Botello v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:18-cv-00549,3:18-cv-00549 |
| Parties | ISREAL BOTELLO, Plaintiff, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Isreal Botello, an inmate of the South Central Correctional Facility (SCCF) in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC); TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker; CCA; TTCC Warden Russell Washburn; TTCC Lieutenant John Doe; TTCC Sergeant f/n/u Draper; TTCC STG Coordinator John Doe; TTCC Internal Affairs Investigator John Doe; TTCC Sergeant Martinez; and TTCC Corrections Officer f/n/u Topper, alleging violations of Plaintiff's civil and constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1).
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under the PLRA, the Court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought by a prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from government entities or officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner's conditions of confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), "governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)." Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a plausible claim, "a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ." To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 2, 2017, while an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC), he was charged with an assault on staff member Sergeant f/n/u Draper. Plaintiff believes "he was picked out to be the Hispanic guy who assaulted Sargent [sic] Draper solely because he was Hispanic . . . ." (Doc. No. 1 at 1). After the accusation, Plaintiff was taken to medical, examined, and then taken to "SEG" where Plaintiff alleges he was assaulted by TTCC Lieutenant John Doe in the shower "while Petitioner was waiting to be stripped searched." (Id. at 3). During the assault, Plaintiff alleges that TTCC STG Coordinator John Doe "stood by and watched." (Id.)
Plaintiff was held in segregation for twenty-two days until the investigation was complete. His disciplinary hearing was held on January 24, 2017. The reviewing designated supervisor found that Plaintiff failed to comply with verbal directives but was not involved in physically assaultingSergeant Draper. (Id. at 25). He found Plaintiff guilty of defiance, but not assault on a staff member.
On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to the Morgan County Correctional Complex (MCCC) and placed in "max custody." He remained in max custody for seventeen days until he was transferred to SCCF on February 17, 2017, where Plaintiff now is in custody. Plaintiff believes he was "was mistakenly placed on Maximum Custody, and the fact that [he] was taken off 41 days later should in itself go to prove that it was due to a clerical error." (Id. at 32).
Plaintiff's parole eligibility review date was set for June 2017 but, as a result of the max custody classification, he was told he was no longer eligible to be placed on the parole docket in June 2017. He was told that he had to be "off max custody" for two years before becoming eligible for a parole docket. Because Plaintiff had been "reclassed" from max custody on February 13, 2017, he will not be eligible for a parole docket until after February 14, 2019. Plaintiff believes that he should be eligible for parole sooner because the assault on staff charge against him was dismissed; that charge was responsible for staff changing his classification to "max custody."
Plaintiff filed a grievance on August 8, 2017, "concerning the denial of his parole." He sent a second letter to IPO Kim Jairels on September 6, 2017. Plaintiff sent an information request to IPO on November 3, 2017, concerning his parole. IPO confirmed that max custody status had been removed and placed Plaintiff on the parole hearing docket for February 2018. Plaintiff sent a letter to the Tennessee Board of Parole asking that his hearing be expedited. Plaintiff also filed a request to expedite his hearing, stating that he was not opposed to being deported upon release from confinement. (Id. at 36).
Plaintiff believes the procedure used to test him for drugs was wrongfully administered and that policy was not followed. He believes Defendants drug tested him as retaliation for his complaints and grievances concerning the January 2, 2017 disciplinary event.
The complaint alleges that unspecified Defendants violated Plaintiff's due process rights because Plaintiff was placed in segregation during the investigation of his assault on staff charge, was reclassified as a super max prisoner as a result of the charge and, as a result, is ineligible for parole for another two years.
First, inmates do not have a liberty interest in a particular security classification or in freedom from segregation. Miller v. Campbell, 108 F. Supp.2d 960, 963 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). Second, the Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Court set forth the standard for determining when a prisoner's loss of liberty implicates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 484. According to the Sandin Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when a deprivation "will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence" or will impose an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995).
Confinement in segregation "is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-73 (1983). Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in "extreme circumstances." Joseph v. Curtin, 410 Fed. App'x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and duration of a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an "atypical and significant hardship." Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008).
With regard to the nature of Plaintiff's stay in segregation, other than Plaintiff's singular reference to "deplorable conditions of segregation" (Doc. No. 1 at 4), there are no allegations in the complaint concerning the conditions Plaintiff faced in segregation. In any event, the Constitution does not protect a prisoner from unpleasant prison experiences. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). Nor does the Constitution mandate comfortable conditions of confinement. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S. Ct. 2400, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981). However, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes an obligation to provide prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, recreation, and medical care. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1119-1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). The failure to provide such necessities is a violation of an inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984).
Here, Plaintiff does not claim that h...
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