Bottinelli v. Salazar
| Decision Date | 15 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-35201,19-35201 |
| Parties | Darren BOTTINELLI; Pamela Marie McGowan; Timothy Lashawn Allen; Ricardo Cesar Ramirez; Juan Jesus Borrego; Michael Eugene Davis; Mark Nutter ; Alex Durand Williams-Davis, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Josias SALAZAR; William Brown, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Stephen R. Sady (argued), Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender; Elizabeth G. Daily, Assistant Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Portland, Oregon; for Petitioners-Appellants.
Jared D. Hager (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney, District of Oregon; Kelly A. Zusman, Appellate Chief; United States Attorney’s Office, Portland, Oregon; for Respondents-Appellees.
Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Susan P. Graber, and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.
Darren Bottinelli and seven other federal prisoners ("Petitioners") appeal from the district court’s denial of their joint petition for a writ of habeas corpus. They argue that the recently enacted First Step Act’s amendment to the good time credit provision requires the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to re-calculate their sentences immediately, which would accelerate their dates for release or transfer to prerelease custody. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
A federal prisoner who is serving more than a one-year term of imprisonment may earn good time credit toward his or her sentence so long as the prisoner "display[s] exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations." 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Section 3624(b) controls how the BOP calculates good time credit. Until recently, although the statute provided that prisoners could earn "up to 54 days" each year for exemplary compliance, the BOP used a calculation that allowed a maximum of only 47 days. See Barber v. Thomas , 560 U.S. 474, 476-79, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (discussing § 3624(b)(1) ). Courts, including ours, upheld this 47-day calculation. See id . at 492, 130 S.Ct. 2499 ; Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood , 272 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001).
On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, was enacted. The Act implemented a number of prison and sentencing reforms. We limit our focus to subsection 102(b), which made two amendments relevant to this appeal.
First, paragraph 102(b)(1) amends § 3624(b) – the good time credit provision – to require the BOP to permit up to 54 days per year. § 102(b), 132 Stat. at 5210. Second, paragraph 102(b)(1) amends § 3624 by adding subsection (g), which is relevant to the Act’s creation of an earned time credit system.1 Id. at 5210-13. The Act requires that, within 210 days of its enactment, the Attorney General establish a "risk and needs assessment system" to, broadly speaking, review each prisoner’s recidivism risk level, award earned time credit as an incentive for participation in recidivism reduction programming, and "determine when a prisoner is ready to transfer into prerelease custody or supervised release in accordance with section 3624." § 101(a), 132 Stat. at 5196-97. Section 3624(g) details the criteria for when a prisoner becomes eligible, considering earned time credit, for transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release. § 102(b), 132 Stat. at 5210-13.
Subsection 102(b) also includes an effective-date provision in paragraph 102(b)(2), and a retroactivity provision in paragraph 102(b)(3).
The parties agree that the Act now provides federal prisoners the possibility of seven additional days of good time credit per year. They disagree, however, as to when that amendment takes effect. Petitioners argue that the amendment took effect upon the Act’s enactment on December 21, 2018, and, therefore, that they are entitled to the immediate recalculation of their good time credit. But the BOP contends that the amendment does not take effect until July 19, 2019 – the date by which the Attorney General must establish "the risk and needs assessment system."
The district court agreed with the BOP. It held that the Act’s text clearly links the good time credit amendment’s effective date to the creation of "the risk and needs assessment system." Accordingly, the court explained that it "cannot, as Petitioners invite [it] to do, ignore Section 102(b)(2)’s express and unambiguous text and conclude that, despite what it clearly said, Congress really intended the ‘good time fix’ to be effective immediately."2
We review de novo the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, Stephens v. Herrera , 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006), and questions of statutory interpretation, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom , 919 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019).
The single issue before us is when the Act’s good time credit amendment takes effect. As a general rule, a statute takes effect upon its enactment unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States , 498 U.S. 395, 404, 111 S.Ct. 840, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). "When interpreting a statute, we are guided by the fundamental canons of statutory construction and begin with the statutory text." United States v. Neal , 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015). Whether the statutory text has a "plain and unambiguous meaning" depends on "the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." United States v. Youssef , 547 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ).
We agree with the district court’s reading of the Act. Congress provided "clear direction" in paragraph 102(b)(2) to delay the implementation of the good time credit amendment until the Attorney General establishes the "risk and needs assessment system." Gozlon-Peretz , 498 U.S. at 404, 111 S.Ct. 840. Like the district court, we refuse to overlook the Act’s plain text and therefore affirm the denial of the joint habeas petition.
Our analysis can begin and end with paragraph 102(b)(2)’s text. First, paragraph 102(b)(2)’s title – " EFFECTIVE DATE " – leaves no doubt about its purpose. § 102(b), 132 Stat. at 5213. Second, paragraph 102(b)(2)’s text unambiguously applies to the entire subsection. Its subject – "[t]he amendments made by this subsection" – refers to "amendments" in the plural without any qualifications. Id. Subsection 102(b) makes only two amendments: the good time credit amendment and the addition of § 3624(g). Id. at 5210-13. Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that paragraph 102(b)(2) must apply to both amendments made in paragraph 102(b)(1). Third, paragraph 102(b)(2)’s text is straightforward as to when these amendments become operative: "The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect beginning on the date that the Attorney General completes and releases the risk and needs assessment system ... as added by section 101(a) of this Act." Id. at 5213 (emphasis added). In addition to the mandatory language – "shall take effect" – paragraph 102(b)(2) plainly ties the amendments’ effectivity to the date that the "risk and needs assessment system" is established. Although no specific date is provided, the text refers directly to "section 101(a) of this Act," which requires the Attorney General to establish the "risk and needs assessment system" within 210 days of enactment, thus no later than July 19, 2019. § 101(a), 132 Stat. at 5196.
Conceding that paragraph 102(b)(2)’s text is difficult to overcome, Petitioners argue that "the full statutory context" requires reading paragraph 102(b)(2) so that it does not apply to the good time credit amendment. They contend that "this subsection" in paragraph 102(b)(2) refers only to paragraph 102(b)(1)’s addition of § 3624(g) because just that amendment is related to the newly created "risk and needs assessment system."
We reject this narrow reading of "this subsection." Interpreting paragraph 102(b)(2) to apply only to the addition of § 3624(g) is unnatural. This proposed interpretation also asks us to ignore how "this subsection" is used elsewhere. See Barber , 560 U.S. at 483-84, 130 S.Ct. 2499 (). For instance, paragraph 102(b)(3) uses "this subsection" to give both of paragraph 102(b)(1)’s amendments retroactive effect:
§ 102(b), 132 Stat. at 5208, 5210, 5213. As in paragraph 102(b)(2), the subject of paragraph 102(b)(3) – "[t]he amendments made by this subsection" – refers to more than a single amendment and contains no qualifier to limit its application to only the addition of § 3624(g). Id. Notably, Petitioners do not advocate for a narrow interpretation of "this subsection" in ...
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