Boston v. Garrison, A-3912

• Decision Date: 11 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. A-3912,A-3912
• Citation: 256 S.W.2d 67,152 Tex. 253
• Parties: BOSTON v. GARRISON et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 67

256 S.W.2d 67

152 Tex. 253

BOSTON v. GARRISON et al.

No. A-3912.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 11, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1953.

Cole, Patterson, Cole & McDaniel, Houston, Bennett B. Patterson, Houston, for appellant.

Price Daniel, formerly Atty. Gen., and J. Milton Richardson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

SMEDLEY, Justice.

This suit was filed in the District Court by appellant Theodore Boston, who had held a chauffeur's license, against the Department of Public Safety of the State, Homer Garrison, Jr., the Director of the Department, and A. F. Temple, Chief of the Drivers License Division. Appellant attacks as unconstitutional on many grounds several sections, particularly Sections 22 to 31, of Article IV of the Drivers License Law, being Chapter 173, Acts Regular Session, 47th Legislature, 1941, p. 245 and following, and appearing in Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes as Article 6687b. The suit as first filed sought to restrain defendants from suspending the plaintiff's license, but before the case came to trial the license expired and the plaintiff by amendment attacked also the Department's action in refusing to renew his license or to issue him a new license, and sought relief from that action. The District Court, after trial without a jury, rendered judgment that Article 6687b of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes is valid and constitutional, that 'the permanent injunction and all other relief sought herein' be denied, and that the plaintiff take nothing by his suit. This appeal is taken from that judgment. The following is a statement of the facts out of which the suit grew, as shown by a stipulation in the transcript, and of the substance of the plaintiff's petition:

On October 3, 1951, the Department issued a chauffeur's license to appellant. According to Section 18, Subdivision (d) of the Act, a chauffeur's license expires one year from the date of its issuance. The Director of the Department on March 18, 1952, summoned appellant to appear before the corporation court of the City of Houston on April 7, 1952. A hearing was had before the judge of that court, and on May 20, 1952, he made an affirmative finding that appellant was a habitual violator of the traffic law and had been responsible for accidents resulting in serious property damage, setting out in the finding a list of twenty-seven violations of the traffic law by appellant from November, 1941, to August, 1951. Pursuant to the report of the finding the Department, on May 26, 1952, made an order suspending appellant's license for a period of six months from May 20, 1952. Appellant on June 11, 1952, filed suit in the County Court at Law of Harris County as an appeal from the order suspending his license. That suit is still pending.

Prior to October 3, 1952, appellant made application to the Department for a renewal of his license and 'attempted to apply in the form and manner required by the statute', and offered to pay a fee of $3 for the renewal. The Department on October 21, 1952, denied the application, stating in its letter to appellant that the application was denied 'due to numerous traffic violations being recorded on your driving record, as in the opinion of the Director your operation of a motor vehicle is inimical to public safety and welfare', and advising appellant that operating a motor vehicle without having a valid driver's license in his possession is a violation of the law. The record does not show that appellant requested an examination or submitted himself for examination when he applied for a renewal of his license, or that the Department waived examination of him. The stipulation contains the statement that the Department made no request that he be examined or re-examined.

On November 8, 1952, appellant, pursuant to Section 31 of the Act, filed suit in the County Court at Law of Harris County appealing from the order of the Department which had denied his application for the renewal of his license. That suit is still pending.

Appellant's trial petition filed in the District Court in this cause alleges somewhat more fully the facts set out above, and it alleges that the order of the Department suspending his license was void and of no effect because several of the sections of the Act pursuant to which the order was made are unconstitutional and void on many grounds set out at length in the petition. The petition alleges that the order of the Department denying appellant's application for renewal of his license was void and of no effect for the same reasons as alleged with respect to the order suspending the license, and further because the order was arbitrary and in violation of due process, and because the sections of the Act under which the order was made are unconstitutional and void on various grounds fully set out.

The greater part of the prayer of the petition has reference to the suspension of appellant's license. It prays that the defendants be permanently enjoined from taking further steps for the suspension of plaintiff's license and permanently enjoined from any action under the statute for the purpose of suspending or attempting to suspend it. With reference to the renewal of petitioner's license the prayer is that the court issue a temporary injunction 'ordering the said defendants to issue a renewal license or a provisional license' to the plaintiff pending the final trial of this cause in the Supreme Court, and pending the disposition of the case which was appealed to the County Court at Law of Harris County; and there is the further prayer that upon the hearing of this cause 'the Court will restrain the said defendants from cancelling plaintiff's license or revoking it or refusing to issue the same to plaintiff', and the further prayer 'that mandatory injunction shall issue requiring the defendants to issue plaintiff's renewal license or provisional license' pending the trial of this cause and pending the trial on the merits of the case appealed to the County Court at Law.

The case in so far as it relates to the order of the Department suspending appellant's license is moot, and was moot when the case was tried in the District Court. Appellant's license was issued October 3, 1951, and since it was issued and could be issued under the Act for a period of only one year, it expired by its own terms on October 3, 1952, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the Department's order made May 26, 1952, suspending the license. Appellant recognized this to be true when, a short time before October 3, 1952, he made application for a new or renewal license.

The appeal taken by appellant on June 11, 1952, to the County Court at Law from the order suspending his license did not have the effect of extending the license beyond the one year for which...