Boudreau v. Maryland Casualty Co.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1934
• Citation: 287 Mass. 423
• Parties: ARTHUR C. BOUDREAU v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY. IRENE M. GIRARDIN v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

287 Mass. 423

ARTHUR C. BOUDREAU v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY. IRENE M. GIRARDIN v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

September 10, 1934

September 25, 1933.

Present: CROSBY PIERCE, FIELD, & DONAHUE, JJ.

Insurance, Motor vehicle liability. Bailment.

In a suit in equity under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 3 (10), to reach and apply the obligation of an insurance company under a policy of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance to the satisfaction of a judgment for personal injuries obtained by the plaintiff, it appeared that the owner of the automobile covered by the policy gave the use of it to his son and to the judgment debtor on a certain occasion, but instructed the judgment debtor not to permit the son to operate it and that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from operation of the automobile by the son, who had been requested to operate it by the judgment debtor. A decree in the plaintiff's favor was entered. Held, that

(1) Although the owner of the automobile gave the use of it to both the son and the judgment debtor, its operation was entrusted to the judgment debtor alone, and he was the bailee thereof;

(2) At the time when the plaintiff's injuries occurred, the judgment debtor was a "person responsible for the operation of" the automobile "with . . . [the owner's] . . consent" within the meaning of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c 90, Section 34A, and the corresponding provisions of the policy; his failure to observe the terms of the bailment, by disobeying the owner's instructions not to permit the son to operate the automobile, was immaterial;

(3) The decree was proper.

TWO BILLS IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on November 30, 1932, described in the opinion.

The suits were heard together by Dillon, J. Material facts, and final decrees entered by order of the judge, are described in the opinion. The defendant appealed from each decree.

A. Donahue, for the defendant. E. A. O'Rourke, for the plaintiffs.

DONAHUE, J. The plaintiff in each case has recovered a judgment against one Dwyer; in the first case for personal injuries and property damage and in the second for personal injuries alone resulting from a collision of an automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding and an automobile owned by Blanche L Kelley, who, on the evening when the collision occurred, had given the use of her automobile to Dwyer and her son. In giving permission to use her automobile she instructed Dwyer, who was licensed to operate motor vehicles, not to permit her son, who was a minor and had no license, to operate the automobile. However, at the time of the collision her son at the request of Dwyer was operating the automobile and Dwyer was riding on the rear seat. The plaintiffs have brought bills in equity under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 3 (10), whereby they seek to have the obligation of the defendant under an insurance policy issued to the owner applied to their judgment debts against Dwyer. A final decree entered in the first case ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff therein the amount recovered for personal injuries with interest. It did not include the amount of property damage suffered by the plaintiff. In the second case the final decree ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of her judgment against Dwyer with interest and costs, that judgment...