Boswell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 8

• Decision Date: 28 September 1928
• Docket Number: No. 4450.,4450.
• Citation: 10 S.W.2d 665
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: BOSWELL v. CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 8 OF NEWTON COUNTY.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>

10 S.W.2d 665

BOSWELL v. CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. NO. 8 OF NEWTON COUNTY.^*

No. 4450.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

September 28, 1928.

Rehearing Denied November 22, 1928.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Newton County; Charles L. Henson, Judge.

Action by Reta Boswell against the Consolidated School District No. 8 of Newton County. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Leo. H. Johnson and Horace Ruark, both of Neosho, for appellant.

P. H. Graves, of Neosho, for respondent.

COX, P. J.

Action for breach of contract of employment as a public school teacher. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff, and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant appealed.

Plaintiff's alleged employment was by district No. 46, which was afterward merged into consolidated district No. 8; hence the suit is against the consolidated district. The plaintiff filed with the board of directors of school district No. 46 in Newton county an application for employment as teacher in that district, but said application was not produced at the trial, nor its absence accounted for and its contents shown, so we may now say that this application is not before us and cannot be considered by us. The facts which we may consider are substantially as follows:

The board of directors of school district No. 46, under date of April 21, 1927, met and placed of record the following order:

                                           "April 21, 1927
                

"The board of directors met and selected Miss Reta Boswell as teacher for the coming year at $90.00 per month.

                        "[Signed] Fred Pepperdine, Clerk."
                

On April 22, 1927, the president of the board sent to Miss Boswell a postal card as follows:

"This is to notify you that you are elected as teacher of district No. 46 for the coming term at $80.00 per month. [Signed] N. Y. Davis."

The plaintiff in her testimony identified the postal card above as the notice of her election as teacher, which she had received, as shown, the day after it was sent. She then stated: "I then made a written acceptance of the appointment." Mrs. Fred Pepperdine, who had acted as clerk of district No. 46, stated that after the board made the order of April 21, 1927, she received a letter from Miss Boswell, but it was her best impression that she had destroyed that letter. She had made no effort to find it, because she was satisfied she had destroyed it. She was then permitted to testify as to its contents, and stated it as follows:

"That Miss Boswell had a card from the president of our board, Mr. Davis, stating that she had been hired to teach the school and that she would get her contract later."

This statement of the witness as to the contents of the letter seems to be couched in her own language, and gives her conclusions as to the meaning of the letter, rather than the language used in it. No objection was made on that point, however, and it is now well settled that the evidence of a witness stated in the form of conclusions, if not objected to at the time, is not to be ignored, but will stand for what it is worth, and, if sufficient, when given its proper weight, will support a judgment. Hillin v. La Fayette Land & Farming Co. (Mo. App.) 296 S. W. 243, 245, and cases there cited, and Wood v. Consolidated School District (Mo. App.) 7 S. W. (2d) 1018, 1021. What this letter purports to say is that the plaintiff, Miss Boswell, had received notice of her selection by the board as teacher of the school, and she accepted the employment and would attend to the execution of a formal contract later.

On this testimony the trial court held that a valid contract, binding on both the district and the plaintiff in this case, had been executed, and gave a peremptory instruction to the jury to find for plaintiff for $560; that is, for seven months at $80 per month. The appellant contends that a valid and binding contract had not been executed, and hence the court erred in instructing the jury to find for plaintiff. It also claims that, on the same testimony, the court should have directed a verdict for defendant. Technically speaking, the court was in error in directing the jury to find for plaintiff. A contract between a school-teacher and a school district, by which the teacher is employed to teach the school, must be in writing, and the statute (section 11137, Rev. Stat. 1919) prescribes what shall be included in the contract. Section 11138 of the same statute provides that the contract required by section 11137 shall be construed under the general law of contracts. Under these provisions of the statute, it has been held that a binding contract between the school district and a teacher may be made without the formal contract, as required by section 11137, being executed as therein required. Baxter v. School District, 217 Mo. App. 389, 266 S. W. 760; Edwards v. School District (Mo. App.) 297 S. W. 1001.

Had the letter of plaintiff to the school board not been destroyed, but had been produced at the trial, and the court had then had before it the order of the board of April 21, 1927, the postal card notifying plaintiff of her selection as teacher, and the letter of plaintiff accepting the school as tendered to her by the board, so that the evidence of the contract would have been all in writing and before the court, it would have been the duty of the court to have construed the effect of the writings and instructed the jury whether or not a binding contract had been executed. Our view is that, since the letter written by plaintiff was not present in court, and its contents were shown by parol evidence, the question of what were the contents of the letter should have been submitted to the jury, and, had there been any dispute as to the contents of the letter, we should hold that the failure to submit that question to the jury constituted reversible error. There was, however, no contention that the letter was not lost or destroyed, nor that the substance of its contents was not correctly stated by the witness. In view of that situation, we are disposed to hold the error harmless in this case.

Appellant urges that the contract is void for uncertainty, because the length of time or the number of months the plaintiff was to teach the school was not specified in the order of the school...