxing power, "and this not only in the forms and modes already established and in use at the time, but in all forms and modes in which the legislature may from time to time see fit to exercise the power, or authorize it to be exercised, over property within its jurisdiction." But it was also observed that this proposition did not apply to exemptions contained in what are called general tax acts; and the effect of such an exemption on an assessment like that in the case before the court was not necessary to be then considered.

It cannot be denied that it was entirely competent for the legislature to modify or withdraw at any time the exemption given by the General Statutes to particular classes of property, nor could the language of the statute be interpreted as a renunciation of the taxing power in respect to property of such classes. Although the language is general, yet, in our opinion, it was the intent only to exempt property such as that of the petitioner from those public charges which it is the duty of the whole community to sustain, and which are therefore provided for by the general laws relating to taxation.

The exemption is found in the chapter whose object is to set forth all the persons and property subject to taxation, and the mode in which the assessment shall be made for the annual public charges which are incurred by the state, counties and towns; and it neither contains nor alludes to the special modes of assessment which are adopted where a particular district or a particular class of persons is deemed to have received a special benefit from an improvement undertaken as a public one.

From the nature of the case, the acts which provide for such objects are special, and intended for particular places or occasions; and although they have been passed both by the colonial and provincial legislature, as well as since, they have not formed a portion of the general system of taxation, but have been enacted as the exigencies for them have arisen. Dorgan v. Boston, supra.

Nor do the considerations, which may fairly be presumed to have influenced the legislature in relieving the estate of the petitioner from the burden of taxation for the general public purposes, apply with the same force when the inquiry is whether it is to be relieved from taxation for a local improvement.

Institutions like the one before us are intended for the benefit of the general public; and even though devoted to the needs of a particular class, they operate, by taking care of such...