Grubbs v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 13 August 1982
• Docket Number: 80-3581,No. 80-3404,80-3616 and 80-3617.,80-3404
• Citation: 552 F. Supp. 1052
• Parties: Scotty GRUBBS, Norman Q. Wright, Elbert Thompson, Debra M. Walling and Stanley Scott, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. Harold B. BRADLEY, Lamar Alexander, Robert Morford, Catherine Walton, Dorothy Greer, John Moore, J. Larry Daniels, Marian Hills, Evans Fine, Jamie S. Brodie, Ronald Bishop, Robert Waller, Glenn Rogers, Robert C. McElrath, Robert Childress, Jim Rose, Charles B. Bass, Herman C. Davis, Jimmy M. Harrison, Eileen Radeker, Seth Garrington, Benjamin Jerry Poindexter, Aileen Love, Bobby J. Stephens, Bill McWherter, Otie R. Jones, and Gary Livesay, or their successors in office in their official capacities.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

552 F. Supp. 1052

Scotty GRUBBS, Norman Q. Wright, Elbert Thompson, Debra M. Walling and Stanley Scott, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. Harold B. BRADLEY, Lamar Alexander, Robert Morford, Catherine Walton, Dorothy Greer, John Moore, J. Larry Daniels, Marian Hills, Evans Fine, Jamie S. Brodie,^* Ronald Bishop, Robert Waller, Glenn Rogers, Robert C. McElrath, Robert Childress, Jim Rose, Charles B. Bass, Herman C. Davis, Jimmy M. Harrison, Eileen Radeker, Seth Garrington, Benjamin Jerry Poindexter, Aileen Love, Bobby J. Stephens, Bill McWherter, Otie R. Jones, and Gary Livesay, or their successors in office in their official capacities.

Nos. 80-3404, 80-3581, 80-3616 and 80-3617.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

August 11, 1982.

(As corrected August 13, 1982).

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G. Gordon Bonnyman, Jr., Kathryn F. Calhoon, Drake Holliday, Russell J. Overby, Legal Services of Middle Tennessee, Inc., Frank C. Gorrell, E. Clifton Knowles, R. Dale Grimes, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., David Kozlowski, Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, Inc., Tullahoma, Tenn., Alvin J. Bronstein, Shawn Moore, The National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., Washington, D.C., Lenny L. Croce, Rural Legal Services of Tennessee, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn., Susan Kay Vanderbilt, Legal Aid, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Tenn., Robert B. Littleton, John F. Southworth, Jr., Jennifer Helton Small, John C. Zimmermann, Michael D. Pearigen, Asst. Attys. Gen. of Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MORTON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenges the constitutionality of conditions of confinement in 12 of Tennessee's adult penal institutions. The case originated as several separate pro se prisoner complaints, each of which challenged various related aspects of prison conditions in the state. Having determined that this court's previous, consistently followed practice of abstention in favor of a pending state court action on the same issues was unjustifiable in light of a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Hanna v. Toner, 630 F.2d 442 (6th Cir.1980),¹ the instant cases were consolidated, and because of the seriousness and complexity of the issues raised, attorneys were appointed to represent the plaintiffs. Thereafter, an amended class action complaint was filed, seeking certification as a class of all present and future adult inmates committed to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c), the court entered an order certifying said class.

The amended complaint challenged a wide range of living conditions in Tennessee's prisons, including, inter alia, overcrowding, sanitation, medical care, violence, idleness and the classification system. The plaintiffs have asserted that these and other conditions lead to the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering, and therefore amount to cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947) (case wherein Supreme Court first assumed incorporation of the Eighth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment), and numerous subsequent cases, e.g. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The same conditions are alleged to violate provisions in the Tennessee Constitution as well. See, infra.

Before proceeding further, the court deems it appropriate to digress a bit in order to clarify the record concerning the manner in which the instant action arose, and the reasons why this court is now faced with deciding issues previously litigated in the state courts of Tennessee. See Trigg v. Blanton, No. A-6047 (Dav. Ch. 978), retired on grounds of state abstention, sub nom., Trigg v. Alexander (Tenn. July 2, 1981).

As is the trend in federal courts throughout the nation, this court in recent years has been inundated with complaints filed by state prisoners incarcerated within this district alleging violations on the part of prison authorities of various rights secured by the constitution and laws of the United States. Such complaints are typically filed pro se, and in this court's experience, have often challenged the constitutionality of conditions of confinement within state prisons. In the past, this court has ruled on individual claims concerning prison conditions on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Carroll v. Murray, No. 77-3467, mem. op. (M.D.Tenn.1979).

However, during the pendency of Trigg, supra, a class action very similar to the instant case, this court determined that principles of comity justified a policy of abstention in cases challenging prison conditions, pending a full and complete state court review of the situation. The court therefore developed a "retired docket" whereby cases challenging conditions of confinement in TDOC institutions were filed, so as to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, but were retired pending a final decision in Trigg, with the possibility of later reactivation upon simple motion in order to determine any issues not precluded by the state court judgment. See, e.g., McDonald v. Henderson, No. 77-3242, mem. op. (M.D.Tenn.1977).

Then, in September 1980, the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Hanna, supra, to the effect that abstention is improper in cases challenging institutional violations of constitutional rights prompted the court to reconsider its previous policy. While Hanna is arguably distinguishable from the instant case because of the presence here of potentially dispositive state constitutional claims, the court concluded that the likelihood of a state court decision that would preclude or alter consideration of the federal constitutional issues was at best slim,² and would not justify contravention of the clear language of Hanna. See Dixion v. Bradley, Nos. 80-3578 et al., mem. op. (M.D.Tenn. June 2, 1981).³

Nevertheless, the court remained hopeful that there would ultimately be no need for substantial federal court intervention, since the Trigg case, dealing with many of the same issues as the case sub judice, was then on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and any final decision by the state courts would be entitled to full faith and credit here. Thus, if the instant action would not have been entirely foreclosed by res judicata, certainly many issues would have been subject to collateral estoppel in the event of a final state court decision.

Unfortunately, there has been no final state court decision. On July 2, 1981, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in a decision that so far as this court is aware is wholly unprecedented in the annals of our federal system, ordered abstention by the state courts pending federal resolution of the present case. Without considering whether such action may have amounted to an abdication of the duties assigned to state courts by the Constitution and laws of Tennessee, the effect of the decision is clear: The task of resolving the serious and politically sensitive constitutional claims raised by inmates incarcerated by the State of Tennessee has been passed to the federal courts. It is a task which this court does not take lightly, in part because of a natural reluctance to interfere with the State's administration of its own prison system. Yet, to shrink from decision would be in contravention of the clear policy statement in Hanna that, where institutional violations of federal constitutional rights are concerned, federal courts must act to hear those claims. 630 F.2d at 444, citing, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-08, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1978). That the state courts have chosen to sit and wait for a federal decision is simply an unfortunate curiosity, a decision which this court assumes will remain an aberration and not evolve into a new policy of state abstention.

Trial of this cause was held on November 23-25 and December 7, 1981. At the conclusion of trial, some 20,000 to 30,000 pages of evidentiary material, including a plethora of detailed documents, reports, responses to discovery, depositions and other material considered by one or both parties to be relevant was filed and submitted for the court's consideration. Objections to the introduction of particular exhibits were raised by the defendants. Those objections, along with the merits of the case itself, were taken under advisement by the court.⁴

Consideration of the issues properly before the court necessitates a detailed inquiry into specific conditions at each of the individual institutions encompassed by this litigation. In order to place the institutional conditions in their proper perspective, the court will first explore the TDOC system: Its organization of personnel and responsibilities, and the division of functions between the Department and the individual institutions.

II. THE TDOC SYSTEM

A. General Overview

At the head of TDOC is the Commissioner of Correction, a post presently held by defendant Harold B. Bradley, an individual whose competence, dedication and professional credentials are beyond reproach. The department's number two administrator is Deputy Commissioner Robert Morford, who, along with Commissioner Bradley, oversees all TDOC functions. Reporting directly to the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner are an assistant commissioner of community relations, the staff attorney, the director of internal affairs and the director of medical services. Those persons administer TDOC functions that, for one reason or another are not assigned to any of the five major divisions of the department.

The Division of Adult Services is headed by...